Tobacco.org

• 05-1284 Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. (PDF) 

Held: The fact that a federal agency directs, supervises, and monitors a company’s activities in considerable detail does not bring that com-pany within §1442(a)(1)’s scope and thereby permit removal. Pp. 3– 14. (a) Section 1442(a)(1)’s words “acting under” are broad, and the statute must be “liberally construed.” Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S. 510, 517. But broad language is not limitless. And a liberal con-struction nonetheless can find limits in a text’s language, context,history, and purposes. . . .

differences in the degree of regulatory detail or supervision cannot by themselves transform Philip Morris’ regulatory compliance into the kind of assistance that might bring the FTC within thescope of the statutory phrase “acting under” a federal “officer.” Supra, at 8. And, though we find considerable regulatory detail and supervision, we can find nothing that warrants treating the FTC/Philip Morris relationshipas distinct from the usual regulator/regulated relationship. This relationship, as we have explained, cannot be construed as bringing Philip Morris within the terms of the statute.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Eighth Circuit isreversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Jump to full article »