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CIPOLLONE v. LIGGETT GROUP, INC.  

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, concluding that 5 of the 1965 Act did not [505 U.S. 504, 505] preempt state-law damages actions, but superseded only positive enactments by state and federal rulemaking bodies mandating particular warnings on cigarette labels or in cigarette advertisements. This conclusion is required by the section's precise and narrow prohibition of required cautionary "statement[s]"; by the strong presumption against preemption of state police power regulations; by the fact that the required 4 warning does not, by its own effect, foreclose additional obligations imposed under state law; by the fact that there is no general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of common-law damages actions; and by the Act's stated purpose and regulatory context, which establish that 5 was passed to prevent a multiplicity of pending and diverse "regulations," a word that most naturally refers to positive enactments, rather than common-law actions. Pp. 517-520.

JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concluded in Parts V and VI that 5(b) of the 1969 Act preempts certain of petitioner's failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, but does not preempt other such claims or the claims based on express warranty or conspiracy. . . .

To summarize our holding: the 1965 Act did not preempt state-law damages actions; the 1969 Act preempts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn and the neutralization [505 U.S. 504, 531] of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions; the 1969 Act does not preempt petitioner's claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.

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To summarize our holding: the 1965 Act did not preempt state-law damages actions; the 1969 Act preempts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn and the neutralization [505 U.S. 504, 531] of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions; the 1969 Act does not preempt petitioner's claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.
Supreme Court Justice Stevens, in the 1992 Cipollone case; he may have to overturn himself in Good.