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• Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. [Item not online] 

As the foregoing examples illustrate, the Phase I findings fail to establish that the issues tried in the Engle Phase I proceeding are identical to the issues presented in this case. Moreover, it is impossible to discern what specific issues were actually decided by the Phase I jury, and what facts and allegations were necessary to its decision; thus this Court is unable to give the Phase I findings preclusive effect with respect to the elements of any of the Engle plaintiffs' claims. . . .

The Defendants also raise a constitutional challenge to Plaintiffs' proposed use of the Phase I findings, arguing that since it is impossible to know what allegations formed the basis of each finding, affording preclusive effect to the general Phase I findings would be an arbitrary application of the common law rules of preclusion. In the Defendants' view, such a fanciful application of well-established procedural doctrine would violate constitutional guarantees of due process. The Court agrees and--as an additional basis for its decision--finds that application of the Phase I findings as Plaintiffs propose would contravene the dictates of due process. . . .

As the above cases establish, this Court is constitutionally bound to strictly apply the doctrine of issue preclusion consistent with its common law origins. Thus, since it is impossible to determine the precise issues decided by the Phase I jury, with respect to individual claims against particular Defendants, the traditional elements of issue preclusion--e.g., identicality, criticality, and necessity to the prior determination--cannot be satisfied. This Court is accordingly foreclosed from applying the Phase I findings as establishing any part of Plaintiffs' claims. 26 See Goodman, 804 So. 2d at 546-47. Doing so would comprise an arbitrary deprivation of the Defendants' federal due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .

Without deciding the issue, there is some question concerning the constitutional validity of the Phase I findings. While many aspects of the sprawling and unwieldy Engle trial proceedings are troubling, none are more galling and shocking--in a constitutional sense--than the conduct of Mr. Stanley M. Rosenblatt, Engle class counsel. Relying on the limited record provided the Court, it seems that during the Engle Phase I proceedings, Mr. Rosenblatt made numerous racially charged statements and openly advocated jury nullification. . . .

A constitutionally sound verdict must be premised on adherence to the law, and not the caprice of individual moral discretion. Verdicts based on unfettered and subjective notions of "morality" and "justice" "are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an [*55] exercise of erroneously seized power." . . .

In summary, the Engle Phase I findings may not be used to establish any element of an individual Engle plaintiff's claim. A general, non-specific finding of tortious conduct on the part of one or more Defendants does not satisfy the requirements of issue preclusion, as the Engle plaintiffs as a whole allege different acts and omissions by different Defendants, breached different tort duties to different people at different times causing different injuries. Additionally, this Court may [*57] not, as Plaintiffs urge, stretch the boundaries of preclusion law beyond its understood common law limits in the interests of convenience and economy. Despite any temptation to do so, this Court may not manipulate established procedural and substantive law in the interests of expediting the progress of this litigation. 29 To do so would be to perpetrate an independent constitutional violation. See In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1993) ("considerations of convenience and economy must yield to a paramount concern for a fair and impartial trial" (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The systemic urge to aggregate litigation must not be allowed to trump our dedication to individual justice, and we must take care that each individual plaintiff's--and defendant's--cause not be lost in the shadow of a towering mass litigation."). This Court will not sacrifice the fundamental right of due process upon the altars of expediency, thrift, and "pragmatism."

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At most, these findings establish that at some time the Defendants sold a defective product, concealed their tortious behavior, acted negligently, breached an express or implied warranty, and engaged in a conspiracy to misrepresent information relating to the health effects of smoking. . . . the Phase I findings merely establish conduct as a broad abstraction, and conduct in the abstract fails to meet the identity requirement to apply such findings in the specific cases before this Court.
HARVEY E. SCHLESINGER , United States District Judge in Jacksonville, FL, ruling on the Engle/Brown case.

The apparent flaw with the jury form, and any verdict delivered from the form, is its nonspecificity with respect to what acts or omissions committed by what Defendant breached what duty to which Plaintiff causing what injury. As such, this Court "would have to embark on sheer speculation" to determine what issues were actually decided during the Phase I trial and how to apply them to the individual claims before this Court.
HARVEY E. SCHLESINGER , United States District Judge in Jacksonville, FL, ruling on the Engle/Brown case.