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Two recent events underscore big problems with the way society tries to fight tobacco use.
First, a new Harvard study came out alleging that the tobacco industry manipulated menthol levels in cigarettes to hook young smokers in violation of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, which bans tobacco companies from targeting youths. And second, billionaires Michael R. Bloomberg and Bill Gates last week threw their support behind a new $500 million worldwide effort to stop smoking.
Whatever the tobacco companies may have done with menthol levels, the bigger scandal is how states have misspent the billions paid to them by the tobacco industry. And however well-intentioned, the Gates-Bloomberg effort, which involves the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, is likely to fail because the tobacco control programs that it will fund - featuring such things as higher taxes, smoking bans and advertising restrictions - have failed before. These multiple shortcomings point to the need for a new, more effective approach to handling, and funding, tobacco prevention. . . .
Ten years and $53 billion after the tobacco settlement windfall, there is precious little to show in terms of credible smoking prevention. It's time for Congress - and perhaps the president - to step in and demand that the states live up to their promise to use the settlement money for effective tobacco prevention. To ensure the settlement money has an impact, it needs to be diverted from projects unrelated to smoking and then placed into interventions that are based on what the best evidence shows are the real reasons kids start using cigarettes.
Until that happens, anti-tobacco efforts - whether funded by the states or by well-intentioned billionaires - will continue to amount to little more than blowing smoke.
--Patrick Basham teaches tobacco regulation at the Johns Hopkins University, directs the Democracy Institute and is a Cato Institute adjunct scholar.
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But if history is any guide, most cigarettes sold will actually be trucked up from Virginia, or shipped in from China, by "butt-leggers" who can make over $1 million on each tractor-trailer load of smuggled smokes. The blunt fact, which politicians of both political parties are determined to ignore, is that high cigarette taxes in New York have led to a bloody, decades-long smuggling epidemic. . . .
As the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms said in September 2002 of New York's cigarette smuggling, "Traditional organized crime is involved, terrorist groups are involved, and street gangs are involved." Rivalry among these groups has resulted in numerous shootings and homicides.
The connection to terrorism is no exaggeration. When New York police cracked another smuggling ring in 2005, they uncovered a multimillion dollar flow of funds from New York City to unknown individuals in the Middle East. Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly gave voice to the obvious conclusion: Terrorists probably got the money. . . .
Politicians continue to use the health of smokers as their excuse for higher cigarette taxes. This view is myopic. As Gov. Wilson argued three decades ago, high cigarette taxes are bad public policy because of their effect on the rest of us. In the 1960s and '70s, organized crime exploited high cigarette taxes at our expense. Today we face an even deadlier adversary.
Mr. Fleenor is chief economist of the Tax Foundation and author of "Cigarette Taxes, Black Markets, and Crime: Lessons from New York's 50-Year Losing Battle" (Cato Institute, 2003).
ACCORDING to anti-smoking groups, the current Congressional attempt to give the Food and Drug Administration authority to regulate tobacco is the most important piece of legislation since the surgeon general spoke out on the dangers of smoking 40 years ago. Surprisingly, it is not just the foes of Big Tobacco that support the proposed law, which was approved by the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee on Wednesday.
Philip Morris, the world's largest tobacco company, is also firmly behind the bill. In fact, it played a pivotal role in writing the legislation, working with the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. What these strange bedfellows came up with is bad for competition in the tobacco industry and bad for public health. . . .
By assigning the F.D.A. responsibility for all tobacco products, the new law would also relieve the industry of any liability for tobacco safety -- and pass it along to the government.
Few lawmakers seem to understand either the bill's origins or ramifications. But the Senate should send it back to the committee and start from scratch. Come up with a law that would give the F.D.A. authority to regulate tobacco, but do so in a way that would truly protect public health.
In reality, it is impossible to summarize accurately from momentary and vague recalls, and with an absurd expectation of precision, the total exposure to secondhand smoke over more than a half-century of a person's lifetime. No measure of cumulative lifetime secondhand smoke exposure was ever possible, so the epidemiologic studies estimated risk based not only on an improper marker of exposure, but also on exposure data that are illusory.
Adding confusion, people with lung cancer or cardiovascular disease are prone to amplify their recall of secondhand smoke exposure. . . .
It has been fashionable to ignore the weakness of "the science" on secondhand smoke, perhaps in the belief that claiming "the science is settled" will lead to policies and public attitudes that will reduce the prevalence of smoking. But such a Faustian bargain is an ominous precedent in public health and political ethics. Consider how minimally such policies as smoking bans in bars and restaurants really reduce the prevalence of smoking, and yet how odious and socially unfair such prohibitions are. .. .
A frank discussion is needed to restore straight thinking in the legitimate uses of "the science" of epidemiology ¿ uses that go well beyond secondhand smoke issues. Today, health rights command high priority on many agendas, as they should. It is not admissible to presume that people expect those rights to be served less than truthfully.
More ammunition for the anti-smoking crowd will soon be released in a new book The Price of Smoking (MIT Press). According to pre-publication reports, the authors -- Duke University economist Frank Sloan and four colleagues -- estimate the actual costs of smoking at nearly $40 per pack. That includes roughly $33 for reduced life expectancy and tobacco-related disabilities; $5.44 for the costs of secondhand smoke, and $1.44 for pooled-risk programs like Medicare, Medicaid, group life insurance and sick leave.
Regrettably, the data will be exploited by zealots to stop the rest of us from making our own decisions about cigarettes. That's why it's important to understand the $40 cost and the public policy implications of Sloan's work. Assuming the numbers are accurate, their principal utility lies in helping private parties make rational choices, not in promoting yet another anti-tobacco crusade. So let's dissect the data. . . .
In a nutshell, then, Sloan and his colleagues have identified three types of costs: Private internalized costs can be eliminated by choosing not to smoke. Externalized costs of secondhand smoke can mostly be redressed by recognizing private property rights and providing for smoke-free areas on government property. Externalized costs of pooled risk programs can be remedied by permitting rational discrimination against smokers who impose those costs.
Yes, there may be some residual cost for which smokers should be accountable. But don't forget that state and federal excise taxes already yield revenues of 76 cents per pack and smokers have been socked with a quarter-trillion-dollar cost payable to state governments under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement. In short, smokers more than pay their way.
Perhaps they did in the 19th century, but this is the 21st.
-- James Repace
The Justice Department's decision to continue to pursue the Clinton-era civil suit against the nation's largest tobacco companies represents poor legal thinking and questionable policy, according to conservative think tank policy analysts.
Robert A. Levy, a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the libertarian Cato Institute, said that the Justice Department's decision to pursue the case was surprising.
"This lawsuit is a loser in many respects," Levy said at a forum on the case held Wednesday at Cato. "It is based upon bad law and is certainly bad public policy." . .
"The American public, voters and juries need to know our legal system is rapidly becoming a tool for extortion," said Levy. . .
Schultz, a former Justice Department official involved in the initial examination of the case, said that despite claims by Levy and others that the case is politically motivated, it was permanent Justice Department staff -- not political appointees -- who recommended pursuing the charges.
However, Matthew Myers, president of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, said that the debate over the lawsuit places opponents' rhetoric at odds with the facts. For one, he said although the Bush administration showed an initial dislike of the case, its position changed following a full examination of the unique set of facts involved. . .
Bass said that much of the government's case is based on press releases put out by the Tobacco Institute, an industry-sponsored research organization, and do not constitute some form of industry conspiracy.
Thanks to Philip Morris' support, 2000 was a very successful year for the Tax Foundation. As the I want to take a minute to tell you about the exciting plans we have for the year and request that Philip Moms renew its annual support for the Tax Foundation in the amount of $50,000.00. I would also like to see Philip Morris continue as a gold sponsor of the Tax Foundation's 64th Annual Dinner in the amount of $7,500.00. Furthermore, I would also ask that Philip Moms make a $25,000.00 contribution toward the Tax Foundation's Excise Tax Conference held early in January at Jacksonville, Florida. . .
One of the most important projects we now have underway is our Next Generation Tax Model project. Patrick Fleenor, our Chief Economist, is just weeks away from completing the first stage of this project - a "static" tax model similar to that used by Congress's Joint Committee on Taxation and other organizations such as Citizens for Tax Justice. This new model will allow us to analyze President George W. Bush's tax proposal, as well as congressional tax plans, in a matter of hours rather than days or weeks. . .
I have enclosed an invoice itemizing these contributions
The failure of New York policymakers to consider the broader effects of high cigarette taxes has been a mistake repeated across the country in the stampede to maximize tax revenue from this demonized product. Too often, policymakers do not consider these effects in the erroneous belief that people do not respond to government-created economic incentives. The negative effects of high cigarette taxes in New York provide a cautionary tale that excessive tax rates have serious consequences—even for such a politically unpopular product as cigarettes.
[This document describes Philip Morris' support of the Tax Foundation: http://www.tobacco.org/resources/documents/010205taxfoundation.html]