Jump to full article: Canadian Medical Association Journal (ca), 2009-10-14
Intro: The destroyed documents reveal a vast body of scientific evidence
on the health effects of smoking. Forty of the 60 documents
pertain to carcinogenicity and “biological activity” of
cigarettes. . . .
All 60 documents ordered destroyed were reports of scientific
work, performed either by British American Tobacco or contractors
hired by British American Tobacco. The earliest
report dated from 1967 and the most recent was produced in
1984. Of the 60 reports, 11 were reviews of internal research
or methods development, 2 were statistical re-analyses of previous
studies and the remaining 47 documents contained
research findings from original studies conducted by British
American Tobacco. . . .
Nicotine and addiction
Six of the destroyed documents depict a sophisticated program
of research on nicotine addiction . . .
Collectively, these research reports include convincing
evidence about the addictive nature of nicotine — a fact that
was vehemently challenged at the time in public by British
American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco Canada. . . .
Second-hand smoke
Eleven of the destroyed documents included original research
findings on the effects of second-hand smoke.26,27,72–80 Nine of
studies were experiments performed on rats to determine the
effects of second-hand and mainstream smoke.26,27,73-79 The primary
outcome of the tests was the finding that “In all exposed
animals there was a consistent smoke-induced change in the
larynx …
in 1990, the president
of the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers’ Council submitted a
written objection to government proposals for a new health
warning on the risks of second-hand smoke, stating that “we
do not accept that there is any credible or reliable evidence to
establish that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) constitutes
a genuine health hazards to smokers.”82 The destroyed documents
indicate that this evidence had already been collected
by the industry and was concealed in confidential files.
. . .
In 1954, the Canadian Medical Association issued its first public warnings about the risks of smoking, followed in 1963 by the landmark statement in the House of Commons from Canada’s Minister of National Health and Welfare that smoking was harmful to health. Despite these historic proclamations, there remained considerable uncertainty about the extent of the health risks, whether some products were less harmful than others, and what government measures should be taken to reduce the harm from tobacco. During this period, British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco Canada collected high-quality scientific evidence that bore directly on these issues and had the potential to hasten effective public health regulation. However, British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco concealed this information and argued that there was a lack of evidence to support government measures such as workplace smoking restrictions and mandatory health warnings on packages.81 For example, in 1990, the president of the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers’ Council submitted a written objection to government proposals for a new health warning on the risks of second-hand smoke, stating that “we do not accept that there is any credible or reliable evidence to establish that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) constitutes a genuine health hazards to smokers.”82 The destroyed documents indicate that this evidence had already been collected by the industry and was concealed in confidential files.
Efforts to conceal research findings on “low-tar” cigarettes have been particularly damaging to health policy and government regulation. Canadian manufacturers began producing and marketing “lower-tar” cigarettes during the 1960s and 70s as a direct response to growing health concerns among consumers.81 Without the benefit of independent evidence on the potential benefits of “lower-tar” cigarettes, many leading health agencies supported this industry strategy.83 For example, in the 1970s, Health and Welfare officials urged the Canadian manufacturers to reduce tar levels further and to print tar numbers on packages to help guide consumers.81 The destroyed documents indicate that British American Tobacco had collected evidence that cast doubt on the potential health benefits of “low-delivery” products. In vivo studies indicated that human smokers were compensating for “low-tar” cigarettes by smoking them more intensely, while biological testing from Projects Janus and Rio revealed negligible differences in the carcinogenity and mutagenicity of cigarette brands. Without access to this evidence, several decades elapsed before regulators and health agencies reached consensus that “low-tar” products did not reduce risk.81,84 In the meantime, millions of smokers switched to these brands, many under the assumption of reduced harm as an alternative to quitting.84 The legacy of low-tar cigarettes continues today . . .
Had the tobacco industry been forthcoming about the evidence collected about human smoking behaviour and low-tar cigarettes, much of the confusion over these products may have been averted.
Imperial Tobacco’s attempt to destroy the evidence in the 60 documents is consistent with the tobacco industry’s welldocumented efforts to undermine science on the risks of smoking and to engineer doubt in the minds of health professionals and consumers.87 Imperial Tobacco Canada and British American Tobacco publicly denied the importance of the health effects that were clearly shown in the 60 destroyed documents. For example, in 1987 — 9 years after the conclusion of Project Janus, which showed the carcinogenicity of tobacco smoke — the chairman of Imperial Tobacco Canada and the chair of the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council, Jean-Louis Mercier, testified in front of a House of Commons Legislative Committee, stating that “It is not the position of the industry that tobacco causes any disease. … The role, if any, that tobacco or smoking plays in the initiation and the development of these diseases is still very uncertain.”88
Further, in 1996, Martin Broughton, the chief executive of British American Tobacco stated, “We have not concealed, we do not conceal and we will never conceal. … we have no internal research which proves that smoking causes lung cancer or other diseases or, indeed, that smoking is addictive.”89
Finally, the destruction of documents by Imperial Tobacco Canada has direct implications for industry liability and new litigation that is proceeding in Canada. Canadian courts are currently being asked to consider whether the tobacco industry should be liable for the health care costs attributable to smoking.
In the first Canadian trial of its kind, the province of British Columbia has launched health care cost-recovery litigation . . .
Tobacco companies have yet to pay any compensation either to the Canadian government or to their consumers as a result of their actions.
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