http://www.tobacco.org/newsfeed/category/labels.rss Latest top tobacco news headlines en-us http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/PDFforevercool/$FILE/forevercool.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/268342.html The ban on tobacco advertising in the UK has greatly restricted the more traditional forms of marketing (eg billboards); however, ubiquitous distribution, increasingly elaborate point- of-sale displays, attractive pack liveries and evocative brand imagery continue to provide key marketing opportunities that influence young people. These sources of pro-smoking imagery are not isolated phenomena; they are intimately linked to society’s ambivalent relationship with tobacco and the fact that over a fifth of the population continue to smoke. Reducing the prevalence of tobacco use remains a key public health priority. As the leading professional organisation representing doctors in the UK, the BMA aims to promote the development and implementation of comprehensive tobacco control policies. This report considers the effect of smoking imagery on young people. It begins by examining trends in smoking prevalence and initiation, and goes on to review the different forms of pro-smoking imagery and the evidence for how they can affect behaviours and attitudes among young people. It concludes by exploring effective ways of reducing young people’s exposure to positive images of smoking – and increasing their exposure to positive images of health. . . . At an international level, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) has done precisely this by defining tobacco advertising and promotion as ‘any form of commercial communication, recommendation or action with the aim, effect or likely effect of promoting a tobacco product or tobacco use either directly or indirectly‘.182 In particular the word ‘action’ takes the focus way beyond advertising and overt communication efforts. Ultimately young people will only be truly protected from the promotion of tobacco when tobacco companies cease to exist. British Medical Association Sun, 06 Jul 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.bma.org.uk/pressrel.nsf/wlu/SGOY-7G8F27?OpenDocument&vw=wfmms http://tobacco.org/news/268341.html A new BMA report1 launched today (Sunday 6 July 2008) calls on the UK Governments to introduce a range of tough measures aimed at reducing young people's exposure to positive images of smoking. The proposals include calling on film censors to take pro-smoking content into account when classifying films and introducing laws so that all films and TV programmes which portray positive images of smoking are preceded by an anti-smoking advert. In its report, 'Forever Cool', the BMA challenges the UK Governments to demonstrate their commitment to protecting children's health by introducing policies that will help reduce smoking prevalence with the aim of making the UK tobacco-free by 2035. . . . "Young people are surrounded by positive images of tobacco - from smoking by parents and peers, to celebrities and role models they see in the media. They are also exposed to robust tobacco industry marketing - all this serves to reinforce the habit as being 'forever cool'. The BMA report shows that despite some of the most restrictive tobacco legislation in the world, young people in the UK are still exposed to creative marketing strategies such as elaborate point-of-sale displays, attractive pack designs and evocative brand imagery. There is also very little regulation of the internet which is commonly used by young people. . . . British Medical Association UK Sun, 06 Jul 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=0e46feef-aef1-4372-b7ca-9b76faadc750 http://tobacco.org/news/268263.html Graphic health warnings on cigarette packages are failing to move the majority of smokers to quit, a new government survey has found. Over the last five years, the percentage of smokers who say the warnings are ineffective at getting them to try to kick the habit has increased, according to the newly released Health Canada poll. More than half - 57 per cent - say they are unmoved by these graphic warnings, up five points from five years earlier. Among potential quitters - smokers who are seriously thinking of quitting - the percentage who characterize the campaign as not very effective or not at all effective in getting them to try to quit has also increased in this period, to 43 per cent from 40 per cent. CanWest News Services hayden@aviarts.com (Sarah Schmidt , Canwest News Service ) Canada Fri, 04 Jul 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://news.iafrica.com/sa/961567.htm http://tobacco.org/news/267776.html The National Assembly on Thursday approved the Tobacco Products Control Amendment Bill designed to tighten cigarette regulations. The step, supported by all political parties, will prohibit the sale of tobacco products in health and education institutions, increase the legal age for buying tobacco from 16 to 18, and restrict the sale of tobacco products from vending machines. It will make advertising, promotion and sponsorships by tobacco industries illegal unless they are made anonymously. The legislation will force manufacturers to display ghastly images of people suffering from smoking-related diseases to create public awareness on the dangers of smoking. iafrica.com news@metropolis.co.za South Africa Fri, 27 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/080626/romania_anti_smoking_campaign.html?.v=1 http://tobacco.org/news/267669.html The Romanian Health Ministry says it is launching a campaign to dissuade people from smoking by placing graphic photographs on cigarette cartons. The ministry says the anti-smoking campaign starting July 1 will include 14 images showing how cigarettes can harm the health of smokers as well as their children. AP Romania Thu, 26 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1964/jun/25/cigarettes.cancer http://tobacco.org/news/267604.html * Thursday June 25, 1964 The Federal Trade Commission today announced its decision to require all tobacco companies to indicate on cigarette packages and in their advertising the health hazard in cigarette smoking. There is considerable doubt whether the commission has the power to impose such rules without new legislation. Indeed, that seems to be the position of the Administration itself. Several members of the House Commerce Committee clearly indicated today that they too believe this to be the case. The Guardian reader@guardian.co.uk Thu, 26 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-562_RespondentAmCuConLawAdminLawScholars.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/267478.html Current constitutional doctrine affords Congress broad authority to preempt state law. If meaningful balance in our federal system is to be preserved, the courts must not overread the preemptive scope of the legislation that Congress enacts. It is for Congress, not the federal courts, to expand the preemptive force of federal regulation into areas of health and safety regulation that have long been subjects of state authority. And courts must be particularly careful not to accord preemptive force to action by federal agencies-which elude both the political and procedural safeguards of federalismexcept when such agencies are either interpreting Congress's statutes or acting within clear delegations of authority to act with the force of law. In this case, these principles require Respondents' state law claims to go forward. ABA Journal Mon, 23 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-562_RespondentAmCuMDConsumerRightsCoalition.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/267477.html SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . A plurality of this Court made clear in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. that a claim of fraud or misrepresentation premised on a cigarette manufacturer’s duty not to deceive consumers is not preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”). Cipollone held that while some state law claims alleging deception in the advertising and promotion of cigarettes are preempted by the FCLAA, some claims are not preempted. The critical factor in determining whether a claim is preempted is the predicate duty upon which a claim is based. Causes of action that allege warning neutralization or constitute failure to warn are preempted; those that are based on the cigarette manufacturer’s duty not to deceive are not preempted. Based on the MUTPA’s imposition of a general duty to not deceive on all commercial actors in Maine, Good’s claims are not preempted by the FCLAA. To construe the FCLAA or Cipollone in any other manner would result in immunity for cigarette manufacturers to deceive consumers on matters that concern smoking and health. Given the explicit documentation of PMUSA’s deception in the advertising and promotion of its light and low tar and nicotine cigarettes, allowing Good to pursue her consumer fraud claims will result in an equitable and legally sound outcome. ABA Journal Wed, 18 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-562_RespondentAmCuTCLCAARPPubJustice.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/267476.html SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Amici file this brief to emphasize a point that may not stand out in respondents’ more comprehensive treatment of the issues before the Court — namely, that there is no hint in either the Labeling Act or in the FTC’s on-again, off-again actions regarding disclosure of cigarettes’ tar and nicotine content that Congress or the FTC intended to “insulate [cigarette] manufacturers from longstanding rules governing fraud.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29. Make no mistake, this case is about fraud. As the United States argued in its civil racketeering action against Philip Morris and other cigarette companies, “marketing of ‘light’ cigarettes is a principal weapon in their attempts to mislead the public regarding the health risks of smoking.” Brief for the United States in United States v. Philip Morris, et al., No. 06-5267, et al., at 146 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 19, 2007). The question in this case is whether petitioners are shielded from state anti-fraud litigation because Congress or the FTC preempted fraud claims arising from statements made to deceive smokers that “light” cigarettes are less deadly than regular cigarettes. The answer to that question is “no.” To be sure, this Court in Cipollone held that the Labeling Act preempts state law claims that would require cigarette companies to add or modify the warnings prescribed by Congress. But Cipollone also held that the Labeling Act does not preempt claims arising from false statements made in advertising, press statements, government submissions and other channels of communication, where the claim is based on the duty not to deceive. 505 U.S. at 528, 529 (plurality). Thus, allegations that a cigarette company deliberately misrepresented and concealed material facts in violation of a state anti-fraud statute — the precise allegations at issue here — are not preempted. Id. As the plurality saw it, Congress did not intend the Labeling Act “to insulate cigarette manufacturers from longstanding rules governing fraud.” Id. Such claims are not predicated on a duty “based on smoking and health,” but on a general duty imposed by state law — i.e., the duty not to deceive. Id. at 528-89. Petitioners’ theory should be rejected because it would, contrary to Congress’ intent, effectively insulate cigarette manufacturers from rules governing fraud, no matter how egregious the manufacturers’ false statements or fraudulent concealment. Equally insubstantial is petitioners’ argument that the FTC “authorized” tobacco companies to use “Light” as a product descriptor (Marlboro Lights), and that permitting respondents’ claims to go forward “would impede the FTC’s low-tar policy.” Br. at 46. The signal defect in petitioners’ argument is that the FTC itself disclaims the existence of any authorization or policy, let alone a policy that justifies ousting longstanding state anti-fraud laws. Even Philip Morris has acknowledged elsewhere that there is no such policy. In 2002, Philip Morris filed a petition with the FTC urging the agency “to promulgate rules governing . . . the use of descriptors such as ‘light’ and ‘ultra light.’” See Good, 501 F.3d at 56 n.29. Philip Morris’ petition, of course, would have been superfluous had the FTC previously “authorized” the use of these descriptors. Just as fundamentally, the hodge-podge of FTC actions cited by the Philip Morris as evidence of a federal policy on light cigarettes could not have the sweeping preemptive effect it claims. Because the FTC’s mission of protecting consumers against unfair and deceptive advertising practice overlaps with state law, Congress established regulatory procedures for the FTC to follow when it intends to take preemptive action. See, e.g., American Financial Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The FTC did not avail itself of those procedures here, which further confirms the FTC’s position that it did not act to preempt state law. For these reasons as well, petitioners’ implied preemption argument should be rejected. The Labeling 4 Act’s preemption provision states that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Those provisions require that packages of cigarettes and their advertisements bear one of a rotating series of warnings about the adverse health effects of smoking. Id. § 1333(a), (c). The Act also provides that no additional “statement relating to smoking and health . . . shall be required on any cigarette package.” Id. § 1334(a). ABA Journal Wed, 18 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-562_RespondentAmCu48States.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/267464.html QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempts state-law claims that a cigarette company violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act by falsely representing its “light” cigarettes to the public when the predicate state-law duty of such claims is the duty not to deceive. 2. Whether such claims are impliedly preempted where the FTC has never exercised its rulemaking power to address the conduct at issue nor defined the terms at issue in this dispute. . . . SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This case presents the questions whether the FCLAA or the actions of the FTC preempt state-law deception claims arising out of Petitioners’ practices with respect to “low tar and nicotine” and “light” cigarettes. Neither the FCLAA nor the actions of the FTC license Petitioners to deceive consumers in violation of state law. Immunizing Petitioners from the consequences of the alleged wrongful conduct is not a result that should be presumed without clear language and intent, neither of which is present here. 1. In Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), the Court held that the FCLAA does not preempt claims resting upon false representation of a material fact or concealment of a material fact by tobacco companies where such claims are founded upon a general duty under state law not to deceive. The suit at issue here brings precisely such claims. It seeks economic, not personal injury, damages, under Maine’s general prohibition against any “material representation, omission, act or practice that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207 (Supp. 2007). Because the lawsuit before the Court is predicated upon a general statutory prohibition against deception (that the manufacturers made false statements and concealed information regarding “light” cigarettes), under Cipollone it is not preempted. To find otherwise would disrupt and do serious harm to the sovereigns’ complementary efforts to protect consumers, which would have adverse implications beyond the “light” cigarettes dispute before the Court here. State law suits pursuant to state unfair practices and consumer protection statutes combating deceptive practices are a critical complement to the administrative and prosecutorial efforts of the FTC. In fact, recognizing that it cannot combat consumer fraud on its own, FTC regulations direct the agency “to assist and cooperate” with state consumer protection efforts. One common outgrowth of that cooperation is that the FTC and the States often target the same wrongdoers, which sometimes results in separate settlements that provide different forms of relief. There is no exception in this complementary regulatory scheme for fraud or deception by cigarette manufacturers. Indeed, the FTC acknowledges the States’ vital part in prohibiting deception by tobacco companies. 2. Petitioners’ arguments that the FTC has somehow impliedly preempted the state-law claims are patently incorrect. Nothing in the text, structure, or regulatory history of the FTC Act or in the actions of the FTC relating to “light” cigarettes supports implied preemption. Petitioners are not claiming that the FTC Act itself imposes requirements on tobacco companies that conflict with state law. Nor could they, given that the FTC Act lacks an express preemption provision and instead contains a broad saving clause protecting state remedies and causes of action. In addition, Congress imposed heightened requirements for FTC rulemaking, and the FTC’s procedural rules require that it explain the impact of any of its rules on state law. And petitioners do not assert that the FTC has promulgated specific rules that preempt state-law actions with respect to “low tar” and “light” cigarettes. Rather, Petitioners’ implied preemption claim is based on their assertion that the FTC has blessed tobacco companies’ “light” cigarette advertisements through a history of less formal actions, such as consent decrees reached with individual companies. But neither the consent decrees nor the other actions relied upon by Petitioners mandated or approved Petitioners’ “light” and “low tar” advertisements. Moreover, in none of those actions did the FTC ever suggest that State consumer protection laws present an obstacle to, or are preempted by, some sort of FTC policy. Indeed, the FTC has eschewed any suggestion that its actions have resolved the issue of tobacco companies’ deceptive practices regarding “low tar” cigarettes. . . . * * * The common purpose of the FTC Act and State unfair trade practices and consumer protection acts, such as Maine’s, is to protect consumers from deceptive practices. The FTC has been most sensitive to this relationship, as have the courts. Finding preemption here would run counter to how the FTC and the States have worked cooperatively together, and would do serious harm to that relationship and to the protections afforded consumers through their efforts. The particular claims of deception here fall squarely within those permitted under Cipollone, and the FTC has not established a cohesive policy impliedly preempting the States with respect to deceitful conduct by tobacco companies regarding “low tar” and “light” cigarettes. For these reasons, the Court should find that the state-law claims before it are not preempted. ABA Journal Wed, 18 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-562_RespondentAmCu5Profs.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/267463.html CONCLUSION Philip Morris voluntarily markets Cambridge Light cigarettes and Marlboro Lights as “light” or “lowered in tar and nicotine” without FTC control or direction. Thus, Respondents’ claims are not impliedly preempted. For these reasons, and because Respondents’ claims are not expressly preempted under the FCLAA, as discussed in Respondents’ brief, this Court should affirm the First Circuit’s decision. ABA Journal Wed, 18 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-562_RespondentAmCuFmrFTCCommissioners.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/267462.html CONCLUSION The FTC’s primary mission as a law enforcement agency is to enforce the FTC Act’s Section 5 prohibition against unfair or deceptive conduct in commerce, rather than to give broad immunity to an industry from state police power. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations … from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”); Fleming v. FTC, 670 F.2d 311, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Commission’s mandate is “to ferret out any unfair competition and unfair or deceptive trade acts or practices in or affecting commerce” ). Nothing in the FTC’s regulatory history suggests an intent to authorize, encourage, or immunize Petitioners’ use of lights descriptors. The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. ABA Journal Wed, 18 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-562_RespondentAmCuUSA.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/267460.html BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS WILLIAM BLUMENTHAL General Counsel Federal Trade Commission Washington, D.C. 20580 GREGORY G. GARRE Acting Solicitor General Counsel of Record EDWIN S. KNEEDLER Deputy Solicitor General MICHAEL F. HERTZ Deputy Assistant Attorney General DOUGLAS HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER Assistant to the Solicitor General MARK B. STERN ALISA B. KLEIN Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 (202) 514-2217 (I) QUESTION PRESENTED The Federal Trade Commission has authority to prevent “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2), and the Federal Trade Commission Act expressly provides that its remedies “are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law,” 15 U.S.C. 57b(e). The United States will address the following question: Whether guidance statements and consent orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission impliedly preempt a state-law tort claim based on a cigarette manufacturer’s allegedly fraudulent use of the descriptors “Light” and “Lowered Tar and Nicotine” to characterize its cigarettes when the manufacturer allegedly knew that the cigarettes, as smoked by a human smoker, would deliver as much tar and nicotine as so-called “full flavor” cigarettes. . . . 3. Petitioner failed for decades to disclose to the FTC its internal research indicating that, due to compensatory behaviors, smokers receive as much tar from cigarettes with lower Cambridge Method ratings than so-called “full-flavor” cigarettes. After hiding its own research for years, despite the Commission’s requests for information in light of growing concerns about compensation, petitioner now claims that the FTC has known about compensation for years and affirmatively decided that it does not warrant any change in the Cambridge Method. In fact, the absence of definitive action on that question to date reflects only the Commission’s ongoing consideration of the issue. Its inaction (particularly insofar as it is based on petitioner’s own failure to provide information to the FTC) does not constitute even a definitive interpretation of the federal Act, much less one that would bar application of state law. ARGUMENT RESPONDENTS’ CLAIMS ARE NOT IMPLIEDLY PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S ACTIONS CONCERNING CIGARETTE ADVERTISING ABA Journal Mon, 23 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121417791175695515.html?mod=rss_whats_news_us http://tobacco.org/news/267459.html The Federal Trade Commission is asking the Supreme Court to reject an Altria Group Inc. argument that only that agency can regulate cigarette advertising, saying such an interpretation mischaracterizes the FTC's "scope and effect" on the issue. The tobacco industry is trying to head off a wave of state-based challenges regarding the cigarettes, even as it appeals a federal judge's order to stop marketing cigarettes as "low tar," "light," "ultralight" or "mild" because they mislead consumers. . . . In its amicus brief, the FTC said nothing Altria is arguing regarding cigarette marketing "pre-empts state lawsuits such as this." The suit alleges cigarettes deemed "light" with lower tar and nicotine content than other cigarette products by their makers were being deceptive. The FTC also noted that given the breadth of its responsibilities, the commission alone shouldn't be responsible for "policing the cigarette industry's marketing practices." Unlike the Food and Drug Administration, which has a mandate to evaluate medical devices for safety, the FTC said it doesn't have the resources to oversee all relevant practices of the cigarette industry. The commission further added that it is "a law enforcement agency composed of attorneys and economists, not a scientific body." The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition Mon, 23 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-562_ReversalAmCuNAM.pdf http://tobacco.org/news/267414.html SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The authority vested in the Federal Trade Commission and the extensive exercise of that authority in this industry preempt the state law deceptive trade practices claims before the Court. Federal agencies have the power to preempt state law by a variety of means; no formally promulgated rule is required. As a state law tort claim cannot survive federal preemption where it frustrates the purposes and objectives of federal law, the enforcement of state law deceptive trade practices statutes must yield not only to federal statutes and formally promulgated regulations, but also to less formal regulatory guidance, such as policy statements, enforcement actions, and consent orders, where the application of those state statutes would conflict with such regulatory guidance. Were it otherwise, federal objectives would be subordinated to varying and competing state interests—precisely the result that the Supremacy Clause should prevent. Born of a national mandate and the product of a singular moment in the regulatory history of our nation, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) was created to provide prospective guidance to businesses in any number of ways. FTC guidance beyond that set forth in formally promulgated rules thus is of exceptionally strong preemptive force. In passing the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 41, et seq. (“FTC Act”), Congress assembled a federal body of experts that would have the flexibility to provide prospective guidance to American businesses. Congress amended the FTC Act in 1938 to empower the FTC to forestall deceptive acts and practices, and again in 1975 to increase its enforcement authority while simultaneously imposing more demanding rulemaking procedures than those applicable to other federal agencies under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. (“APA”). Despite making the procedures for promulgating trade regulation rules more burdensome to the FTC, Congress, at the same time, expressly preserved the authority of the FTC to provide regulatory guidance on deception in the marketplace other than by way of formal rule. Empowered with the express statutory authority to issue guidance on what is (and what is not) deceptive, the Commission has defined the meaning of deception under the FTC Act not in a formally promulgated rule, but, rather, in a policy statement. Given the FTC’s historical mandate and statutory authority, the preemptive effect of FTC regulation does not depend upon the form that the regulation takes. The Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq., at once reflects a desire to subject this industry to a single, uniform set of federal standards in order to provide consistency in the marketplace and leaves the FTC with the authority to further that goal. As contemplated by the Act, the FTC provides the expertise to ensure that the purposes and objectives of the Act are fulfilled. In keeping with its crucial role as an expert and advisory body in the area of advertising and labeling, the FTC has guided this industry and maintained uniformity and consistency through a variety of means. Taken together, the Labeling Act and FTC regulation preempt state law causes of action that would intrude upon the FTC’s ability to police this industry as it sees fit. Allowing the state law claims pressed here to countermand the FTC’s guidance would place in the hands of generalist judges and jurors what Congress has intended be placed within the hands of an expert federal agency. The Commission’s focus has been trained on this industry continually since the early days of its existence, and it has accepted that which is challenged here. The substance and the manner of the Commission’s regulation of this industry cannot lightly be set aside. While the national interests at stake are substantial, the parochial interests advanced are modest. Private enforcement of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 ME. REV. STAT. § 205, et seq. (“MUTPA”), furthers no “traditional police power” that would save it from preemption; the act is entirely derivative of the FTC Act. Indeed, the FTC has been regulating this industry far longer than MUTPA has been in effect, as it was only enacted in 1969. The deceptive trade practices claim before the Court is not one that would supplement an otherwise consistent federal enforcement regime. Rather, it would be wholly at odds with federal law and, therefore, is far less deserving of preservation than were it otherwise. The FTC is empowered to police and punish practices that might violate its guidance; private enforcement is neither warranted, nor needed. ABA Journal Mon, 07 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT