Jump to full article: Supreme Court of the United States, 2008-10-06
Intro: JUSTICE KENNEDY: Would you accept that
amendment to your complaint, that the plaintiff does not
seek any damages based on some link between smoking and
health?
MR. FREDERICK: I think we would accept
that, Justice Kennedy.
JUSTICE SOUTER: How can you accept that and
then expect to prove damages in the case? You can
accept it to this extent, it seems to me. You can
accept it in saying that what we are going to prove at
step number one is that it is false to indicate that
smoking light cigarettes will result in the ingestion of
less tar and nicotine; and we know why you're saying
that. But in order to prove damages in your case, you
would have to say: People get hurt because there is a
relationship between the ingestion of tar and nicotine
and their health; and the same cause -- the same causal
connection is therefore appropriate for -- for -- is
therefore necessary in order to prove that people were
hurt.
MR. FREDERICK: In fact in our case we are
not proving health-related damages.
JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but you're asking for
injunctive relief, I guess.
MR. FREDERICK: No, we are not asking for
injunctive relief. We are asking damages for the
difference in value between a product we thought we were
buying and a product we actually bought.
JUSTICE SOUTER: And the reason -- and the
reason the product is of different value is that in fact
it is dangerous to health, as opposed to -- or more
dangerous or equally dangerous to health as opposed to
less dangerous to health; so that at the causation stage
you've still got to prove the link between causation and
health.
MR. FREDERICK: I don't think so, Justice
Souter. I think all we have to prove is that the
products were different and that we relied materially on
a misrepresentation about what product to use. . . .
JUSTICE SOUTER: What would the harm be,
sort of aesthetic?
MR. FREDERICK: If we bought a product
thinking that it would be a safer product and it was
not, and we would have quit smoking.
JUSTICE SOUTER: If they are healthy as
horses, you have no proof that it is not.
MR. FREDERICK: We're -- yes, we do, because
the product is different. If you buy a car thinking
it's a Ford and it's a Yugo but it still drives, you
still have a claim under the lemon laws for deceptive
advertising.
JUSTICE SCALIA: But what if Yugos and Fords
are worth the same amount of money? . . .
JUSTICE SOUTER: And all I'm saying is what
we have here is, you say, a clear preemption provision.
But we also have a clear regulatory regime which is at
odds with that preemption provision, and presumably
we've got to give some effect to that, too.
MR. OLSON: Well, the -- the statute deals
with this to a degree in section 1336 by saving certain
responsibilities. But I think the more powerful answer
is that the background principle, the Federal Trade
Commission Act and Federal and State Trade -- Fair
Practices Act, are a part of a national scheme just
exactly as you said. It's a background --
JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, it's part of a
national scheme, but in practical terms you can say that
on any subject matter that the FTC regulates. And,
nonetheless, the complementary State regimes of -- of
regulating deception survive.
So that the argument you are making here is
an argument that can be made, I suppose, on every
subject that the FTC touches.
MR. OLSON: Well, no. As a matter of fact,
I could not disagree more, Justice Souter. That's the
general background scheme. Then Congress specifically
addresses smoking and health in the advertising of
cigarettes. . . .
JUSTICE ALITO: Was there a different
between saying "light" and saying "lower in tar" in
accordance with the Cambridge testing method?
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Yes, Your Honor,
because the -- the "light," on its own, much more
conveys the impression to the consumer that this is the
yield to the consumer himself, the actual human smoker,
and in fact that was why the
JUSTICE ALITO: The FTC's position seems to
me incomprehensible. If these figures are meaningless,
then you should have prohibited them -- are misleading,
you should have prohibited them a long time ago. And
you've created this whole problem by, I think, passively
approving the placement of these figures on the -- on --
in the advertisements. And if they are misleading, then
you have misled everybody who's bought those cigarette
for a long time. . . .
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: . . . Beginning in 1983,
when in light of the Barclay's case in which it was
determined that a particular cigarette, the yield
according to the test method had nothing to do with
yield to an actual consumer, the FTC started to inquire
about this.
But the Petitioners, although they have
known since 1967 about the incidence of compensation,
failed to disclose that information to the Commission.
They have failed to -- they have refused to give them
the benefit of their insights, their own studies. The
Commission has asked --
JUSTICE SCALIA: The Commission -- when did
the Commission know of this stuff? I had a case when I
was on the Court of Appeals, so it had to be before 1984
involving so-called lip drape --
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: You're right.
JUSTICE SCALIA: -- by which the smoker
covers up the little holes that bring in some fresh air.
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: In 1978 --
JUSTICE SCALIA: It's been general knowledge
for a long time, and the FTC has done nothing about it. . . .
JUSTICE SCALIA: Can I ask a question? I
plan to go back and see what the Government said in
the -- in the case that Petitioner asserts you have
effectively supported his position on -- on express
pre-emption. I plan to go back and read it. Assuming I
agree with him rather than you, has the government's
position changed from what it was then? As far as you
know, is the government's position still the same, the
position that you delicately did not bring to our
attention?
JUSTICE GINSBURG: This is in the Reilly
case.
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: The Reilly case.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes. In Reilly. I haven't
read the brief there, I must say. But suppose I agree
with Petitioner. Can I assume --
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Of course --
JUSTICE SCALIA: And do you assume that it's
--
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: The position of the
United States as stated in the Reilly case was that the
express guarantee provision did not pre-empt a regulation of the nature in that case. It was our
position that that, because it was --
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I'm not asking about --
I'll figure that out on my own. Trust me. I can
probably figure that out. But once I have figured it
out, can I assume that that is still the government's
position --
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Well, I --
JUSTICE SCALIA: -- whatever it is?
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Well, I would think
that we would need to revisit the question in light of
this Court's holding in Reilly, in light of the
additional precedents that there have been over the last
decade or whatever it's been since that decision was
issued. So --
JUSTICE SCALIA: You have no idea which
direction that would lead?
MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: We have not taken a
position on the first -- on the bottom line of the first
question presented. Although as I say --
JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm going to hold you to
your last position, just -- just for fun.
(Laughter.)
Jump to full article » |