Tobacco.org

* Shortly after notifying Brown & Williamson that he had cooperated with Justice Department investigators, Wigand received two threatening phone calls. In one, he was warned, "Don't mess with tobacco" and in the second call the same voice warned him to "leave tobacco alone or else you'll find those kids [Wigand's two daughters] hurt. They're pretty girls now."

Note: Wigand's allegations in the interview prompted U.S. Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) to call on House Republicans to subpoena him to testify before Congress. In a letter to Commerce Committee Chair Thomas Blilely (R-VA), Waxman and Wyden said that Wigand's allegations about Sandefur "appear to conflict fundamentally" with Sandefur's testimony before the House in 1994. Blilely, who would have to authorize a subpoena, is the leading recipient of tobacco industry campaign contributions in the House.

USEFUL QUOTES

"It became so obvious, to me anyway, that we were -- we were simply dead wrong, that we were caving in."

Mike Wallace, WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 16, 1995, p. A5.

"We got beat by Big Business . . . we were beaten by the tobacco companies and by our own company. . . . Most of us think the chairman of the board [Laurence Tisch] ran our company badly."

Andy Rooney, USA TODAY, November 21, 1995, p. 3D. (This was among many lines cut out of Rooney's 60 MINUTES commentary from November 19th by 60 MINUTES producer Don Hewitt.)

[Whatever the cost of a lawsuit,] "it wouldn't cost as much as it's going to cost us if we get a reputation for folding every time someone threatens us."

Dan Rather, WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 16, 1995, p. A5.

[Broadcasters and publishers who] "permit such pressure to be exerted clearly are thinking purely of their pocketbooks and not thinking of the people's right and necessity to know, and I abhor it."

Walter Cronkite, reacting to the 60 MINUTES decision, quoted on NIGHTLINE, November 9, 1995.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS

1. Write to 60 MINUTES and tell them you are disappointed with their decision to pull the Brown & Williamson interview. Point out that they could help mend their tarnished reputation and do a great public service by airing the broadcast. Point out that other public entities have stood up to the tobacco industry despite perceived or actual threats. Three examples:

Write to:
60 Minutes
555 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10019
212-975-2009
212-757-6975 (fax)

2. Write letters to the editor pointing out that other public entities have been braver than CBS. Urge people to not watch 60 MINUTES until they air the missing broadcast.

Address:

Advocacy Institute
1707 L Street, NW., Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: 202-659-8475, Fax: 202-659-8484
E-mail AI0001@ADVINST.ORG

SCARC ACTION ALERT -- November 22, 1995

Studies Correlate Cigarette Advertising with Smoking Initiation Among Youth

Ellen Goodman, commenting on RJ Reynolds advertisements which publicize the company's youth smoking prevention campaign, WASHIGNTON POST, October 14, 1995, p. A23.

SUMMARY

Two recently published studies provide further evidence that cigarette advertising plays a significant role in encouraging children to smoke. The first study discovered that tobacco advertising is more influential than exposure to peers or parents who smoke in encouraging adolescents to begin smoking. The second study reports that smoking initiation rates among youth increased in the periods after major tobacco marketing campaigns were launched.

According to a study published in the JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, tobacco advertising and promotion influence adolescents' decision to begin smoking significantly more than does peer pressure. While both receptivity to tobacco advertising and exposure to cigarette smokers were correlated with susceptibility to smoking, the relationship was stronger for receptivity to advertising. Specifically, the researchers, led by John Pierce of the University of California at San Diego, discovered that non-smoking adolescents who are receptive to tobacco advertisements are 3.91 times more likely to smoke than teens who do not notice tobacco advertisements. In contrast, adolescents who were exposed to family members and peers who smoked were 1.89 times more susceptible to begin smoking than those who were not exposed to smokers.

Relative receptivity to tobacco advertising was measured according to an adolescent's ability to recognize tobacco advertising messages, whether he or she had a favorite advertisement, could name a brand he or she might buy, owned a tobacco-related promotional item, and if he or she would be willing to use such a promotional item. An adolescent was judged to be susceptible to smoking if he or she could not definitely rule out trying a cigarette soon or smoking one offered by a friend.

Key findings of this study include:

The researchers analyzed 3,536 interviews with adolescents aged 12 to 17 who said they had never smoked. The data were compiled by the 1993 California Tobacco Survey.

The same team of researchers released additional findings, published in HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY, that indicate sudden rises in adolescent smoking coincided with large-scale cigarette promotional campaigns. The researchers selected five periods between 1890 and 1977 during which major tobacco marketing campaigns were launched and measured smoking initiation rates before and after these promotions.

The data from these periods show that smoking initiation rates increased most dramatically among youth in the campaign's target market. For example, after the Lucky Strike brand launched its advertising campaign "Reach for a Lucky Instead of a Sweet," in 1925, the rate of smoking initiation among adolescent girls tripled within a decade. However, smoking initiation among adolescent males remained constant during the same period. These findings are consistent with previous findings which suggests that marketing influences children's behavior more than that of adults.

The results of these studies provide a clearer picture of the specific influence tobacco advertising and promotion have on encouraging children to begin smoking. As the studies' lead researcher, John Pierce, explains, "It's not that children see an ad and start smoking, but seeing the ads and handling the cigarette packs and the promotional gifts lessens their resistance, weakens their resolve, so that later on they will be somewhat more willing to accept a cigarette from a peer when it's offered." 3

Advocates can use the results of these studies to supportPresident Clinton's proposal to restrict tobacco advertising and marketing that reach children and adolescents. (For more information about the proposed tobacco product and marketing restrictions, see SCARC Action Alerts "FDA Moves to Regulate Tobacco Products; PM Launches Youth Plan," 7/24/95; "President Clinton's Proposed Regulation of Tobacco Comes Under Attack from the Industry," 8/18/95; and "FDA Debate Continues," 10/13/95). In particular, advocates can use the studies to defend the proposal's advertising regulations against the tobacco industry argument that advertising maintains brand loyalty among adults but does not encourage smoking uptake among adolescents. Citing these studies, advocates can explain how advertisements and promotional items set kids on the road towards smoking.

In addition, these findings can support the proposed marketing restrictions by shifting the responsibility for the increase in youth smoking away from peer pressure and towards the tobacco industry. Tobacco companies claim that children start smoking in response to peer pressure. However, advocates can use these studies to show that peer pressure is not the primary culprit and to expose the fact that the industry overstates the importance of peer pressure in order to absolve itself of responsibility for the rising rates of smoking among youth.

The tobacco industry has charged that these advertising studies are inaccurate and politically motivated. Thomas Lauria of the Tobacco Institute said the studies were "custom-made to dovetail with the FDA proposal," and noted that a number of studies show that peer pressure is the most important factor influencing adolescents' decision to smoke.

OBJECTIVES

1) To use the advertising studies' findings and the accompanying publicity to support the Food and Drug Administration's proposed advertising restrictions.

2) To use the findings to debunk the myth, generated and sustained by the tobacco industry, that children begin smoking in response to peer pressure.

USEFUL QUOTES

"Conservative defenders of the tobacco industry are put in the untenable position of arguing that when a school gives a condom to a teen, it sends a pro-promiscuity message; when Hollywood makes a slasher movie, it glorifies violence; but when cigarette companies promote their products as hip, cool, macho, etc. . . . and give away gear with obvious adolescent appeal -- it has zero impact. Bit of a consistency problem, no?"

Don Feder, BOSTON HERALD, October 25, 1995, p. 27.

"Cigarette people maintain peer pressure is the culprit in getting kids to start smoking and that advertising has little effect. That's like saying cosmetic ads have no effect on girls too young to put on lipstick. . . . "

Rance Crain, ADVERTISING AGE, October 30, 1995, p. 20.

"[These studies'] erroneous conclusions fly in the face of overwhelming international evidence to the contrary. The primary reason [youth start smoking] is peer pressure. It is appalling that anti-smoking groups would do anything to downplay the pre-eminent reason why young people start smoking. It's almost as if they don't want to solve this problem."

Thomas Lauria, spokesperson, Tobacco Institute, REUTERS, October 17, 1995.

"Tobacco marketing is the most influential factor in getting toward the first step toward smoking initiation. . . . Kids who are collecting the packs [to get promotional items] -- they're handling the products. That weakens their resistance towards tobacco."

John Pierce, lead researcher, University of California at San Diego, WALL STREET JOURNAL, October 18, 1995, p. B1.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS

1. Update your materials (fact sheets, brochures, letters) about tobacco marketing and youth with these latest data. In particular, mention these studies in your materials and arguments supporting the proposed FDA regulations.

2. Distribute copies of this alert to your colleagues, coalition members and local reporters. When talking with reporters, mention these studies and explain how the findings illustrate the need for tobacco marketing restrictions such as those proposed by the FDA.

3. Scan your local paper for advertisements placed by the tobacco industry which suggest, directly or indirectly, that children begin smoking in response to peer pressure. Using data from the new studies as supporting evidence, write a letter to the editor of the paper running the ad explaining why the advertisement is inaccurate and misleading. Inform readers that the tobacco industry spends hundreds of million dollars in advertisements each year to perpetuate the myth of "peer pressure" so it will not be held responsible for addicting kids!

4. Use these data to create visual aids such as charts and/or graphs for backdrops at press conferences, pamphlets, or visual aids for presentations. Many of these findings are dramatic and will support the argument that tobacco marketing affects children's decision to smoke. Look at the graphs and charts provided in these publications for ideas.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nicola Evans, Arthur Farkas, Elizabeth Gilpin, Charles Berry, and John Pierce, "Influence of Tobacco Marketing and Exposure to Smokers on Adolescent Susceptibility to Smoking," JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, October 18, 1995, Volume 87, p. 1538-45.

2. John Pierce and Elizabeth Gilpin, "A Historical Analysis of Tobacco Marketing and the Uptake of Smoking By Youth in the United States: 1890-1977," HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY, Vol 14, No.6, p. 500.

3. NEW YORK TIMES, October 18, 1995, p. B9.

Advocacy Institute
1707 L Street, NW., Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: 202-659-8475, Fax: 202-659-8484
E-mail AI0001@ADVINST.ORG

"The tobacco lobby's use of political contributions is a classic example of the influence money scandal at work in Washington. Members of Congress are as addicted to large campaign contributions as smokers are to nicotine."

Ann McBride, president of Common Cause, Common Cause Press Release, March 24, 1995.

SUMMARY

The conclusions of numerous studies on the effect of tobacco industry political contributions will not surprise the advocate who has worked to enact tobacco control legislation, either at the state or federal level: lawmakers who accept tobacco industry money are less likely to support tobacco control legislation than lawmakers who don't accept tobacco industry money. A study examining the effect of tobacco campaign contributions in California found that these contributions affected state legislators in their decisions on tobacco policy independent of constituent support for tobacco control (Glantz and Begay, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, October 19, 1994).

The tobacco industry uses money as a political tool to influence public policy and protect tobacco interests. Tobacco money permeates the political process at many levels, including money given as campaign contributions to individual lawmakers, donations to political parties or caucuses, funding for political events or legislators' pet charities, and funding ballot initiative campaigns.

The enclosed materials by the Washington, D.C.- based citizens' group Common Cause, which works on campaign finance reform, show how pervasive tobacco money is in the political process. Some of the highlights:

_ Philip Morris was the leading soft money donor to the Republican National Committee in March, giving $58,000. RJR Nabisco tied for fourth-largest donor, giving $20,000. (Soft money is a contribution outside the limits and prohibitions of federal law. Federal law applies to money spent in connection with federal elections. Soft money donations, which in theory are not given to influence federal elections, can be given to political parties for such activities as get-out-the-vote drives or building up the party.)

_ In the 1993-94 election cycle, tobacco industry political action committees (PACs) gave $2,759,497 to Congressional candidates and other political committees, an increase of 110 percent from the 1985-86 election cycle.

_ Seventy-nine percent of all current Members of Congress -- 339 Representatives and 83 Senators -- accepted tobacco industry PAC contributions from 1985 to 1994.

_ In the 103rd Congress (the last Congressional session), several bills affecting the manufacturing, taxation and indoor public use of tobacco products died in three key House committees whose members received, on average, twice as much tobacco industry PAC money during the past decade as other House members -- $18,655 to $8,140.

However, tobacco industry money does not always prevent strong tobacco control policy from emerging from the political process. Michigan's excise tax increase; California's defeat of the Philip Morris- sponsored initiative Proposition 188 and the legislative passage of a strong clean indoor law; Arizona's passage of an excise tax increase ballot initiative; Maryland's enactment of a smokefree workplace policy; and New York City's clean indoor air law are all examples of pro-health victories in spite of the tobacco industry's political influence.

Health advocates can work to break politicians' dependence on tobacco money -- and the all-too-frequent tobacco-friendly stances that follow. California-based Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights (ANR) has suggested reinstating some form of the Fairness Doctrine, under which the Federal Communications Commission could ensure that all sides of an election issue receive a reasonable amount of broadcast time, and mandating strong state campaign disclosure regulations. Under such a regulation, a committee's full name, including its top funding sources, would appear on all campaign materials, from TV and radio ads to direct mail pieces and billboards. Disclosure would prevent tobacco companies from hiding behind front groups with misleading names like "Californians for Statewide Smoking Restrictions" or "No More Taxes." In California's Proposition 188 campaign, polling indicated that opposition to the measure was strongest among those who knew it was backed by cigarette companies, while a majority of those who thought tobacco companies opposed the measure intended to vote for the measure.

Common Cause suggests that important reforms would be to shut down the soft money system; curb the influence of political action committee contributions; and make the political system more competitive and fair to challengers by setting up voluntary overall spending limits for campaigns, coupled with some form of public incentive to encourage compliance with the limits. The system of voluntary spending limits and public financing for presidential campaigns that was established as part of the post-Watergate reforms in 1974 is currently under attack in Congress. Common Cause believes it is critically important to protect the presidential campaign finance system.

OBJECTIVES

To spread awareness among advocates that campaign finance reform can be an important tool for tobacco control.

USEFUL QUOTES

"Tobacco remains largely unregulated 31 years, 50,000 studies and more than 10-million smoking-related deaths after the first Surgeon General's report certifying that smoking causes disease not only because of the fabled 'power' of the tobacco lobby, but also because of the hundreds of lawmakers who've given it that power by taking its money and protecting its interests."

Vicky Kemper, "The Inhalers," COMMON CAUSE MAGAZINE, Spring 1995, p. 18.

"Tobacco industry contributions to members of the US Congress strongly influence the federal tobacco policy process. Unless this influence is diminished through a combination of members refusing tobacco money and campaign finance reform, this process of contributing to death by thwarting tobacco control will continue to claim hundreds of thousands of lives a year."

Steve Moore et al., JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, October 19, 1994, p. 1171.

"The [tobacco] industry is probably the most sophisticated political giver around. They give anywhere and everywhere. They give direct hard money to congressional campaigns, soft money to presidential campaigns, foundations affiliated with elected officials and the favorite charities of politicians."

Ellen Miller, director of the Center for Responsive Politics, NATIONAL JOURNAL, January 1, 1994.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS

1. Read and disseminate the enclosed materials. Consider introducing campaign finance reform as an issue on your group's agenda. You can educate yourself further on the issue by contacting Common Cause (202/833-1200) or commoncaus@aol.com, U.S. PIRG (202/546-9707) or other organizations working on campaign finance reform, either at the federal or state level. (U.S. PIRG is the national lobbying office for state Public Interest Research Groups. PIRGs are consumer and environmental advocacy groups with over one million members around the country.) Jennifer Lamson is the contact at Common Cause; Gene Karpinski or Ed Mierzwinski are contacts at U.S. PIRG. Common Cause and U.S. PIRG have offices at the state level as well, although neither organization has offices in all fifty states.

2. If your organization chooses to work on campaign finance reform, there are a number of activities you can do, with varying levels of commitment and time. Consider asking (publicly and/or privately) office- holders and candidates to pledge that they will not take money from tobacco companies. Track and publicize tobacco industry political contributions at the local, state or federal level. Join coalitions working on campaign finance reform, either at the state or federal level.

For more background, see SCARC Action Alerts: August 31, 1994, "Tobacco Industry Exerts Itself in Health- Care Reform;" November 23, 1993, "New Report Documents the Influence of Tobacco Money on Congress;" October 26, 1992, "Tobacco Money Results in Congressional Gridlock."

Advocacy Institute
1707 L Street, NW., Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: 202-659-8475, Fax: 202-659-8484
E-mail AI0001@ADVINST.ORG