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• PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., et al. v. NONA K. CHRISTENSEN (PDF) 

Applying the foregoing principles, we have little difficulty in concluding that the filing of the Philip Morris class action tolled Mr. Christensen’s claims against the Philip Morris petitioners, and that the effect of this tolling is to render respondents’ claims against these petitioners timely.

Most of the preconditions for the application of class action tolling are not in dispute. Mr. Christensen was a member of the Philip Morris putative class. With the exception of Giant, all of the petitioners were defendants in Philip Morris. All of the causes of action asserted by respondents against the Philip Morris petitioners in the case sub judice were asserted in the Philip Morris class action c omplaint.15 Although the pa rties dispute when Mr. Christensen’s claims against the Philip Morris petitioners accrued, they do not dispute that his claims did n ot accrue prior to 1998. Thus, the statute of limitations for Mr. Christensen’sclaims against the Philip Morris petitioners asserted on his behalf in the original class action was suspended from the date his actions accrued until May 16, 2000, when this Court issued its mandate in Philip Morris vacating the Circuit Court’s class certifica tion Order. See Philip Morris, 358 Md. at 788-89, 752 A.2d at 254-55. Accordingly, if the filing of the Philip Morris class action complaint tolled Mr. Christensen’s claims, respondents’ survival claims against the Philip Morris petitioners were timely filed when respondents initiated the survival claims in the instant case on August 13, 2001, as they would have had until May 16, 2003 to file their claims. See Georgia-Pacific, slip op. at 38 (under Maryland law, statutes of limitation apply to su rvival claims).

The one remaining question is whether the Philip Morris petitioners received adequate notice of Mr. Christensen’s claims. We conclude that they did. . . .

Given that the pendency of the Philip Morris class action tolled the statute of limitations on Mr. Christensen’s claims against the Philip Morris petitioners, the statute of limitations applicable to Mr. Christensen’s claims does not serve as a bar to respondents’ wrongful death claims against the Philip Morris petitioners. These wrongful death claims, therefore, are timely . . .

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the Circuit Court should reconsider the propriety of granting summary judgment to Giant in light of the subsequent appellate refinement of the inquiry notice rule. Accordingly, because our opinion in Georgia-Pacific affirming the Court of Special Appeals is now the controlling authority on this issue, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and remand the case to the Court of Special Appeals with instructions to vacate the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Giant, and to remand the case to the Circuit Court for reconsideration of the issue of whether petitioner Giant is entitled to summary judgment in light of Georgia-Pacific.

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• Family can sue tobacco industry over 2001 death ($$) 

WHAT THE COURT HELD Case:Philip Morris USA, Inc., et al. v. Nona K. Christensen et al. CA No. 68. Sept. Term 2005. Opinion by Raker, J. Filed…

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