IN RE: LIGHT CIGARETTES MARKETING SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION
Jump to full article: United States District Court - District of Maine, 2010-03-05
Intro: Judge Kessler‟s exhaustive August 17, 2006 ruling contains thousands of factual findings against the tobacco company defendants and in this ensuing multi-district litigation, individual smokers, who claim harm from smoking light cigarettes, are anxious to avoid proving before this Court what the United States so painstakingly proved to Judge Kessler. Relying on the doctrine of issue preclusion, they ask this Court to hold that Philip Morris USA, Inc. (PM) and its corporate parent Altria, Inc. (Altria) are bound by Judge Kessler‟s factual findings. From the standpoint of judicial efficiency, the Plaintiffs‟ argument has an undeniable attractiveness. However, upon analysis, the Court concludes the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish the criteria for non-mutual issue preclusion, and the Court denies their motion.
. . .
Whether PM and Altria violated various state marketing and unjust enrichment statutes by fraudulently advertising light cigarettes is distinct from whether nine different cigarette companies and trade organizations participated in a decades-long enterprise to defraud consumers in six different ways. Liability in the pending actions must depend on the specific actions or inactions of the named defendants in relation to light cigarettes.
Similarly, liability in DOJ was based on fraudulent activity that took place “throughout the past fifty years.” DOJ, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 866. Many of the proposed class periods for the pending cases, however, are limited to fraudulent activity occurring within a more circumscribed time.15 The DOJ conclusions based on the consideration of a larger time period do not sufficiently overlap. . . .
None of the predicate RICO actions alleged against Altria involved light cigarettes,
. . .
The additional Parklane considerations underscore why issue preclusion is inappropriate in this case. First, the decision in DOJ was reached through a bench trial whereas the Defendants are entitled to a jury trial in the pending actions. Although Parklane found the lack of a jury in the initial action did not bar offensive issue preclusion and was “basically neutral,” 439 U.S. at 332 n.19, Parklane also gave district courts “broad discretion” over the issue preclusion decision. Id. at 331. The Court follows the lead of other courts that have given weight to the deprivation of a jury trial.
Second, the Court is concerned about the possibility for jury confusion and the lack of efficiency.18 Punitive damages may not be used to “punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties.” Williams, 549 U.S. at 353. If issue preclusion were imposed, however, much of the Defendants‟ underlying liability would be based in part on actions that inflicted injuries
Furthermore, proving causation and reliance might also involve the introduction of evidence that duplicates DOJ‟s basic findings, negating efficiency benefits. The Plaintiffs contend that “the majority of plaintiffs” do not have to prove “reliance and deception.” However, they base this argument on statutes from only two of the states in which actions are pending, Pls.’ Mot. for Collateral Estoppel at 17-19, and implicitly concede that some Plaintiffs will have to make both showings.
Finally, even if issue preclusion were appropriate against PM, there is a significant question as to whether it may be used against Altria. Applying issue preclusion to PM and not to Altria would yield few efficiency benefits and would likely confuse the jury.
Because the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy traditional issue preclusion requirements and additional fairness considerations weigh against its application, the Court declines to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to the facts in these consolidated cases.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the Plaintiffs‟ Motion for Collateral Estoppel (Docket # 59).
Jump to full article » |