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• PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. v. HON. NICHOLAS G. BYRON, Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit, et al. 

This cause coming to be heard on the motion of the petitioner, Philip Morris USA, Inc., an objection having been filed by the respondents Sharon Price, et al., a reply having been filed by the petitioner, and the court being fully advised in the premises;

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition is denied. The motion for supervisory order is allowed. In the exercise of this court's supervisory authority, the circuit court of Madison County is directed to vacate its order of May 9, 2007, certifying questions for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 in Price et al. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 00 L 112, and to enter an order dismissing plaintiffs' motion to vacate or withhold final judgment pursuant to section 2–1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure . . .

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: . . .

the record shows that the federal government filed an amicus curiae brief on the merits in Watson, in which the federal government again declared: "The FTC has never promulgated official regulatory definitions of terms such as 'light' or 'low tar.' "

Indeed, continued the federal government: "Far from issuing detailed and specific regulations that govern respondent's marketing of light cigarettes, the FTC has not issued any such regulations at all." . . .

I do not believe that the question presented here can be characterized as being of such importance to the administration of justice that it necessitates this court's exercise of supervisory authority.

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The court's action today is entirely predictable because it quickly and quietly closes the book on a case that a majority of this court, I am sure, would rather forget. Had the court taken steps on rehearing to learn more about the various FTC actions that exist and thus render a more informed opinion, as I suggested at the time, we would not be in the situation that we are in today. I warned, in my dissent on denial of rehearing, that the court's suspect analysis with respect to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would prove embarrassing over time. And indeed, time has not been kind to the plurality's conclusion that the FTC had "specifically authorize[d]" PMUSA's use of the terms "lights" and "lower tar." . . .

Given this turn of events, it is hardly surprising to see the court grant supervisory relief despite Philip Morris' utter failure to satisfy the criteria for this extraordinary remedy.

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