SCARC ACTION ALERT -- April 17, 1996: An Embattled Philip Morris Launches Advocacy Advertising Campaign


SCARC ACTION ALERT -- April 17, 1996

An Embattled Philip Morris Launches Advocacy Advertising Campaign

It wouldn't be a bolt out of the blue that a tobacco company like Philip Morris doesn't have a lot of credibility. Our short-term goal is to make people aware of our position on youth smoking. Our long-term goal is to raise the credibility of this company.

Steve Parrish, Philip Morris senior vice president of communications, WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 29, 1996, p. B6.

SUMMARY

Earlier this month, Philip Morris launched a $5 to $10 million advertising campaign to publicize its position that kids should not smoke. According to news reports, the campaign will include several ads that highlight the company's youth access prevention program, Action Against Access, which was created in July, 1995. The first ad in the campaign appeared on April 8 in ROLL CALL, a newspaper covering Congress. The full-page ad is headlined, Kids should not smoke, in child-like lettering in crayon. The text of the ad states that Philip Morris doesn't want minors to have access to cigarettes. Minors should not be allowed to smoke. Period. A second series of ads, running in the WALL STREET JOURNAL, WASHINGTON POST, and ROLL CALL, identified the elements of the Action Against Access program that have been implemented and those that are in progress. (For more information about the Action Against Access program, see SCARC Action Alert, FDA Moves to Regulate Tobacco Products; Philip Morris Launches Youth Plan, 7/24/95 and the Advocacy Institute Fact Sheet, 'Action Against Access': An Ineffective Voluntary Program, 8/1/95.)

The company may also create advertisements that criticize the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), lawyers suing the tobacco companies and the tobacco company Liggett Group for wrapping themselves in the youth flag to further their own agendas. Philip Morris executives acknowledge that the advertising campaign is aimed at lawmakers and opinion leaders, not at kids, and that the advertisements are part of a broad effort to repair the company's battered public image. Initially, the advertisements will be limited to newspapers and magazines, but the campaign may also include an anti-youth smoking message for the airwaves. The company has begun looking for athletes and celebrities to pitch its message.

This massive public relations effort comes at a time when Philip Morris and the tobacco industry as a whole have suffered a string of serious attacks on their credibility, including the release of testimony by three former Philip Morris employees who claim the company controls nicotine levels in cigarettes; five pending Justice Department investigations involving tobacco companies; Liggett's decision to settle five state Medicaid suits and the Castano case; and the prospect of regulation by the FDA. In addition, the tobacco industry is becoming increasingly isolated from the mainstream as recent reports have detailed the tobacco industry's attempt to buy Congress through campaign contributions and politicians have been criticized for accepting tobacco money. (For more information about tobacco industry's campaign contributions, see SCARC Action Alert, Studies Show Impact of Tobacco Money in Politics, Campaign Unveils New Initiative on Tobacco Cash, 3/22/96.)

Scientific studies have found that tobacco industry-sponsored youth access programs such as Action Against Access are ineffective. According to a February, 1996, study published in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, vendors participating in tobacco-industry sponsored merchant education programs were just as likely to make illegal sales as merchants who were not participating.[1] The specific elements of the Action Against Access program also have been found to be ineffective. For example, the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH study also found that installing vendor-controlled lockout devices merely made vending machines equivalent to over-the-counter sales in their compliance with the law.

While touting the Action Against Access program extensively, Philip Morris has implemented only the program's most superficial measures such as distributing minimum age signs for merchants, placing Underage Sale Prohibited notices on packages, and eliminating distribution of free samples. The company is advertising its support of state bills it says are designed to reduce youth access, bills that tobacco control advocates know to be ineffective and preemptive.

OBJECTIVES

  • 1) To expose Philip Morris' latest public relations campaign as an attempt to divert attention away from the growing evidence that the industry has hidden evidence of nicotine's addictiveness and knowingly aimed its advertising at children.
  • 2) To inform lawmakers and the public that current tobacco-industry sponsored youth access prevention programs are not substantial, comprehensive, or effective.

USEFUL FACTS

  • Total amount spent on latest Action Against Access advertising campaign: $5 to $10 million.
  • Percent of this total spent discussing health issues: 0
  • Total amount the tobacco industry profits from illegal sales to minors each year: approximately $221 million.[2]
  • Amount the tobacco industry spent on cigarette advertising and promotion each day in 1993: approximately $16.5 million.[3]

    ANALYSIS OF ACTION AGAINST ACCESS

    Evidence suggests that the Action Against Access program will do little to prevent youth access and curb smoking. The following provisions may look significant at first glance, but closer examination shows that the program is a public relations campaign, its provisions more cosmetic than sincere.

  • THEIR PROVISION: Supply vendor training and minimum age signage and materials
    • REALITY: A study measuring the effectiveness of the Tobacco Institute's voluntary training and education program for vendors found that participants were as likely to make illegal sales as merchants who were not participating.[4]
  • THEIR PROVISION: Discontinue free sampling and mail distribution
    • REALITY: Most underage smokers buy their cigarettes from stores. Free samples account for only 0.004 percent of the cigarettes Philip Morris produces each year.[5]
  • THEIR PROVISION: Support state bills that license vendors and revoke licenses and/or fine vendors who violate the law
    • REALITY: This measure in particular deserves scrutiny, since tobacco control advocates have called for licensing. The Philip Morris program lacks a requirement which specifies that licensing fees would be allocated for enforcement; without such a requirement, most states can't afford to effectively enforce youth access regulations. Although 50 states currently ban tobacco sales to minors, the Department of Health and Human Services reports that only two states enforced the laws in 1992.[6] Many states cited funding restrictions as a primary reason for under- enforcement.[7]
  • THEIR PROVISION: Restrict location of vending machines and install vendor-controlled lockout devices
    • REALITY: Studies reveal that vending machine restrictions such as limiting machine locations and installing lockout devices do not prevent youth purchases.[8] One study found that youth were able to purchase cigarettes in adult locations 79 percent of the time.[9]
  • THEIR PROVISION: Place all cigarettes under the control of store clerks
    • REALITY: Approximately 75 percent of tobacco retailers illegally sell tobacco products to minors.[10]

    • SUGGESTED RESPONSES

    PHILIP MORRIS HAS NOT EARNED THE RIGHT TO SAY THAT IT DOESN'T WANT CHILDREN TO SMOKE -- ALMOST EVERY ONE OF ITS ACTIONS COMMUNICATES OTHERWISE.

    Bites:

  • If Philip Morris doesn't want children to smoke, why does it continue to lobby against simple, effective measures to prevent youth access to tobacco?
  • The tobacco industry hasn't dropped its opposition to effective youth smoking prevention measures, it's just gotten better at hiding it. Why else would it choose to support tobacco-friendly bills by hiding behind the business and retail lobbies?
  • You can't judge by intent, only by effects. There is no evidence that tobacco industry-sponsored youth initiatives have had any effect on youth smoking rates or that it will in the future.
  • Why doesn't their so-called youth smoking prevention campaign mention anything about smoking's serious health risks?
  • Whether you agree with their methods or not, the FDA and attorneys general are clearly trying to protect public health. Who do you think Philip Morris is looking out for?
  • Why is Philip Morris so determined to attack others, including another tobacco company, for acting to protect children?

    SUGGESTED ACTIONS

    • 1. Prepare statements in advance criticizing Philip Morris' use of celebrities and sports figures as spokespeople. When spokespeople are named, write letters asking them to discontinue their association with Philip Morris and suggest they send a better message by working directly with health groups, rather than the tobacco industry which has a vested interest in kids continuing to smoke. Use your organization's criticism of the spokespeople, and their responses, to generate local media coverage.
    • 2. Test Philip Morris' implementation of the program in your area. Investigate whether Philip Morris has violated any of the program's provisions by: opposing state legislation to license tobacco retailers, distributing free cigarettes, distributing cigarettes through the mail, or continuing to disburse benefits to retailers fined or convicted of selling cigarettes to minors. If they have, write the company and the program's independent auditor, former Senator Warren Rudman. Publicize the results and the company's response to your inquiries. You might also get friendly state legislators involved in publicizing the findings. Philip Morris' address is 120 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10017. Warren Rudman's address is Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 1615 L St. NW, Suite 1300, Washington DC 20036.
    • 3. Since this latest campaign is directed towards reaching opinion leaders, ask supportive local and state lawmakers and leaders to expose the program as a public relations ploy. Use the opportunity to outline the evidence that Philip Morris wants children to smoke, including the company's record of fighting effective youth access legislation and its use of advertising and promotional activities aimed at making smoking attractive to children.
    • 4. Use numbers to illustrate the argument that Philip Morris is spending most of its time and money to encourage, not prevent, smoking among youth. (See Useful Facts section above.) If you can, include localized numbers to compare the cost of this ad campaign to the amount the tobacco industry spent on campaign contributions in your state, lobbyists in your state, or the amount spent on treating smoking-related diseases.

    FOOTNOTES

    • 1. DiFranza, Joseph, et. al., Youth Access to Tobacco: The Effects of Age, Gender, Vending Machine Locks, and 'It's the Law' Programs, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, February 1996, p. 221.
    • 2. DiFranza, Joseph and Joe Tye, Who Profits From Tobacco Sales to Children, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1990, Vol. 263, p. 2784.
    • 3. 1995 Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress for 1993, Federal Trade Commission, 1995.
    • 4. DiFranza, Joseph, et. al., Youth Access to Tobacco: The Effects of Age, Gender, Vending Machine Locks, and 'It's the Law' Programs, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, February 1996, p. 221.
    • 5. WASHINGTON POST, June 28, 1995, p. B1.
    • 6. Growing Up Tobacco Free, Institute of Medicine, 1994, p. 201.
    • 7. Office of the Inspector General, State Oversight of Tobacco Sales to Minors, Department of Health and Human Services, April 1995.
    • 8. Growing Up Tobacco Free, Institute of Medicine, p. 213; DiFranza, Joseph, et. al., Youth Access to Tobacco: The Effects of Age, Gender, Vending Machine Locks, and 'It's the Law' Programs, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, February 1996, p. 221.
    • 9. Growing Up Tobacco Free, Institute of Medicine, p. 214.
    • 10. T.E. Radecki, et al., Tobacco Sales to Minors in 97 U.S. and Canadian Communities, TOBACCO CONTROL, Vol. 2, 1993, p. 300.

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    Produced by: Smoking Control Advocacy Resource Center (SCARC)

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