Secret Tobacco Documents News on the Web
Archive, January, 1998
Note: These articles wink in and out of existence with the frequency of sub-atomic particles. Many links will be dead. In that case, these pages can be approached as bibliographies, both noting the event, and showing where you might look for further information.
- This collection of internal RJR documents focuses on the company's efforts to cultivate (and cash in on) the youth market, a predatory campaign that included the introduction of the cartoonish, and kid-friendly, Joe Camel character. These records were released in January by Representative Henry Waxman, one of Washington's leading anti-tobacco activists. . . Further proving that Joe Camel's a despicable hump, these documents include: Smoke Camel, Be Masculine (5 pages) The Hilton Head Manifesto (11 pages) Lucky Number 13 (1 page) Meet The Turk (1 page) Promoting Poison (1 page)
- The documents, posted this week by Rep. Thomas Bliley, R-Va., chairman of the House Commerce Committee, are a quagmire of internal memoranda, old publications, pamphlets, scientific research, executive speeches and the occasional smoking gun. Still interested? OK, then. Here are some tips:
- Ultimately a road map to the site may emerge, but it may be too late to have much effect on the fate of a major tobacco policy bill pending in Congress.
- RJR Doc From MN Case Shows Smoking and Health Research Suppressed, Subverted, Rewritten and Destroyed (This document just posted today on the House Commerce Committee Web site at www.house.gov/commerce. Bates # is 515873805.)
- Secret R.J. Reynolds memos show the No. 2 cigarette maker targeted teen-agers as young as 13 in a plan to steal its competitors' youngest smokers -- and even created a special brand aimed at boys. Code-named Project LF, a 1987 memo stamped "RJR Secret" says the company created a "wider-circumference nonmenthol cigarette targeted at young adult male smoker (primarily 13-24 year old male Marlboro smokers)." Camel Wides eventually were sold. . . RJR provided the papers to California attorneys as part of a $10 million settlement of lawsuits brought by San Francisco and other communities that accused Joe Camel of targeting teens.
- One paper in the batch analyzed the importance of the 14- to 24-year-old market and concluded that the company must have a strategy of "direct advertising appeal to the younger smokers."
- On June 20, 1997, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, along with others in this industry, signed a Proposed Resolution with state attorneys general, other litigation plaintiffs and the public health community that seeks to resolve a broad range of tobacco issues and includes new rules for advertising and marketing cigarettes. That agreement would move this country forward in dealing with cigarette issues and avoids the kind of misimpression that results from actions such as the plaintiffs in Mangini took today. We disagree with the Mangini plaintiffs' characterization of these few cherry-picked documents released to reporters across the country today.
- Dr. David Kessler, a former FDA chief, said a fresh batch of Reynolds tobacco documents were a "smoking gun" on teen smoking and should dissuade Congress from giving the industry legal immunity under a deal with cigarette makers. "If you are looking for a smoking gun regarding youth smoking, you need to look no further," the former head of the Food and Drug Administration told Reuters shortly after a Democratic congressman released the documents on Wednesday
- R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. specifically targeted smokers as young as age 13 in efforts to reinvigorate its aging Camel cigarette brand during the 1980s, according to internal company documents released Wednesday. A 1987 memo stamped "RJR Secret" discusses the planned launch of "Project LF," a code name for Camel Wides, and says the cigarette it later introduced was aimed at "younger adult male smokers (primarily 13-24 year old male Marlboro smokers)." . . "The [Camel] brand must increase its share of penetration among the 14-to-24 age group ... which represent tomorrow's cigarette business," a marketing executive wrote in a 1975 memo to C.A. Tucker, then Reynolds vice president, marketing. In a separate memo two years earlier, a Reynolds executive suggested a comic advertising character "might get a much higher readership among younger people than any other type of copy."
- A leading Congressional critic of the tobacco industry released documents that he says show a concerted, decades-long effort to market cigarettes to young people. . . "If you are looking for a smoking gun regarding youth smoking, you need to look no further," Dr. David Kessler, a former head of the Food and Drug Administration, told Reuters in a telephone interview. "There should be no deals with this industry. There should be tobacco legislation but no deals. Not when this conduct has been displayed," Kessler, now dean of Yale University medical school, said after reviewing the papers.
- R.J. Reynolds developed a "direct advertising appeal to younger smokers" -- teens as young as 13 -- in the 1970s that resulted in the hip Joe Camel campaign and even a special brand aimed at boys, newly unveiled secret memos show. The papers, released Wednesday, provide the first detailed look at how the nation's No. 2 cigarette maker spurred youth sales -- and they promise to further complicate how Congress deals with the tobacco industry.
- Any shred of credibility the tobacco industry might once have had has long since gone up in smoke, thanks to its own greed, arrogance and devious ways. But for some strange reason, it keeps trying to portray itself as an innocent, misunderstood victim of Big Government. . . Somebody open a window. We're feeling sick.
- The new documents increase the pressure to crack down harshly on this rogue industry, either in the context of an overall tobacco settlement or through separate legislation aimed at strengthening legal and regulatory tools to combat youth smoking. . . If the long-stalled tobacco deal is to move forward in Congress, it seems clear that the penalties to be imposed on the industry should it fail to reduce youth smoking will need to be much harsher.
- THE R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. documents made public Wednesday pretty well destroy the case for granting the tobacco companies limited liability for the damage they and their products have done to the nation's health in the years since the nature of that damage became well understood. . . Nor -- if money is raised from the companies to force up the price of cigarettes, provide compensation for past harm and other purposes -- should the money and the splitting-up of it become the object of the exercise. Too many people are already circling that bait, including the administration.
- Knowing what it knows -- and the documents are damning -- may convince Congress to pull a provision in the tentative $368.5 billion settlement worked out with states that protects the tobacco industry from lawsuits. . . RJR's defense of the memos is ludicrous, trying to brush off the contradictions to a different era's attitudes or to typographical errors. The time for Congress to strike is now.
- Typos or no, Waxman intends to hand these documents to Atty. Gen. Janet Reno as part of the Justice Department's ongoing criminal probe into whether the industry misled government officials about their intentions toward kids. Perjury convictions should swiftly follow.
- The memo that mentioned 13-to-24-year-old Marlboro smokers in fact meant to say "18-to-24-year-old," RJR pointed out. In fact, the company has long been committed to stamping out youth smoking. At least of Marlboros. To suggest otherwise is not only unfair to RJR employees, the memo said, "it is unfair to the American people and serves only the agenda of some who seek to benefit from a broad misperception of how this company has conducted its business." The gall of these anti-tobacco types, trying to perpetrate this kind of fraud on the public and the press. There ought to be a law.
- An unanswered question in the tobacco wars is, does the cartoon character target teens? We asked teens what they think. 16-year-old Irma Victorio says, "Kids like the colorful stuff, the animals and all that. Yes, I think they are talking to kids."
- "With regard to social group participation, FUBYAS tend to live in a movie: They know the roles, they know the script, they know the costumes, they know the props. We want to supply one of the props -- their brand of cigarettes."
- A Michigan congressman on Friday accused R.J. Reynolds of discrimination, citing an internal marketing memo from 1969 that he said demeaned and stereotyped blacks. The remarks that angered Rep. John Conyers were in a September 1969 internal R.J. Reynolds media planning study on how best to appeal to blacks, Hispanics and Jews in advertising to get them to smoke. The marketing study says that blacks cherish quality products, remarking, "Negroes buy the best Scotch as long as the money lasts, most marketers agree."
- According to documents released today, R.J. Reynolds used the cartoon character Joe Camel to target young smokers. In response, President Clinton has urged Congress to act quickly on tobacco legislation. After a background report, the man who released the documents, Congressman Henry Waxman, joins a discussion on what the federal government should do about under-aged smoking
- According to more than 800 once-secret documents reviewed by The Kansas City Star, tobacco lawyers: *Steered scientific research to defend the industry against claims its products killed people. * Proposed a variety of public relations campaigns to squelch public alarm about smoking and health. * Cloaked the record of their activities from public scrutiny behind attorney-client privilege. The documents also reveal that Shook, Hardy & Bacon, a Kansas City law firm, advised all the major cigarette makers, including overseeing a special multimillion-dollar fund to pay for scientific research that cast doubts on whether cigarettes cause cancer.
- Shook, Hardy officials declined to comment on any of the documents. Stevens, general counsel at Lorillard, did not return telephone calls. Brown is no longer at the Chadbourne & Parke firm in New York and could not be reached. An administrator at the Jacob Medinger firm in New York said Jacob would have no comment. Witt is no longer with R.J. Reynolds and could not be reached. Decker, now with Latham & Watkins in New York, did not return phone calls. Decker's memo indicated that at the meeting Stevens wanted more discussion of specific projects and more information than was presented in some of the special project proposals. He repeated a concern "if the science is not worth a damn." Shinn of Shook Hardy interjected: "There are not enough witnesses... " Brown reminded Stevens that the point was to keep the debate about the scientific evidence open.
- When Geoffrey C. Bible, the urbane chairman of Philip Morris Co. Inc., began addressing a congressional committee yesterday, he urged its members to take "a look forward to cut these Gordian knots of conflict." It was a heroic task Bible gave the House Commerce Committee, so his reference to Greek mythology ‹ where King Gordius tied the tightest knot ever ‹ seemed apt. In mythology, Alexander the Great managed to cut through the knot with his sword. But in real life, such knots aren't so easily untied and conflicts resolved ‹ especially when Philip Morris and its allies have so many strands of intrigue still emerging from their pasts.
- New internal tobacco documents released Thursday suggest that Philip Morris Cos. (MO) also targeted children in its marketing campaigns. Top Democrats on the House Commerce Committee released four documents from the 1970s and 1980s that shows the nation's largest tobacco company's interest in selling to teenagers.
- House Democrats released damaging new documents Thursday showing that Philip Morris marketed Marlboro and other cigarette brands to youths as young as age 12. Ohio Democrat Sherrod Brown read aloud brief excerpts from the papers as the House Commerce Committee began hearings into the proposed national tobacco settlement, in which top executives were testifying. Brown said the documents would show that Philip Morris, the nation's largest tobacco company, did market research on "children as young as 12 -- sixth grade boys and girls."
- Decades of tobacco industry internal documents reveal numerous acknowledgments of the addictiveness of smoking -- the habit that one memo said gives the companies a need for "a larger bag to carry the money." The documents, released for Minnesota's lawsuit against the industry, show cigarette makers researching the health effects of smoking and studying how to increase the nicotine kick for smokers.
- Philip Morris, the nation's largest tobacco company, monitored the smoking habits of people as young as 12 because "today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer," according to internal documents released yesterday. Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.) and Rep. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) presented the four memos in a House Commerce Committee hearing
- Damaging information about the tobacco industry was disclosed here Thursday as a congressman released documents detailing the industry's attempts to specifically target African Americans, in particular African American youths. Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.), who released the material, said: "These documents make clear that the tobacco industry was targeting blacks, including black teenagers, at the same time the industry knew that tobacco was addictive and caused lung cancer and other smoking-related disease."
- R.J. Reynolds apologized yesterday. "We do recognize that some of the highlighted sections from selected documents may be unfortunate or even offensive, and we repeat what we said earlier that negative stereotypes, regardless of the point in history in which they were written, are inappropriate," the company said in a statement. It also said, however, that "adult smokers of different ethnic backgrounds should have information about brand options in the market in order to make informed purchase decisions."
- They also led to calls from African-American and other minority lawmakers, as well as from Dr. Louis Sullivan, the former secretary of health and human services, that some proceeds from any tobacco legislation enacted by Congress be directed toward minority communities. . . "With this additional transit effort, Kool will cover the top 25 markets in terms of absolute Negroes," the document stated.
- Another batch of tobacco documents has shed further light on how two companies designed marketing tactics geared toward teen-agers and minority groups. Michigan Rep. John Conyers, the senior Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, released the papers Thursday dating back to 1973, mostly from RJR Tobacco Co. and Brown and Williamson. . . One 1982 analysis broke the black smokers market into three segments it called "Coolness," "Virile" and "Stylish."
- Newly released tobacco industry documents provide another glimpse into how extensively the industry targeted young people -- and black youths in particular -- in its search for billions in profits. . . The documents released today show that, in 1973, an R.J. Reynolds marketing profile included a study of black smokers aged 14-20. A 1981 marketing plan stated, "The majority of blacks ... do not respond well to sophisticated or subtle humor in advertising. They related much more to overt, clear-cut story lines." A series of documents from 1972 point to the Brown & Williamson Co.'s efforts to attract youth smokers with sweet-flavored cigarettes, including blending artificial ingredients to produce a cola-like taste. "It's a well-known fact that teen-agers like sweet products. Honey might be considered."
- Internal documents from the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. appear to detail a long-running marketing strategy aimed at underage smokers. The hundreds of pages of documents, which also include detailed descriptions of marketing efforts to minority smokers, are being released this morning by Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) during a House Judiciary Committee hearing on the issue of legal protection for the tobacco industry.
- Hundreds of internal documents from the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. will be released this morning by Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich., during a House Judiciary Committee hearing on legal protection for the tobacco industry.
- Britain's biggest tobacco company secretly admitted 20 years ago that cigarettes are highly addictive and that nicotine is poisonous, the Observer has learnt. The admission, in internal British American Tobacco documents, flies in the face of tobacco companies' arguments, used in their defence in the United States as recently as last month, that cigarettes are not addictive.
- One of the world's largest tobacco firms secretly admitted nearly 20 years ago that it knew nicotine is both poisonous and addictive, a British newspaper reported Sunday. The Observer said the admission contained in internal documents from British American Tobacco could change the outcome of American lawsuits brought by smokers seeking damages from tobacco companies.
- David Bacon, the company's head of corporate communication, added: "You cannot draw conclusions from individual documents. They need to be considered in the proper context in the debate at the time. "All aspects of the smoking debate have been taking place in public for decades, so it is not surprising that it is taking place inside the company and that some documents contained references to a subject which never became company policy." Mr Bacon said.
- WASHINGTON (Reuters) - House Commerce Committee Chairman Tom Bliley said Thursday he had subpoenaed more than 39,000 additional documents from tobacco companies. "This should come as no surprise," Bliley said in the statement. "I've said all along that if more documents were identified in the Minnesota case as possibly containing evidence of crime or fraud that I would request them. More documents have been identified, and these documents should see the light of day."
- "I think it's nice they're doing it," said Stanton Glantz, a San Francisco-based researcher and one of the country's leading anti-smoking activists. "They're obviously doing it because they know the documents are going to be released by the court. They're trying to pre-empt it. But that's OK, I guess." . . . These days, "the game they're playing is warm and cuddly, so the Congress will bail them out," Glantz said. John Banzhaf, head of the Washington, D.C., group Action on Smoking and Health, was also skeptical. "This is not that they've turned over a new tobacco leaf," he said. "This is nothing more than damage control."
- On February 27, the major cigarette companies will post on the Internet the first installment of the documents their chief executive officers offered to make public in recent Congressional testimony. In a process unprecedented in corporate history, these documents are the first of tens of millions of pages to be opened for public access in coming weeks. . . The various company document Web sites will be accessible through www.tobaccoresolution.com . This initial installment will include the vast majority of those selected by the Minnesota Attorney General for use in his lawsuit. . . Each Web site will offer an index to aid users in their searches of the documents. Additional documents will be posted to the Web sites in installments as quickly as possible.
- British American Tobacco considered "exploiting" cannabis by adding "near-subliminal levels of the drug", according to the Observer. It said internal documents showed that BAT was preparing itself for the future possible legalisation of the drug. Cigarette companies had already registered brand names with links to the drug, like Acapulco Gold and Red Leb, short for Red Lebanese. The document "considers the main threats to the smoking habit... and draws attention to the undoubted opportunities which exist in the development of future products". It went on: "In the illicit use of marijuana, relatively large doses of the active principal are involved. "If the use of such drugs was legalised, one avenue for exploitation would be the augmentation of cigarettes with near subliminal levels of the drug."
- Tobacco-industry documents, including some released in recent weeks, strongly suggest that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. altered nicotine delivery to smokers, apparently believing that doing so would increase the "kick" of its popular Winston brand and make it more competitive.
- Jurors pored over formerly confidential tobacco industry documents Wednesday, learning further details about what cigarette makers knew and kept under wraps for decades. The jurors were given the entire day to examine documents from the files of the 11 defendants in Minnesota's trial of the tobacco industry.
- 27 million pages are posted to deflect critics' charges they're hiding damaging information. Attempting to neutralize charges that they are keeping damaging material secret, the tobacco industry began posting a staggering 27 million pages of internal documents on the Internet on Friday. The massive disclosure of internal documents was, as the industry put it, "unprecedented in the history of American business" and may be the largest amount of material ever posted on the Internet in one day. Ironically, the introduction to RJR's document Web site said that it contained five separate filters if parents were concerned about children seeing the material. Because of its Joe Camel campaign, RJR has been the cigarette company most under attack for marketing its products to kids.
- "It's disingenuous for the tobacco industry to claim this PR stunt proves they are coming clean with the truth," Humphrey said in a statement. "It's like Richard Nixon taking credit for releasing the Watergate tapes."
- Each of the four major tobacco companies provided separate indexes to the material. The instructions on how to download the material from Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ran 21 pages. . . But computer technicians and librarians at The Times and other news organizations, as well as staff members of the Minnesota attorney general's office, had considerable difficulty downloading the material, which was posted at the www.tobaccoresolution. . . While each company provided detailed and lengthy instructions for searching the index, it was necessary to have some information to start with, such as a name or a date or an identification number of some kind.
- The tobacco industry today posted hundreds of thousands of internal documents on the Internet to keep a promise that tobacco executives made to Congress last month. The documents included most of those compiled by Minnesota and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota in their $1.77 billion lawsuit against the industry, now in its sixth week. Tobacco interests said the posting showed the industry's new attitude of openness and cooperation. "This is not a hollow gesture," said Scott Williams, a tobacco industry spokesman in Washington. "This is an unprecedented release of industry material."
- For tobaccophiles already feasting on the smorgasbord of long-secret cigarette company documents made public in the past few months, the cook comes out of the kitchen today with the heaping next course. At 11 a.m. CDT, anyone with a computer and a modem can head to http://www.tobaccoresolution.com and see the first installment of documents that cigarette industry executives recently promised Congress they would release. The majority of the first internal records posted online will be those chosen by Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey III for use in the lawsuit the state and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota is prosecuting against the major cigarette manufacturers.
- But finding such documents as the memo described above takes some real digging. . . But, even without detailed knowledge of what to look for, the casual reader can search for key words in hopes of turning up a relevant document. And sometimes that turns up an interesting document. A search for the phrase "nicotine research" revealed the 15-year-old internal Reynolds memo, which is fascinating reading. For example, the memo writer was worried that Reynolds had no scientific studies of its own dealing with the relationships between medicine and behavior in such areas as nicotine addiction.
- Two months after a top executive of Philip Morris Cos. testified in 1994 before Congress that the cigarette maker did not "manipulate or independently control" nicotine in its products, company scientists reported on experiments that indicated that they could produce "enhanced" nicotine effects on a smoker's nervous system, an internal company document shows.
- "If you have 30 million pages of paper and you don't have a road map, it's pretty hard to make anything of it," said David J. Adelman, a tobacco analyst with Morgan Stanley Dean Witter.
- Newly released documents showing that scientists at Philip Morris Cos. reported they could enhance the effect of nicotine may be significant for Justice Department investigators. But on Capitol Hill, the industry's reputation already is as low as it can be, lawmakers and others said. "There is no question that the tobacco companies have known their products were addictive and have deliberately marketed them as such," Sen. Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch said Sunday. "My focus is more on future opportunities than on past misconduct," the Utah Republican said.
- Last week, with the trial in its sixth week in state court in St. Paul, Minn., plaintiffs entered into evidence focus-group interviews conducted in 1991 for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. The company had hired a consulting firm to interview Camel smokers in the Dallas area to better understand the popularity of Joe Camel among 18 to 34 year olds. . . "He's a rebel in a good sense -- a free spirit who does what he's in the mood to do but not at the expense of others. I think he'd go out of his way not to hurt someone else." * "Basically, he'd be there for you." * "Gives guys hope that one day, if they make it, they can do whatever they enjoy most."
- The noon deadline Thursday for tobacco companies to deliver 39,000 documents subpoenaed by the House Commerce Committee has passed. But Representative Tom Bliley (R-VA), who chairs the panel, says he will not take further action until a Minnesota court renders a decision concerning those documents. That decision could be rendered within days.
- But a Reynolds document, attached as an exhibit to a lawsuit filed against the company in state court in Philadelphia, is the first to indicate that Reynolds's own measure of tar and nicotine intake for its Winston brand in 1979 was nearly double the numbers estimated using the Federal Trade Commission's method. . . The internal Reynolds study was cited in a report written in 1994 by Alan Rodgman, a former Reynolds research director who is now an outside consultant to the company. Mr. Rodgman had expressed doubts about the validity of any tar and nicotine yields measured by smoking machines in another report in 1965. Machine measurements, he said in that report, "cannot give the smoker meaningful information... . He is more likely to be misled than informed."
- Now I'd guess I could drive across Texas faster than I could read all this legal and scientific stuff. So before leaving for El Paso, I'll close with my personal favorite among this treasure trove of tobacco thinking. It's an undated advertisement that shows a baby saying, "You're darn tootin my dad smokes Marlboro . . . he knows what's good for him!"
- "Concern was expressed that other people might perceive a Harley-Davidson smoker as a bad biker type, and for the majority expressing that concern, that was a potential major negative for the product," a Lorillard official wrote in a January 1988 report after members of a focus group told the company how they felt about the new cigarette. The Lorillard-Harley memos are among thousands of pages of documents released by the cigarette maker last month. . . The tobacco company would find, however, that the Harley cigarette would be doomed not by a "bad biker" image, but rather by the motorcycle company itself. After fearing that Lorillard's proposed national ads for the smoke would appeal to children, Harley decided it wanted out of the deal.
- " When I smoked them among the other HOG members, it looked cool, " said Pachi, known as " Ma" in the club. " They' d say, ' Wow, where did you get the Harley cigarettes?" ' While Harley butts were a hit with some smokers, the Milwaukee-based motorcycle maker came to regret its foray into the cigarette business. Court documents recently released on the Internet from tobacco lawsuits shed light on how the deal went up in smoke.
- The records of Reynolds and Philip Morris Inc., maker of the No. 1 Marlboro brand, show how both companies relied heavily on image to sell cigarettes, particularly to young people. In the mid-1980s, Reynolds was looking at ways to reposition Camel as the brand choice among younger adult smokers, recognized as the key to the future of the business. Marlboro, at the time, was the choice of 75 percent of non-menthol smokers between the ages of 18 and 24, Reynolds noted in an advertising development memo.
- Lawyers for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. suppressed research on the hazards of smoking -- including the discovery of how to remove dangerous carbon monoxide from cigarettes -- and even destroyed early evidence, according to documents that Congress released Wednesday over the industry's fierce objections.
- Although it will take some time for lawyers and scientists to digest the mass of documents, initial samplings found evidence that at least some of the companies had destroyed or concealed damaging health research. Some research was also done overseas, particularly in Germany. The documents also show that lawyers played a clear role in guiding researchers, setting parameters for their projects and teaching them how to avoid "sensitive" information in their written reports, a process that one 1985 Reynolds Tobacco document referred to as "wordsmithing."
- The defendants delivered the documents to the state of Minnesota and Blue Cross and Blue Shield two weeks ago. Rep. Thomas J. Bliley, R-Va., chairman of the House Commerce Committee, subpoenaed them weeks before the issue reached the high court. The posting did not include 400 documents that remained under bipartisan staff review at the request of Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich. Those documents may contain confidential business information that affects the privacy of third parties or may figure in pending litigation. Committee staff were unsure when review of those documents would be complete.
- Highly sensitive tobacco-industry documents expected to be released this week detail such issues as a cigarette maker's use of a secret offshore facility to conduct research and the extensive role of industry lawyers in controlling -- and allegedly concealing -- the results.
- The privileged tobacco documents made public on the internet today show that the attorneys representing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. were doing what lawyers are supposed to do -- preparing the company to defend itself in litigation and regulatory challenges. While we are disappointed that the House Commerce Committee would not recognize attorney-client privilege for all the documents, we believe it upheld important legal principles in deciding not to publish all the documents, including some that contain vital trade secrets that distinguish one brand from another. . . While we anticipate that plaintiffs' lawyers will now attempt to use these documents in courts by taking them out of context and trying to mischaracterize and misconstrue them, we will respond as appropriate.
- But the " smoking howitzers, " as the plaintiffs so often called them, fell silent after that. Except for one document Ciresi used to make a minor point Tuesday during the testimony of a Philip Morris vice president, the plaintiffs have not used any of the hard-won papers since the April 14-16 testimony of Scott Appleton, a toxicologist for Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. And the jury might not get to see many more of what Attorney General Hubert Humphrey III often called " the crown jewels of the conspiracy." With the defense preparing to rest its case early the week of May 3, Ciresi said he doesn' t need to do much more with the fresh documents before the case goes to the jury.
- At issue is a 104-page report from the law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue that laid out how Reynolds Tobacco officials had hidden, destroyed or edited scientific research that linked smoking to cancer. Humphrey prepared a summary of the report and a news release, then provided the document to reporters when they couldn't find it on a U.S. House of Representatives Internet site where 39,000 previously secret industry records were released Wednesday.
- In about 1953, Claude Teague, a top RJR scientist, reviewed smoking and health literature and was surprised by the amount of material that "indicted" cigarette smoking, the report said. The Law Department advised that Teague's report not be circulated. A scientist who found a dangerous compound present in cigarette smoke and found an efficient filter in about 1965-67 was told not to prepare a final report on the research. Lawyers also suppressed discovery of a method to remove harmful carbon monoxide.
- A quick search of this batch revealed that in about 1,300 Philip Morris documents, Shook, Hardy attorneys were mentioned 439 times. A computerized search found four of the firm's attorneys -- David Hardy, Pat Sirridge, William Shinn and Don Hoel -- among the top 11 authors of documents in the Philip Morris section.
- Lawyers for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. turned up evidence 13 years ago that company officials destroyed or altered research papers and lied to the public, a once-secret memo says. The 120-page memo, prepared in 1985 by an outside law firm and stamped "Privileged and Confidential," describes three decades of efforts by the nation's No. 2 cigarette maker to protect itself from the dual threats of smoker lawsuits and science linking cigarettes to disease.
- "I'm not sure that any new revelations, while troubling, will be particularly surprising," said Sen. John McCain . . . For many years, for example, Philip Morris Cos. ran a smoking research facility in Germany. In one 1993 document, a company official outlines a policy under which reports from the German facility were to be sent to Richmond, Va., home to the company's domestic tobacco operations. Executives in this country were then to return the documents to Germany when they were finished reviewing them, the document states.
- "The testimony by tobacco executives before Congress was indelibly imprinted on the minds of the American public," Seligman added, referring to the occasion in 1994 when top executives of seven large tobacco companies testified that they did not believe cigarettes were addictive. "If Congress believes the lawyers were aware, when that testimony was given, that it was untrue, I think it is possible -- and perhaps likely -- that Congress will examine the lawyers' role."
- The 104-page Reynolds memo got the most attention yesterday because it covered 40 years of that company's relationship between its legal and scientific departments. It discussed altering scientific reports at different times "to eliminate unfortunate word choices," including information about diseases caused by tobacco products, all to keep information out of the hands of "the enemy." Charles Blixt, Reynolds' executive vice president and general counsel, said yesterday that Humphrey, who sent out a lengthy summary of the RJR document, was attempting to "mislead the American people by mischaracterizing portions of this report, even when he knows that many of the things he says about it are not true on their face."
- The released documents are dominated by memos between lawyers and scientists, and it is striking how legal concerns shaded almost all aspects of the industry. "Counsel at Shook, Hardy, & Bacon and Covington & Burling are seeking scientists and physicians able and willing to refute claims of nonsmoker harm," reads one RJR memo detailing efforts to deal with studies about the harms of second-hand smoke.
- Now antitobacco lawyer CLIFF DOUGLAS says he plans to file complaints against tobacco lawyers with state bar disciplinary authorities and to urge the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION and Congress to look into the lawyers' conduct. In Minnesota, where a trial is under way in the state's case, Attorney General HUBERT "SKIP" HUMPHREY strongly condemned the attorneys yesterday and provided the media with a summary prepared by his office of the 1985 law firm report. Mr. Humphrey contends that the 104-page report describes a history of document destruction at Reynolds dating to 1953. It was prepared by the Cleveland law firm Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. But Jones Day litigation department head John Strauch challenged the attorney general's summary, saying that the report it was based on referred to possible document destruction only twice and that in both instances the documents were saved on microfilm and turned over to plaintiffs in Minnesota.
- House Commerce Committee Chairman Thomas Bliley is withholding from public view about 400 of the 39,000 documents he subpoenaed from tobacco companies while his staff and that of the panel's ranking Democrat, Rep. John Dingell of Michigan, consider industry claims that the papers should, for various reasons, remain confidential. . . In a memo to members of his committee, Mr. Bliley, a Virginia Republican, explained that the 400 documents "may contain confidential business information, information affecting the privacy of third parties, and information possibly relating to pending litigation."
- An R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. report released yesterday shows that the company suppressed and reworded damaging research on tobacco products. . . . The Reynolds document [is] called "RJR Research and Development Activities, Fact Team Memorandum, Volume III"
- Within hours, Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey III said one of them proved that for 30 years the nation's second-biggest tobacco company "systematically destroyed, suppressed, reworded and concealed damaging research." Among the 39,000 new documents was a candid 104-page report compiled in 1985 by the Cleveland-based law firm of JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE for R.J. REYNOLDS.
- Across the Atlantic, JOSEPH CULLMAN III, PHILIP MORRIS Cos.' chief executive at the time, expressed interest in "getting answers to certain problems" by contracting work out to labs in Europe, as he said in a memo on Feb. 24, 1970. Thereafter, Philip Morris acquired the lab, called INBIFO, which then generated $250,000 a year. . . "I feel [this] presents an opportunity that is relatively lacking in risk and unattractive repercussions in [the U.S.]," Mr. Cullman wrote.
- A lawyer for the state of Minnesota said Thursday that the most sensitive of the 39,000 tobacco-industry documents posted on the Internet this week by the House Commerce Committee are virtually impossible for the public to find because the identifying numbers on the documents are different from the ones provided to the state. . . "Obviously something was done to make it more difficult for the public to get at these documents," said Michael Ciresi, lead lawyer for Minnesota. Spokesmen for Philip Morris Cos. and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the nation's two largest cigarette manufacturers, couldn't explain the discrepancies.
- "Rodgman (a company scientist) recalled that at one point in mid-50s Ramm (a company lawyer) came to his lab and asked him if he in fact had identified benzopyrene and other (carcinogenic) compounds in cigarette smoke. Rodgman told him that he had, and, after looking at Rodgman's lab notebook, Ramm asked Rodgman why he thought benzopyrene was there. Rodgman explained that there were five indicia of the existence of (it) in cigarette smoke. . . . Ramm then asked, 'Why do you have to be so damned thorough?'"
- The nation's largest cigarette maker disagreed with efforts by the rest of the tobacco industry to fight smoking by kids, according to a document formerly kept secret under attorney-client privilege. A May 1979 memo from a tobacco lawyer to the industry's "committee of counsel" said Philip Morris officials didn't agree that smoking was harmful to children but did agree the issue was controversial. "They believe the industry should not show `gratification' at news that smoking among children is trending down or express the view that children should not smoke," wrote Ernest Pepples, who was senior vice president and general counsel for Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
- In their sum, the papers portray an industry caught up in a uniquely hostile environment, determined to control the public debate even though, as one tobacco consultant understates in a memo, "this business defies traditional public-relations fixings."
- A provocative memo describing how R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. lawyers suppressed research on the health hazards of smoking has been removed from a congressional Web site after company officials complained that it
- The cover memo, written by a Jon Zoler to two top company officers, introduces a 27-page memo entitled "Trends in Smoking Among High School Seniors." The long memo, prepared by another Philip Morris employee, analyzes data on smoking trends in two national behavioral surveys of 18-year-olds by researchers at the University of Michigan and University of California-Los Angeles.
- A British anti-smoking group on Thursday accused BAT Industries Plc (quote from Yahoo! UK & Ireland: BATS.L), the world's second largest tobacco multinational, of failing to discourage pregnant women from smoking despite allegedly knowing the dangers it posed to unborn babies. Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) said company documents showed BAT knew about the health hazards in 1974 but decided not to try to stop expectant mothers from smoking.
- Internal tobacco company memos, posted on the Internet last week, provide the clearest picture yet of the companies' concerted efforts to deny the risks posed by passive smoking . . . They reveal the extraordinary effort the firms put into the problem of passive smoking--forming advisory groups, funding studies, picking holes in the work of unfriendly researchers, and barring others from attending industry-sponsored seminars.
- From: BOZELL SAWYER MILLER GROUP . . . it is crucial that the industry take Immediate steps following the holidays to shore up existing support, educate and engage new allies and address critics head-on Although many agree that some form of tobacco control legislation will be passed in the first half of 1998, the industry should wage an aggressive campaign to ensure that this legislation closely resembles the current PR. . . Internet Website Development . . . The web page would also be useful in capturing valuable demographic information to the extent possible.
- In March 1994, the directors of Philip Morris Cos., the world's largest cigarette maker, gathered to hear a warning that their industry faced tumultuous change. . . In a slide presentation that day, Philip Morris executives . . they promised to fight any regulation of nicotine -- and the industry's counterattack soon began. Tobacco strategists raised concerns that regulating cigarettes like drugs would create a thriving black market. And executives urged allies in Congress to put Kessler on the "hot seat" in public hearings. . . Lawyers and public relations experts turned up their efforts to influence and intimidate the media. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. even considered suing cartoonist GARRY TRUDEAU, the creator of the "DOONESBURY" comic strip, for a story line that executives viewed as defamatory. These and other details are from a cache of more than 38,000 internal industry documents that a congressional committee released last week, after a long fight by cigarette makers to keep them secret.
- "Smoke as many as you want," the ads for Camel cigarettes proclaimed in 1934. "They never get on your nerves." A year later, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. was telling customers to smoke Camels because "They don't get your wind." And by 1948, Reynolds was proclaiming that "More doctors smoke camels than any other cigarette." Cigarette ads with quasi health claims proliferated from the 1930s until the mid-1950s, when they were pulled by tobacco companies as evidence grew linking smoking and disease. Just how far those early health claims went is outlined in "A Review of Health References in Cigarette Advertising 1927-1964," a document from Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. introduced in Minnesota's tobacco trial.
- The first BAT document, a discussion of policy options, shows that the company considered a public stance that would "not encourage smoking: by children; by pregnant women; to excess". However, a line is hand-drawn through the words "by pregnant women". The second document shows the final policy document in which pregnant women are omitted from the short list of smoking activities BAT would discourage. This document was a strategy document sent to company heads worldwide. ASH believes that BAT - the world's second largest tobacco multinational - decided against any warning action to protect itself from litigation. By effectively acknowledging that pregnant women are at risk from smoking, the company would have had to answer the following questions:i
- The head of research for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. believed in the early 1980s that the government should regulate cigarettes but changed his mind after lawyers told him that such a move would hamper Reynolds' ability to market products, according to a memorandum by a company lawyer. "When he first came to the company, he thought that perhaps the company would be better off under FDA jurisdiction," an outside lawyer for Reynolds, whose parent is RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp., wrote in a 1983 memorandum referring to the research official, G. Robert DiMarco. "He now understands from what the lawyers have told him that this might not be good because it might affect the ability of the company to market its products in supermarkets and other places."
- Smoking by kids as young as kindergarteners and a " trip to the woodshed" for a tobacco executive were among the highlights Tuesday of the final batch of documents introduced in Minnesota' s tobacco trial.
- The world's largest cigarette maker stopped the publication of research in 1983 that found evidence that nicotine was addictive, days after outside lawyers warned the company that such research had "undesirable and dangerous implications" for smoking-related lawsuits. And two months after receiving the lawyers' warning that nicotine research at one of its laboratories could damage the industry in trials, the cigarette maker, Philip Morris Cos., tried to move the laboratory to Europe and, failing in that, closed it in early 1984. The memorandum, written by lawyers at Shook, Hardy & Bacon, a tobacco law firm in Kansas City, Mo., is among the industry documents that the state of Minnesota entered as evidence this week in its lawsuit against five tobacco companies.
- While the tobacco industry was telling the public and the government that it was hard at work researching the health effects of smoking, company lawyers were hard at work trying to curb that research for fear it would hurt the firms if it ever came out in court.
- Following is the text of the 1954 tobacco industry advertisement that came to be known during Minnesota's tobacco trial as the "Frank Statement." In his jury instructions Wednesday, Judge Kenneth Fitzpatrick said that jurors should assume in their deliberations that tobacco companies assumed a "special duty" by publishing the ad, and that jurors will have to determine whether the industry fulfilled that duty.
- Disclosure of the documents, many dating back 40 years, has done enormous damage, outraging citizens() and forcing once-helpful politicians to climb on the anti-tobacco bandwagon. Notes Southern Illinois University law professor Donald Garner: The tobacco companies "are dying the death of a thousand paper cuts."
- A 1992 memo from one Philip Morris official, headlined "When Nicotine is not Nicotine" discussed smokers' differing responses when different compounds of nicotine had been sprayed on cigarette filler. It recommended more work be done. But the project, called ART stem, for which the tests were run, was halted by 1994. A November 1990 memo from its electrophysiological studies researchers said their work had "shown there are optimal cigarette nicotine deliveries for producing the most favorable physiological and behavioral responses." Other documents presented in the Minnesota case show Philip Morris also paid close attentionto teen-age smokers.
- April 3, 1970 Auerbach dog study memo
- September 18, 1981 Committee of Counsel Meeting
- March 31, 1981 Philip Morris Johnston/Seligman "Young Smokers" document that "shocked" Geoffrey Bible
- July 17, 1963 Addison Yeaman memo
Exhibits Listing
- The United States tobacco giant, PHILIP MORRIS, infiltrated the British scientific establishment with consultants paid to promote the tobacco industry's line on passive smoking, according to a confidential memo from the company's lawyers. The 1990 memo from the London office of COVINGTON AND BURLING, released on the Internet, claims one consultant, recruited by Philip Morris, was an editor of THE LANCET, one of Britain's most prestigious medical journals, and another was an adviser to a Commons select committee.
- THE tobacco company Philip Morris recruited a covert army of scientists to contribute to The Lancet and other journals to counter bad publicity about passive smoking, it was claimed last night. A company "consultant" also advised a a Commons select committee on pollution. The infiltration exercise, codenamed "Project Whitecoat", is described in a 1990 memorandum from an American law firm acting for the company, which has released some 39,000 papers as part of a Minnesota lawsuit.
- Indoor Air International (IAI) was born in 1989, but was renamed the International Society of the Built Environment six years later. Based in Geneva, the society organises conferences, publishes a journal and acts as a forum for research into such areas as sick building syndrome and the hazards of microscopic airborne fibres and particles.
- I and my colleagues take the allegation made in the 1990 memorandum from Covington and Burling (p7, vii) extremely seriously, although the details remain vague and lack confirmation. I had not heard of the existence of the European Consultancy Programme until New Scientist drew it to my attention. . . I note that no corroborative evidence to support Covington and Burling's assertion is provided by New Scientist and no name is cited by either Covington and Burling or New Scientist. I have referred this matter to our Ombudsman for further independent review. Richard Horton Editor, The Lancet
- The files, disclosed in the state's lawsuit against cigarette makers, show that Wes Lane, longtime lobbyist for the Teamsters, worked as a $2,500-a-month "consultant" for the Tobacco Institute, the industry's trade group. . . . He was probably the prime reason I lost most of the improvements I was trying to make to the Clean Indoor Air Act," said Rep. Phyllis Kahn, DFL-Minneapolis, sponsor of the landmark anti-smoking legislation in 1975. "He would basically say that he was there representing labor and labor was opposed to this. He never said he was being paid by the tobacco industry."
- PETR SKABANEK, an associate professor of community health at Trinity College in Dublin, is suspected of being the paid consultant to the U.S. tobacco giant Philip Morris alleged to have infiltrated the British medical journal Lancet. . . Skabanek, a chain smoker who died aged 53 in 1994, was not an editor of the Lancet but was a regular contributor and wrote a number of editorials. An epidemiologist, he held views against the grain of conventional medical thinking and disputed the idea that many diseases were preventable.
- CIGARETTES-to-life insurance giant BAT Industries today hit back at suggestions that it failed to warn pregnant women of the dangers of smoking in the Seventies. Public affairs spokesman Michael Prideaux said the allegations totally misrepresented the company's policy. He said: "The company's position in the Seventies was for pregnant women to talk to their doctors. I would contend the risks of smoking during pregnancy were well known in the Seventies. I remember my own wife being advised to that effect."
- "It's a nice story, but it's a little old," said Lane, now semiretired in Shoreview but still acting as a lobbyist from time to time. "Anybody who's tied into it is either retired or dead."
- A Teamster official, who said he did not know of Lane's work for the tobacco group until now, expressed outrage. "Do I condone it? Absolutely not," said Harold Yates, president of Minnesota DRIVE, the Teamsters' political arm that employed Lane until last year. "I'm very, very upset because I paid the person a decent wage. Why he would do that is beyond me. The only reason I can see is greed."
- For the next round of political reformation, how about requiring that lobbyists dress the way race car drivers do? . . Had we had the label requirement for lobbyists in effect a few years ago, Wes Lane would have shown up for work with "Teamsters" on one lapel and "Tobacco" on the other. As it was, legislators -- and perhaps Teamsters officials -- didn't know that Lane, once a crusty and powerful figure at the Capitol, was taking money from tobacco while collecting his salary from the Teamsters.
- In an R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. memo, dated April 8, 1987, and titled "Priority Ingredients," toxicologist Scott Appleton lists 17 chemicals and describes their potential health effects. Camphene, for example, is listed as "a turpene [sic], many terpenes are regarded as tumor promote rs in rodents." The memo also says that cocoa, commonly used in candy, is reported to "increase the skin tumor initiating activity of cigarette smoke condensate in mice."
- Nearly 400 additional tobacco documents are being released at 2 PM today by the House Commerce Committee on its website: http://www.house.gov/commerce/TobaccoDocs/documents.html . . . After a bipartisan staff review, Bliley and Dingell agreed that 39 documents (excluding duplicates) should remain confidential because they contain: proprietary trade secret information; information directly related to pending litigation; or potentially defamatory information regarding named plaintiffs in lawsuits. None of the 39 documents contains any discussion relating to the health risks associated with tobacco use. In addition, any trade secret information contained in the documents is regularly provided on a confidential and aggregate basis by the tobacco industry to the Federal Government. . . A Committee Print of the documents on CD-ROM will be issued by the Government Printing Office (GPO) containing the full set of all documents released on the Committee's website.
- The chairman of cigarette giant British American Tobacco blocked plans to develop a safe cigarette, according to internal documents seen by The Observer, Anti-smoking groups condemned the revelation as "shocking", saying BAT was more concerned with its image than people's health. The company memo shows Sir Patrick Sheehy was afraid that developing a safe cigarette would imply that ordinary cigarettes are "unsafe". Clive Bates, director of anti-smoking pressure group Ash, said: "It shows that the boss of BAT chose not to give a higher priority to safe cigarettes for PR reasons."
- " My role has been to assist the wholesalers, the vendors and the retailers in responding to a relentless attack by anti-tobacco groups on their legitimate business interests, " BRIANT said. Briant said it is no secret that his groups are backed by the tobacco industry: He disclosed the funding sources in annual reports filed with the Ethical Practices Board, though he did not reveal dollar figures. But beyond the disclosure on those forms, neither Briant nor his groups advertised their alliance with the industry.
- DAVID ROE, former president of the Minnesota AFL-CIO, has worked as a paid lobbyist for a tobacco industry group since 1995, but didn't fully disclose the relationship in state lobbying reports, newly released documents show.
- David Roe, 73, of Medicine Lake used his influence in the labor movement to campaign against federal regulation of cigarettes, the Saint Paul Pioneer Press said in early Sunday editions. . . " It seems downright deceptive, " said Weigum, president of the Association for Non-Smokers Minnesota. " It looks to me like he managed to do it in a way that neatly avoids being caught despite the fact that all kinds of us were looking at it."
- The Philip Morris official wrote "[W]hen asked to comment on Humphrey's accusation that we are not to be trusted and our program is a pathetic, grandstanding, foot-dragging, finger-pointing PR stunt, I told (the reporter) that he could tell Humphrey we think he is a lying, power-tripping, sheep-loving, all-talk-but-no-action loser." The memo added in parenthesis, "Just kidding about the last part." The comments were not actually made to the reporter. When told about the memo last week, Humphrey's staff first had a laugh, then spent two days drafting a cautious response.
- A tobacco company had a secret strategy for fighting anti-smoking efforts in Australia. The plans, which included backing new political groups and encouraging debate about problems in the political system, are contained in newly released internal documents from Philip Morris. They also recommended building relationships with politicians, the union movement and the ACTU, as well as putting "pressure on selected" members of the Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria's board. The 1992 documents suggested that political attacks on the Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy (MCDS) be encouraged, and the community and politicians urged to focus on illicit drugs. Another plan was to "support or create groups concerned with the usurpation of political power by bureaucracy," and to work with other groups to investigate launching an organisation devoted to marketing freedoms and free speech.
- The plan said: "Australia has one of the best organised, best financed, most politically savvy and well connected anti-smoking movements in the world." It suggests to: "Create sufficient counterforces in Australian political life that the Antis loose their ability to legislate and regulate at will."
- http://www.philipmorris.com Thinking of suing the bejeezus out of Big Tobacco? Wondering how to get started? Well, the folks at Philip Morris have provided an online home for searching the more than 1 million documents produced by the lawsuit filed by the state of Minnesota against the company. The documents are searchable by a number of ways, and visitors can view and print a single page at a time.
- Todd Paulson, executive director of Common Cause Minnesota, requested a committee hearing, following a series of newspaper disclosures about secret tobacco industry payments to labor lobbyists and industry gifts to several legislators' favorite charities. The latest gift-giving incident was self-reported by SEN. DOUG JOHNSON, DFL-Tower, longtime chairman of the Senate Tax Committee and a Democratic candidate for governor.
- Documents released under last month' s settlement of the Minnesota tobacco case name former House Speaker Irv ANDERSON, DFL-International Falls, Sen. Steve NOVAK, DFL-New Brighton, and former Senate Republican leader Dean JOHNSON of Willmar. " It shows the influence of tobacco money on the Legislature, " said Jeanne WEIGUM, president of the Association for Nonsmokers-Minnesota . . . The three legislators denied Tuesday that the donations influenced their legislative positions.
- Using excerpts from the industry's own internal documents, the three TV ads and two newspaper ads will begin appearing locally today and will be made available to public officials in any other states, said Dr. GREGORY CONNOLLY, director of the state's $36 million Tobacco Control Program.
- The tobacco industry is going to get its own words hurled back in its face in an advertising campaign being launched by the state Department of Public Health that features ominous excerpts from internal industry documents. . . Another ad cites a 1972 document that says, " Happily for the tobacco industry, nicotine is both habituating and unique in its variety of physiological actions." Public Health Commissioner Howard Koh said the campaign was " just a small step toward exposing the truth about industry tactics against our sons and daughters."
- Nearly three decades ago, the cigarette industry considered launching an offensive similar to the one that is taking place now against big-spending Washington politicians who want to raise tobacco taxes. Lawyers recoiled in horror. An attorney for the industry, DAVID HARDY, warned that such an ad "would be detrimental to the industry with respect to its effect on legislators whose consideration we might seek." The theme that "the smoker is mad or angry" was all right, Hardy said, but it should be directed at anti-smoking zealots and not politicians. No such fear haunts the industry now. Its TV and radio ad campaign on CNN and local stations around the country urges the public to get on Congress's case immediately to stop a tax increase and a big Washington grab for the smokers' wallet. It's a gamble, but it may be having an effect.
- Among the documents is a Philip Morris corporate affairs plan for Australia that shows it intended to spend $100,000 per month countering the anti-smoking message when its New York parent knew for decades smoking could kill. A memorandum from the industry's former political lobby organisation, The Tobacco Institute of Australia, recommended spending $200,000 to set up an independent working party of experts to "mirror" the work on passive smoking of an official joint working party of the Natonal Health and Medical Research Council. It set out to handpick 20 scientists and medical specialists for this body.
- Philip Morris also planned to "diffuse and reorient" the World Health Organisation and the International Union Against Cancer, and to oppose airline smoking bans and legislation restricting smoking in restaurants globally. . . The 1988 document, now made public as part of a multi-billion dollar US legal settlement, reveals that the company also wanted to destroy attempts by governments and others to reduce cigarette constituent levels. And, with the tobacco industry as a whole, it was prepared to spend hundreds of millions of dollars backing its causes in Australia, Europe, Latin America and Asia. Anti-smoking lobbyists expressed horror at the contents of the documents yesterday.
- Public health minister Tessa Jowell joined in the broadside against the tobacco companies over the report which was said to reveal an "appalling catalogue of evidence" of the industry's deceit. Doctors also took part in the attack, with the British Medical Association accusing the tobacco giants of "a conspiracy against the vulnerable".
- Lorillard Tobacco Co. strongly suggested in confidential documents that its customers smoked because they were physically addicted to nicotine, that high school students were the core of its customer base, and that a supposedly independent industry-funded health research organization was a public relations machine. The documents also show that Greensboro-based Lorillard extensively studied ways to elevate the delivery of nicotine and considered developing a brand aimed at image-conscious teenagers. . . "It's better than a confession," said Thompson, whose office is in Birmingham, Ala. "I've handled several class actions where you had one smoking gun, but never have I had a case like this where you've got smoking guns everywhere."
- DR. BENNETT JENSON says he has collected more than $400,000 from the tobacco industry to conduct numerous cancer studies since 1983. But Jenson said he never knew about the controversy over a proposed $40,000 payment to him in 1992 that was the topic of internal law firm memos and a letter to Lorillard from its law firm. The documents were released as part of the tobacco industry trial in Minnesota this spring. They were in Lorillard Tobacco Co.'s possession because in 1992 the Greensboro cigarette maker raised questions about the legal implications of participating in the one-time payment to Jenson by the tobacco industry with one purpose being to keep him happy."
- Nearly three decades ago, the cigarette industry considered launching an offensive similar to the one that is taking place now against big-spending Washington politicians who want to raise tobacco taxes. Lawyers recoiled in horror. An attorney for the industry, DAVID HARDY, warned that such an ad "would be detrimental to the industry with respect to its effect on legislators whose consideration we might seek." The theme that "the smoker is mad or angry" was all right, Hardy said, but it should be directed at anti-smoking zealots and not politicians. No such fear haunts the industry now. Its TV and radio ad campaign on CNN and local stations around the country urges the public to get on Congress's case immediately to stop a tax increase and a big Washington grab for the smokers' wallet. It's a gamble, but it may be having an effect.
- Among the documents is a Philip Morris corporate affairs plan for Australia that shows it intended to spend $100,000 per month countering the anti-smoking message when its New York parent knew for decades smoking could kill. A memorandum from the industry's former political lobby organisation, The Tobacco Institute of Australia, recommended spending $200,000 to set up an independent working party of experts to "mirror" the work on passive smoking of an official joint working party of the Natonal Health and Medical Research Council. It set out to handpick 20 scientists and medical specialists for this body.
- Philip Morris also planned to "diffuse and reorient" the World Health Organisation and the International Union Against Cancer, and to oppose airline smoking bans and legislation restricting smoking in restaurants globally. . . The 1988 document, now made public as part of a multi-billion dollar US legal settlement, reveals that the company also wanted to destroy attempts by governments and others to reduce cigarette constituent levels. And, with the tobacco industry as a whole, it was prepared to spend hundreds of millions of dollars backing its causes in Australia, Europe, Latin America and Asia. Anti-smoking lobbyists expressed horror at the contents of the documents yesterday.
- AUSTRALIAN tobacco companies are shredding incriminating documents to avoid costly payouts in the wake of damaging US court decisions. Leading anti-smoking campaigners claim they have exposed the practice via industry documents released onto the Internet as part of litigation settlements.
- A pro-tobacco informant apparently infiltrated a meeting of health activists in Colorado six years ago to monitor their efforts to start the local arm of a federal anti-smoking program. A report by the informant, found in Philip Morris Cos. Inc. files, provides a portrait of an amateurish undercover attempt.
- A new cache of internal documents details the tobacco industry's long obsession with California's smoking wars and its palpable fear that adverse legislation, if not killed in this bellwether state, would spread throughout the country. . . The documents reveal how the nation's big cigarette makers sought to strike unusual alliances with other groups that also had a vested interest in diverting tobacco tax funds. One such group was the CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSN.--although representatives of the influential physicians' organization say there never was such an alliance. The documents also highlight the role that the Dolphin Group, a Los Angeles consulting firm, has played in representing the interests of tobacco giant Philip Morris in California. THE DOLPHIN GROUP now runs the gubernatorial campaign of Republican Atty. Gen. DAN LUNGREN.
Here's the item at the 07/12/98 Winston-Salem Journal
- The little-known relationship, outlined in internal industry documents released in the Minnesota tobacco litigation, assisted cash-strapped fire-service organizations, including one co-founded by the Minnesota fire marshal, by underwriting fire prevention programs, training and organizing with tobacco money. But the documents reveal that the industry's generosity -- the total amount hasn't been disclosed -- was an integral part of a lobbying strategy to defeat legislation mandating redesigned cigarettes that are less prone to start fires on fabric or furniture.
- A King County judge unsealed two previously secret tobacco-industry documents this week and then declared they were evidence of an antitrust conspiracy by cigarette companies to limit competitors' claims of health benefits in cigarette advertising. The records, which were found as part of state ATTORNEY GENERAL CHRISTINE GREGOIRE's lawsuit against the tobacco industry, reveal how cigarette companies developed a written advertising code - one the state alleges was part of a conspiracy to create doubt about the health hazards of smoking. The ruling by SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE GEORGE FINKLE potentially strengthens the state's case as it enters a week of hearings on whether the antitrust lawsuit should be dismissed or go to trial in nine weeks.
- King County Superior Court Judge GEORGE FINKLE has granted the state's request to use key portions of a document the state claims will provide strong evidence of wrongdoing by the nation's largest tobacco company, RJR Tobacco. The state expects to use the document as evidence in its upcoming trial against the tobacco industry. State attorneys say the document prepared by the law firm JONES, DAY, & POGUE for RJR details the industry's efforts to cover up damaging findings from its own research and contradicts sworn testimony by industry officials. . . The document was originally part of the 39,000 documents placed on the Internet by US House Commerce Committee Chairman, Thomas Bliley (R-VA). However, when the tobacco companies turned over a list of documents to the state for review, it was missing, subsequently catching the attention of state attorneys. "The industry continues to hide the ball and withhold documents," said Senior Assistant Attorney General John Hough. "Judge Finkle recognized this and granted our request to use it in our litigation."
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue Draft: Corporate Activity Project The text file, in 3 parts.
- Confidential documents have disclosed that U.S. cigarette-makers seduced and trumped the California Medical Association in a battle to block tobacco taxes 11 years ago. . . . Memos show that tobacco lobbyists were in daily contact with the state's largest doctors' organization and believed they neutralized the CMA by sidestepping its elected leaders and by threatening to support "anti-medicine initiatives." The lobbyists claim to have met "personally" with 13 key leaders of the CMA, including its then executive director Bob Eisner. "We turned our attention almost full time to dissuading CMA from joining the fray," according to the memo.
- The documents reveal a sophisticated bid by Philip Morris to regain Marlboro's falling market share by refashioning the brand to appeal specifically to young Australians. Also, other recently released documents show the company subsequently planned to nobble Australia's politically savvy anti-smoking lobby to prevent its influence spreading internationally.
- An open letter to Max Mosley, President of the FIA: As we welcome the Formula One World Championship to Britain, I write to provide further evidence to support the contention that tobacco advertising, especially through the sponsorship of Formula One, increases consumption of cigarettes and helps to nurture smoking in teenagers. We were very encouraged by your declaration at the Australian Grand Prix that the FIA would end tobacco sponsorship by 2002, four years ahead of the time required by the EU Tobacco Advertising Directive, if you could be convinced that there is a link between advertising, sponsorship and smoking. . . . To this end, wish to offer evidence drawn from confidential tobacco industry documents released through litigation in the United States.
SECRET DOCUMENT News
- 07/17/98 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: SUBJECT: Public Availability of Tobacco Documents White House
- These documents confirm that for decades the tobacco companies did intensive research on the smoking habits of children, knew tobacco products were addictive and deadly, understood that a price increase would drive down the number of young people who smoke, and deliberately marketed their products to young people and minorities. . . Therefore, I hereby direct you, working with the Attorney General, the States, public health professionals, librarians, and other concerned Americans, to report back to me in 90 days with a plan to make the tobacco industry documents more readily accessible to the public health community, the scientific community, the States, and the public at large.
- 07/17/98 REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT GIRLS NATION EVENT White House
- So I've decided to use this moment with you to show you one thing that the President can do with executive authority that has nothing to do with legislative action in Congress. I am directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to report back to me in 90 days with a plan to make these documents more accessible to all Americans, so anybody that can get on the Internet can get them all and can understand them all.
- 07/18/98 Clinton Wants the Word Out on Tobacco Washington Post
- 07/17/98 Clinton Orders Release Of Tobacco Documents Reuters
- 07/17/98 Clinton Wants Tobacco Files Opened AP
- "We must lift the veil of secrecy on the tobacco industry so that all Americans understand that there is an epidemic of teen smoking, and how it came about," Clinton said at a morning gathering of the 1998 Girls Nation class. "Let us use the darkest secrets of the industry to save a new generation of children from this habit, and to help us fight and win." Clinton's executive memorandum directs Health Secretary Donna Shalala to give him, within 90 days, a blueprint for indexing the papers and making them easily available on the Internet and through other means. "These documents contain a treasure trove of information that can be used to save lives," Clinton said. "Public health experts can design more effective anti-smoking strategies by studying the marketing plans of the cigarette companies."
- 07/19/98 Groups Linked To Tobacco Firm Paid For Judges' Travel Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune
- One organization sponsoring the conferences -- LIBERTAD, Inc., a charitable foundation -- is entirely funded by Philip Morris Cos., the nation's largest tobacco company, a company spokeswoman said. Philip Morris provides most of the funding for the other nonprofit organization, the NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, said Darienne Dennis, spokeswoman for Philip Morris Management Cos., the corporations' administrative arm. . . After attending one conference in 1995, one of the judges, DOUGLAS GINSBURG of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, ruled on two tobacco cases, each time in the industry's favor. . . Another judge, PASCO BOWMAN of the Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, ruled against smokers in a case brought by a prisoner who claimed his rights were violated by a smoking ban. . . A frequent judicial traveler, CHIEF JUDGE LOREN SMITH of the Court of Federal Claims in Washington, D.C., could face a decision soon on whether to participate in tobacco-related cases.
- 07/22/98 Medical Researchers To Publish Reports Based On Tobacco Trial Documents AP/Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune
- Minnesota medical researchers plan to study documents from the state' s tobacco trial and write papers that will make the information more accessible to the public. " I think the main purpose of this is to try to use some of the industry' s information to try to help people stop smoking or try to prevent youth from smoking, " said Dr. Anne Joseph of the Veterans Administration Medical Center, a lead author of the research group. . . Dr. Richard Hurt, director of Mayo Clinic' s Nicotine Dependence Center and one of the six researchers, said he hopes the first articles will appear within a year in medical journals.
- 07/24/98 Tobacco Cos. Pay for Judges' Trips AP covers July 19's Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune story, Groups Linked To Tobacco Firm Paid For Judges' Travel
- 07/27/98 Tobacco Targeted Insurance Companies; Industry Opposed Non-smoker Discount St. Paul Pioneer Press
- Cigarette makers launched a campaign of intimidation against insurance companies in the late 1970s after some insurers began advertising reduced premiums for non-smokers, newly disclosed tobacco industry documents say. Tobacco industry lobbyists accused insurance executives of misleading the public, threatened action by members of Congress and later financed a "grass-roots" publicity effort to portray the discounts as discriminatory.
SECRET DOCUMENT News
- 07/28/98 'Jewels' Emerge From Tobacco Settlement Austin American-Statesman
- Millions of tobacco documents could be more important than monetary compensation
- 08/03/98 Secondhand Smokescreen; Tobacco Firms Worried For Years About Risks Of Passive Smoke US News & World Report
- "The entire issue concerning sidestream smoke . . . has been minimized by the industry," says William Farone, a former Philip Morris scientist turned whistle-blower in a July 13 document made available to U.S. News. "If a group of terrorists decided to place a poison gas in public places there would be public outrage and prompt reaction." Sources say the industry's internal documents on secondhand smoke reflect the sort of behavior that has attracted the attention of the U.S. Justice Department. Authorities won't comment officially, but sources report that a four-year-old criminal investigation, which focuses on the possibility that industry executives misled the public and lied to Congress about such matters as nicotine addiction, is gaining momentum and may soon result in indictments.
- 08/07/98 OPINION: Blowing The Tobacco Industry's Credibility Simon Chapman, The Age
- In May 1995, Philip Morris's spin doctors packed their bags for a Burson-Marsteller charm school in Hong Kong. Leaked coaching manuals detail the industry's "public position". The manuals, crammed with crafted analogies, quotes from scientific consultants and grand invocations to the white horse of Corporate Freedom, set out every issue that might confront cigarette company representatives - from explaining away addiction to tobacco's blamelessness in cot death. But with public access to oceans of internal company talk, the charade - as Wills chairman Nick Greiner once cynically called it - is all but over. . . The enormity of the lying, public deception and conspiracy to be found in these pages constitutes a Tutankhamen tomb-like haul of evidence that would prove devastating in any public inquiry. The 1995 Senate (Herron) inquiry into tobacco was held without the benefit of these insights. With potentially billions in damages at stake, the public might wonder why the Government continues to shield the industry from the glare of a royal commission.
- 08/06/98 Tobacco-paid Authors Spur Scrutiny; Journal May Ask Writers To Reveal Payments St. Paul Pioneer Press
- Dr. Barry Kramer, editor of the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, said his magazine may require contributors to declare whether they were paid to write the article or letter, and whether the writing was reviewed by those who paid for it. "I would say that people have not been aware that this might be a practice out there," said Kramer. "Our hope is that it's disclosed when it exists, but we may need to be a little bit more explicit when asking about potential conflicts."
- 08/04/98 Tobacco Industry Paid Scientists AP
- Officials of the Tobacco Institute and the two law firms that handled the letter-writing project, Covington and Burling of Washington and Shook, Hardy & Bacon of Kansas City, declined to comment or didn't return calls. Editors of some of the publications targeted by the tobacco industry said that while some of the authors disclosed ties to the tobacco industry, the editors were unaware those authors were paid thousands of dollars to write the letters.
- 08/04/98 Scientists Were Paid To Write Letters St. Paul Pioneer Press
- The records show that, in many instances, lawyers for the tobacco industry edited the scientists' letters before they were submitted for publication. There are indications the law firms wrote some letters for the scientists to sign. The letters, aimed at casting doubt on the Environmental Protection Agency's landmark report on environmental tobacco smoke, or ETS, brought different prices. The tobacco industry paid a biostatistician $10,000 to write a single letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association. A former government health official got $6,000 for a letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal. In all, 13 scientists were paid more than $156,000 for their letters and some manuscripts, the records show. It appears they were paid whether the material was published or not.
- 08/13/98 Dilemma For Journals Over Tobacco Cash Nature (Free Registration)
- Editors of medical journals have given mixed reactions to last week's revelations that more than a dozen scientists received $156,000 from the tobacco industry to write letters and manuscripts disputing the carcinogenicity of second-hand smoke. One of the targeted journals, the Journal of the National Cancer Institute (JNCI), is expected to change its policy and require future authors to divulge whether they have been paid by outside interests for a particular letter, and whether those interests reviewed and edited the letter. . . But George Lundberg, editor of another targeted publication, the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), says he is not troubled by the fact that a scientist was paid by the tobacco industry to write to his journal. This is because the journal acknowledged in a footnote that the Tobacco Institute provided support for the analysis contained in the letter
- 08/17/98 Tobacco Industry Tried To Exert Pressure On Insurers, Papers Show AP/Winston-Salem Journal
- Tobacco companies tried to pressure insurance companies when they started offering reduced premiums for nonsmokers about 20 years ago, according to industry documents. Tobacco lobbyists in the late 1970s accused insurance executives of misleading the public about the health effects of smoking and threatened action by members of Congress, according to documents examined by the Saint Paul Pioneer Press.
- 08/21/98 OPINION: Memo: Your Notes May Become Public Policy James M. Smith, Capitol Hypertext, National Journal's Cloakroom (Very Hefty Pay Registration)
- It is one thing for documents to be made public in a county court house or a library. It is quite another for them to be posted to the Web, where people from all corners of the globe, at all hours of the day, can actually view them. The wrangling between the tobacco industry and various opponents has brought millions of documents from that industry -- documents that had once been assumed to be private -- into broad, public view. . . Searching the Philip Morris site for "allies" turned up a list of talking points for distribution to like-minded organizations. . . it could set a chilling precedent for anyone involved in public policy.
- 08/25/98 Tobacco and Rupe Mother Jones
- Secret documents show that Philip Morris loves RUPERT MURDOCH's tobacco-friendly media. That might explain why he's on their board. . . "The Perspective of PM International on Smoking and Health Issues: Text of the discussion document used at the meeting of top management." . . . is a memo from Hamish Maxwell, a former PHILIP