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New Jersey's campaign finance system may have restricted the flow of big money into statewide elections and cut down on the abuses known as pay to play, but determined donors and fund-raisers always seem to find a loophole.
Indeed, newly available records show that big donors to the Democratic and Republican Parties -- along with law firms, engineers and others who do business with the state -- are sidestepping the state's contribution limits and pay-to-play rules by giving to the parties' governors' associations, which turn around and spend heavily in New Jersey.
Harry Pozycki, chairman of the Citizens' Campaign, a nonpartisan group that is an advocate of the pay-to-play rules, said on Monday that the two associations were providing "a huge back door for the evasion of contribution limits." He added, "Following the money becomes that much more difficult." . . .
The Republican Governors Association, which has spent nearly $3 million already in support of Christopher J. Christie, the former federal prosecutor who is challenging Mr. Corzine, has raised $90,000 from the National Rifle Association since December. . . .
Big tobacco also seems to be backing Mr. Christie, who as a securities lawyer once represented the industry in an antismoking lawsuit: Tobacco interests have given the Republican group nearly $300,000.
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Conclusion
Pursuant to the Attorneys General Settlement Agreement dated 3/20/97, Liggett has produced documents for which it claimed privilege. Liggett has waived its privilege with respect to certain of those documents, and such documents have been ordered produced to the Plaintiffs herein. Defendants claim a joint defense privilege with respect to the remaining documents produced by Liggett. Plaintiffs, however, have made a prima facie case to invoke the crime-fraud exception. Thus, further review of the remaining Liggett documents by the Special Master is warranted. Such review shall proceed according to the procedures established herein by the Special Master and approved by this Court, which procedures shall apply to all parties' allegedly privileged documents unless otherwise ordered.
K.J.F.
Description:10-day jury trial for a plaintiff who died at age 81 of lung cancer after suffering chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) as a result of cigarette smoking for over 55 years. The jury awarded the plaintiff $700,000 against Liggett Group (a part of Vector Tobacco and Vector Group).
This was the second "Engle" tobacco case to go to trial after a Broward County jury awarded nearly $8 million to the widow of a smoker who died from lung cancer in Hess v. RJ Reynolds. . . .
Type Start Date End Date Court Status Sessions
Trial 2009-02-23 2009-03-06 Judicial Complex Concluded - Verdict 20
Description: This is the second "Engle" tobacco case to go to trial after a Broward County jury awarded nearly $8 million to the widow of a smoker who died from lung cancer.
After a Miami jury awarded the largest class action verdict in history to smokers who claim major tobacco companies withheld critical information about the dangers of smoking, the Florida Supreme Court determined that each case had to be tried individually.
By presiding over the first two of nearly 8000 of these individual suits, Judge Streitfeld could set an important standard for how future "Engle litigation" will play out across the state Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court on Thursday let stand a Broward County smoker's $545,000 award in a tobacco case that also may affect liability claims for a broad range of other "inherently dangerous" products.
Those items can range from guns, knives, motorcycles and personal watercraft to less obvious products such as gasoline and sugar.
A jury found the design of Chesterfield cigarettes was flawed when it returned a verdict for Beverly Davis, who had smoked the brand for more than 20 years before contracting lung cancer. She died during the litigation, but her family continued the case.
We initially accepted jurisdiction to review Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, 973 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), a decision in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified two questions to be of great public importance. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. However, upon further consideration, we have determined that we should exercise our discretion to discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed.
11/06/2008
ORAL ARGUMENT HELD
12/11/2008
DISP-REV DISM IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED (OA)
We initially accepted jurisdiction to review Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, 973 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), a decision in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified two questions to be of great public importance. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. However, upon further consideration, we have determined that we should exercise our discretion to discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed. NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
In fact, the most persuasive exhibits in the case were no secret at all: magazine ads that the tobacco companies published in the 1950s and '60s. Among them were ads that appeared in 1954 issues of LIFE, in which such Hollywood stars as Barbara Stanwyck and Rosalind Russell gave testimonials for L&M's new "miracle product," the "alpha cellulose" filter that is "just what the doctor ordered." Several other brands made similar claims at the time in response to increasing nervousness about smoking and health. R.J. Reynolds said, "More doctors smoke Camels than any other cigarette."
Cipollone chose L&M, she explained before her death, partly because of the testimonials by celebrities in the company's ads. Said she: "I remember they used to be so glamorous. They always used to wear evening gowns." Defense lawyers sought to establish that Cipollone was an intelligent woman who made a decision to keep smoking despite plenty of signs that it was risky. As evidence, they introduced 115 articles from TIME, 47 articles from Reader's Digest and even lyrics from popular songs like the 1947 hit Smoke, Smoke, Smoke, which included the words "Puff, puff, and if you smoke yourself to death."
What was difficult for Cipollone's lawyers to prove was that she was helplessly addicted. . . .
The biggest impact of the Cipollone verdict may be political rather than financial. Concedes Maxwell, the Philip Morris chairman: "The industry suffered some public relations damage during the trial. By describing the documents as secret, the plaintiffs made it sound as though we were doing something sinister or underhanded." The case could inspire Congress to enact new limits on tobacco -- for example, an extension of a smoking ban to all domestic airline flights instead of just shorter hauls. Predicted Representative Robert Torricelli, a New Jersey Democrat: "The impact in Congress, state legislatures and town halls is going to be rather profound." If that is so, Cipollone's late-awakening rebellion against tobacco is likely to endure longer than she could have imagined.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, concluding that 5 of the 1965 Act did not [505 U.S. 504, 505] preempt state-law damages actions, but superseded only positive enactments by state and federal rulemaking bodies mandating particular warnings on cigarette labels or in cigarette advertisements. This conclusion is required by the section's precise and narrow prohibition of required cautionary "statement[s]"; by the strong presumption against preemption of state police power regulations; by the fact that the required 4 warning does not, by its own effect, foreclose additional obligations imposed under state law; by the fact that there is no general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of common-law damages actions; and by the Act's stated purpose and regulatory context, which establish that 5 was passed to prevent a multiplicity of pending and diverse "regulations," a word that most naturally refers to positive enactments, rather than common-law actions. Pp. 517-520.
JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concluded in Parts V and VI that 5(b) of the 1969 Act preempts certain of petitioner's failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, but does not preempt other such claims or the claims based on express warranty or conspiracy. . . .
To summarize our holding: the 1965 Act did not preempt state-law damages actions; the 1969 Act preempts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn and the neutralization [505 U.S. 504, 531] of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions; the 1969 Act does not preempt petitioner's claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.
To summarize our holding: the 1965 Act did not preempt state-law damages actions; the 1969 Act preempts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn and the neutralization [505 U.S. 504, 531] of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions; the 1969 Act does not preempt petitioner's claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.Supreme Court Justice Stevens, in the 1992 Cipollone case; he may have to overturn himself in Good.
Vector Group (VGR) is structured as a holding company, with two distinct businesses. The first, and by far the majority of revenue is the sale of discount cigarette brands such as Liggett Select, Grand Prix, Pyramid, Eve, and USA. Also, Vector has designed and marketed a nicotine free cigarette called Qwest. The second business is a residential real estate company, Douglas Elliman Realty LLC, which operates in the New York metropolitan area and is the biggest concern of it's type there. Vector Group owns a 50% stake in Douglas Elliman.
From the grades it's obvious that Vector Group is not a favorite of MagicDiligence. There are a few positives to note. . . .
Lastly, the company has a history of restructuring, side businesses, and a confusing set of financial statements. If you cannot understand a business, it's probably not a good investment for you.
With so many other quality companies on the Magic Formula screen, MagicDiligence recommends steering clear of Vector Group.
Claudia Henschke and David Yankelevitz of Weill Cornell Medical College are key figures in a multicenter study of spiral CT screening for lung cancer and leading proponents of screening. . . .
All the scientists presumably hold their strong views without being influenced by monetary considerations. But their incautious behavior in accepting special-interest money and the failure of Weill Cornell researchers to make their royalty interests explicit have inevitably cast doubt on the research they take pride in.
The New England Journal of Medicine yesterday caught up with a bit of full-disclosure housekeeping, publishing a correction and a clarification to describe a few funding and conflict-of-interest details from a lung cancer screening study the journal published in 2006.
A 2006 study claiming 80 percent of lung cancer deaths may be prevented with CT scans was funded by a tobacco company, the New England Journal of Medicine said in corrections and an editorial yesterday.
After embarrassing disclosures of financial links between authors of a lung-cancer study and two big corporations -- General Electric Co. and Vector Group Ltd. -- the New England Journal of Medicine published a correction, a clarification and an editorial calling for transparent disclosure of funding sources.
The lung-cancer study, which the journal published in 2006, has been controversial. It suggested that an annual screening with a CT scan could reduce the death rate from lung cancer, the top cancer killer. Critics said the study showed only that screening could detect cancers earlier -- not necessarily that it could avert deaths.
In today's correction, the New England Journal acknowledges that the study's lead authors, Claudia Henschke and David Yankelevitz of Cornell University's Weill Medical College in New York City, received royalties from GE, a big maker of CT scanners, for pending patents on ways to manipulate and interpret CT scans and other medical images. . . .
In its editorial, the New England Journal called for more-transparent disclosure of funding sources. Readers "cannot fully appreciate a study's meaning without acknowledging the subtle biases in design and interpretation that may arise when a sponsor stands to gain from the report," the journal's editors wrote. "We and our readers were surprised to learn that the source of the funding of the charitable foundation was, in fact, a large corporation that could have an interest in the study results."
Are these results sufficiently effective to justify screening people who are at risk of lung cancer? As compared with mammographic screening for breast cancer, for lung cancer the rates of detection among the participants in this study who were 40 years of age and older were 1.3% on baseline CT screening and 0.3% on annual screening (Table 2), values that were slightly higher than those for the detection of breast cancer (0.6 to 1.0% on baseline screening) and similar to those for annual screening (0.2 to 0.4%) among women 40 years of age and older.22 The rate of cancer detection depends on the risk profile of those undergoing screening; the higher the risk, the more productive the screening. Thus, as expected, CT screening of the original participants in ELCAP, who were former and current smokers 60 years of age and older,1,2 was more productive in detecting lung cancer (detection rates, 2.7% on baseline screening and 0.6% on annual screening) than among participants in the expanded study. The cost of low-dose CT is below $200,23,24,25,26 and surgery for stage I lung cancer is less than half the cost of late-stage treatment.26,27 Using the original ELCAP data and the actual hospital costs for the workup, we found CT screening for lung cancer to be highly cost-effective.23 Other estimates of the cost-effectiveness of CT screening for lung cancer for various risk profiles24,25,26,28 are similar to that for mammography screening.29,30
Supported in part by the National Institutes of Health (grants R01-CA-633931, to Dr. Henschke, and R01-CA-78905, to Dr. Yankelevitz); the Department of Energy (DE-FG02-96SF21260, to Dr. Markowitz); the Department of Defense to Dr. Tockman; Department of Health and Mental Hygiene of the City of New York; New York State Office of Science, Technology, and Academic Research; American Cancer Society; Israel Cancer Association; Starr Foundation; New York Community Trust; Rogers Family Fund; Foundation for Lung Cancer: Early Detection, Prevention, and Treatment; Foundation for Early Detection of Lung Cancer; Dorothy R. Cohen Foundation; Research Foundation of Clinic Hirslanden; Clinic Hirslanden; Swedish Hospital; Yad-Hanadiv Foundation; Jacob and Malka Goldfarb Charitable Foundation; Auen–Berger Foundation; Princess Margaret Foundation; Tenet Healthcare Foundation; Ernest E. Stempel Foundation, Academic Medical Development; Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield; Eastman Kodak; General Electric; Weill Medical College of Cornell University; New York Presbyterian Hospital; Christiana Care Helen F. Graham Cancer Center; Holy Cross Hospital; Eisenhower Hospital; Jackson Memorial Hospital Health System; and Evanston Northwestern Healthcare.