Tobacco.org

• KRISTINA L. BENEDICT, et al., v. ALTRIA GROUP, INC., et al. 

This is a “tobacco” case, but not of the personal injury variety. Highly summarized, the legal claims in this case are that the defendants, Philip Morris USA, Inc. (“Philip Morris”), and its corporate parent, Altria Group, Inc. (“Altria”), violated the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”), K.S.A. § 50-623 et seq., and that defendants were unjustly enriched, by marketing “Marlboro Lights” and “Cambridge Lights” brands of cigarettes as being lower in tar and nicotine than regular cigarettes. The factual allegation upon which these claims is predicated is that although defendants’ light cigarettes yield lower tar and nicotine quantities when tested by a machine approved by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), they do not in fact deliver lower quantities of tar and nicotine to smokers. Defendants allegedly knew their light cigarettes would not actually deliver lower amounts of these chemicals to smokers, but marketed them as such.

. . .Philip Morris argues that Ms. Brown cannot demonstrate its statements regarding its light cigarettes caused her to suffer a loss, as required by K.S.A. § 50-634(d), because she has not shown she relied on those statements in deciding to smoke Marlboro Lights. Ms. Brown argues that a showing of reliance is not required, but even if it is, she claims she did in fact rely on Philip Morris’ statements when she started smoking Marlboro Lights. As set forth in connection with the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis above, the court finds that K.S.A. § 50-634(d) requires a showing that Ms. Brown relied on Philip Morris’ representations regarding their light cigarettes. This inquiry is a factual one, specific to the individual plaintiff in question. Given the current state of the record, the court is unprepared to say, as a matter of law, Ms. Brown did not rely on Philip Morris’ statements when she started smoking. Although neither side complied with D. Kan. Rule 56.1, the court believes that a rational trier of fact could find that Ms. Brown relied on Philip Morris’ representations in purchasing light cigarettes. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to causation, and therefore Philip Morris’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

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