Partial transcript of a His response . . . "" . . Many of the questions asked of Cullman in this interview are still pertinent today, such as why Philip Morris continues to market promote smoking among women through the Virginia Slims tennis tournament, all the while knowing that smoking can hurt fetuses of pregnant women.

"[W]e have developed a cigarette system which produces smoke of reduced biological activity. The activity referred to in this context relates primarily to tumorigenicity of smoke in the skin of the mouth [of the test animal]. The animal test procedures used conform to accepted practices by investigators across the world in a number of research laboratories and institutes and are in accordance with protocols established by the National Cancer Institute. . : [O]ur experimental cigarette consists of a blend of commercial tobaccos treated with small amounts of two additives. one of these is a normal component of tobacco, especially burley tobacco, and the other is used extensively to purify automobile exhaust. Our results indicate that when these two additives are used in combination, the overall effect is greater than can be achieved with either one independently."
July 28, 1977, memo on the palladium project by Dr. Kallianos of Liggett to Dr. Mold. The quote is contained in an August 1, 1992 Shook, Hardy document, Draft Memorandum Between Joint Defense Members Regarding Ets Media Statement Bates #s 2021382482-95 on Page 5, Bates # 2021382486 (LINKS DEAD)

"Starting [date], all cigarettes exported by Philip Morris contained health warnings. To the extent that those warnings are not required by local law, we have placed the rotating United States Surgeon General's warnings which are required under U. S. law. The warnings are set forth in the language of the country to which the cigarettes are being shipped."
October 22, 1991 PM memo from Murray Bring to Michael Miles, proposing language regarding voluntary warning labels. Bates #s 2023003853 and 20230038534. The Text is here

"It was noted that Ammonia treatment was now being used increasingly widely. For security reasons, it was suggested that, in future, the treatment should be referred to by a code name."
Minutes of the Tobacco Strategy Review Team (BAT) meeting held on September 17, 1990. This and other documents relating to Y-1 are here

"Y-1 Tobacco : Mr. Pritchard reported that Brown & Williamson had 2 million pounds of Y-1 tobacco and would be consumer testing cigarettes with a low tar:nicotine ratio during the Autumn. Mr. Herter reported that BATCF had samples of Y-1 which were being used in product development. Souza Cruz were testing ventilated and non-ventilated products including Y-1 and would repeat these tests after ageing Y-1 for twelve months."
Minutes of the Tobacco Strategy Review Team (BAT) meeting held on May 18, 1990. This and other documents relating to Y-1 are here

"We tend to suffer from the sternly repressed [underscored] fear that our opponents are right and we are wrong on the health question and that we are thus devoting our business lives to the propogation of lung cancer"

"BENZPYRENE MUST GO.
This compound must be removed from Marlboro and Parliament or sharply reduced. We do this not because we think it is harmful but simply because those who are in a better position to know than ourselves suspect it may be harmful. Other ingredients that might be harmful must also go, but benzpyrene should go first because it is the one that seems to be under most suspicion at the moment. . . Act on the doctrine of uncertainty and get the benzpyrene, etc., out of the cigarettes."

April 1958 Philip Morris memorandum from CFO J.E. Lincoln to President and Vice Chairman Ross Millhiser Trial Exhibit 10686

"Chemical Carcinogens" ... "Lung Cancer: Smoking Studies" ... "Lip Cancer: Smoking Studies" ... "Chemical and Biological Investigations of Tobacco Tar and Smoke"
Titles of some reports by Alan Rodgman, a former top scientist at RJRT. The Wall Street Journal 04/22/98 The reports are due to be released on the House Commerce site

"With one exception, (H.S.N. Greene) the individuals whom we met believed that smoking causes lung cancer if by "causation" we mean any chain of events which leads finally to lung cancer and which involves smoking as an indispensable link. . . We found disagreement however as to the likely _mechanism_ by which smoking may cause lung cancer. . . Otherwise we found general acceptance of the view that the most likely means of causation is that tobacco smoke contains carcinogenic substances present in sufficient quantity to provide lung cancer when acting for a long time in a sensitive individual"
1958, Report on Visit to U.S.A. and Canada, 17th April - 12th May 1958, by H.R. Bentley, D.G.I. Felton, W.W. Reid Trial Exhibit #TE11028

"There are biologically active materials present in cigarette tobacco. These are: a) cancer causing b) cancer promoting c) poisonous d) stimulating, pleasurable, and flavorful."
1961 "Confidential" memorandum from the consulting research firm hired by Liggett to do research for the company

"The aim of this work is to produce a device resembling a conventional cigarette from which a human smoker can obtain a satisfying dose of nicotine without accompanying undesirable pyrolysis and combustion products."
June, 1962 BAT document, "Physical Chemical Aspects of Proposed Artificial Cigarettes" First Report of Project Ariel, by D.V.S. Williamson and H. Schachner, Trial Exhibit 10554

"It is my conviction that nicotine is a very remarkable, beneficent drug that both helps the body to resist external stress and also can, as a result, show a pronounced tranquilizing effect. You're all aware of the very great increase in the use of artificial controls, stimulants, tranquilizers, sleeping pills, and it is a fact that under modern conditions of life people find that they cannot depend just on their subconscious reactions to meet the various environmental strains with which they are confronted. They must have drugs available which they can take when they feel the need. Nicotine is not only a very fine drug, but the technique of administration by smoking has considerable psychological advantages"
1962 B&W report, Sir Charles Ellis, "The Smoking and Health Problem," Smoking And Health - Policy On Research, Research Conference, Southampton, 1962 McCormick, A. D. (Chairman)

"It has been repeatedly stated that some scientists discount the cigarette smoke- lung cancer theory. This is true. But it should be noted that many of those quoted in this regard are on record with contrasting views."

"Members of the Research Department have studied in detail the cigarette smoke composition. . . Some of the findings have been published . . . However, much data remain unpublished because they are concerned with carcinogenic or cocarcinogenic compounds."

"Although the major part of the sales of this Company consists of cigarettes, what the Company sells is cigarette smoke. To maintain our first- place position against any eventuality, we should be first in acquisition of information concerning the composition and physiologic effects of cigarette smoke."

"The Evidence to Date . . . Obviously the amount of evidence accumulated to indict cigarette smoke as a health hazard is overwhelming. The evidence challenging such an indictment is scant"
1962 RJR report by Alan. Rodgman, The Smoking and Health Problem - a critical and objective appraisal of. Trial Exhibit 18187 This document was discussed in the Minnesota trial on Jan. 29, 1998 on March 6, 1998, on March 30, 1998, on March 31, 1998

"During the past two decades, cigarette smoke has been the target of a host of studies relating to ill-health and particularly to lung cancer. The majority of these studies incriminate cigarette smoke from a health viewpoint."

"Members of this Research Department have studied in detail cigarette smoke composition. Some of these findings have been published. However, much data remains unpublished because they are concerned with carcinogenic and cocarcinogenic compounds. This raises an interesting question about the former compounds. If a tobacco company pled 'Not guilty' or 'Not proven' to the charge that cigarette smoke (or one of its constituents) is an etiological factor in the causation of lung cancer or some other disease, can the company justifiably assume the position that publication of data pertaining to cigarette smoke composition or physiologic properties should be withheld because such data might affect adversely the company's economic status when the company has already implied in its plea that no such etiologic effect exists?"
1962 RJR report by Alan. Rodgman, The Smoking and Health Problem - a critical and objective appraisal of. (Page 13) Trial Exhibit This document was discussed in the Minnesota trial on Jan. 29, 1998

"Basically, we accept the inference of a causal relationship between the chemical properties of ingested tobacco smoke and the development of carcinoma, which is suggested by the statistical association shown in the studies of Doll and Hill, Horn, and Dorn with some reservations and qualifi- cations and even estimate by how much the incidence of cancer may possibly be reduced if the carcino- genic matter can be diminished, by an appropriate filter, by a given percentage"
1963 memorandum from the consulting research firm hired by Liggett to do research for the company

"Wakeham [Dr. Helmut H. Wakeham, Philip Morris Vice-President and Director of Research & Development] said that there was an association between chewing tobacco and cancer of the mouth in U.S.A. and India. Therefore the carcinogens in smoke might not all be the result of pyrolysis. Moore was looking into the carcinogens present in tobacco"

"Mice painted with nil nicotine cigarettes and neutral fraction lived longer, owing to reduced toxicity. L&M preferred not to reveal how they produced nil nicotine cigarettes on the grounds that it was a "commercial process"

"The charcoal filter, according to Darkis [Dr. Fred R. Darkis, former VP and Director of Research, now part-time adviser for Liggett & Myers], does nothing for cancer but in general, the reduction in gas it effects could not but be good for health"

"Mr. Coulson [D.L. Coulson of the Imperial Tobacco Co.] said that tobacco was not included in the Miller Act (and its amendments) that regulated the issue of lablels for food and cosmetic additives. Endrin(sp?) has had disastrous effects: drainage of this from land into rivers had killed fish. Its use on tobacco had been discontinued. A Committee had been formed to deal with additives to tobacco and in particular to determine resideues and their carcinogenicity."

Visit to USA Sept.-Oct. 1964; Report on Research into Smoking and Health, Philip J. Rogers and Geoffrey F. Todd, Tobacco Research Council (United Kingdom) (1964) Trial Exhibit #TE11027

"Instituting a biological program today will be argued to be an implied admission that the company believes it has not in the past been doing all it could and should have been doing to find the scientific facts respecting tobacco use and health"
1965 memo to Cyril Hesko, vice president and general counsel for American Tobacco by attorney Janet Brown St. Paul Pioneer Press 02/11/98

"The animals received up to 500 cigarettes and emphysema was produced"
1969 Philip Morris memo quoting a Reynolds research executive Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 03/13/98

"One of the striking features of the Auerbach experiment was that practically every dog which smoked suffered significantly from the effects of the smoke either in terms of severe irritation and bronchitis, pre-cancerous changes or cancer."

"[W]e believe that the Auerbach work proves beyond reasonable doubt that fresh whole cigarette smoke is carcinogenic to dog lungs and therefore it is highly likely that it is carcinogenic to human lungs"

"[T]he results of the research would appear to us to remove the controversy regarding the causation of human lung cancer although it does not help us directly with the problem of how to modify our cigarettes."
April 3, 1970 Gallaher memo by company research manager to the head of Gallaher Ltd., American Tobacco 's British-based sister company.
Trial Exhibit 21,905.
The memo is the subject of Amid Millions Of Tobacco Documents, A Single One Stands Out Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune
Electronic Telegraph 03/16/98
PA 03/15/98

"I would say that the experiment is a crude one but effective in that carcinoma in dogs has been produced. . . The crux of the situation is whether there is general agreement by qualified pathologists that carcinoma, squamous cell carcinoma has indeed been produced. And even if the cancer-production is invalidated the obvious emphysema produced cannot be denied."
Feb. 25, 1970 Philip Morris memo, "Auerbach's Smoking Beagles," by R. Fagan Trial Exhibit TE10387

"[A]ll of you should be aware that an organization with strong scientific credentials is putting abroad a theory which links the presence of Freon and the heat from burning cigarettes with lung poisoning."
"Legionnaires' Disease and Cigareettes Dec. 17, 1976" The Wall Street Journal 04/28/98

"I have become more and more convinced that we should not conduct any longevity studies with animals. It appears to me that even positive results would be meaningless in light of the human experience where statistical evidence indicates that longevity is adversely affected by smoking"
December 21, 1976 PM document, "Longevity Study with Animals," from Dr. Seligman to Jett Lincoln Trial Exhibit 11470

"The trend toward low tar cigarettes necessitates that ways be found to maintain nicotine satisfaction for the smokers of these new brands. We feel that alternatives to nicotine enrichment of the tobacco need to be explored. One method--air dilution filters--has already proven of value. Another approach would be to add to tobacco bases having a greater base strength than nicotine. Such a tobacco treatment might be useful if it resulted in either a greater efficiency of nicotine delivery or an increased smoke pH. An increased smoke pH would liberate nicotine free base from its salts to give a greater chest impact. The present work has been directed towards the use of gaseous ammonia for such a tobacco treatment. Gaseous ammonia is an advantage over non-gaseous treatment of tobacco in that it could be introduced easily during cigarette manufacture through the Vacudyne unit used to condition tobaccobefore blending and cutting."
April 18th, 1977 Lorillard memo, "Gas Phase Ammoniation of Tobacco," by Paul D. Schickendantz, with a carbon copy to Dr. Minnemeyer Trial Exhibit #TE 10101

"Techniques are needed for adaquately (sic) estimating the amount of ammonia to be added to the tobacco, as well as a method for determining the amount acutally retained by the tobacco. Weighing by difference before and after ammoniation might be used."
April 18th, 1977 Lorillard memo, "Gas Phase Ammoniation of Tobacco," by Paul D. Schickendantz, with a carbon copy to Dr. Minnemeyer Trial Exhibit #TE 10101

"An estimate of a reasonable level of ammonia to add can be determined, for a start, from the optimum amount of free nicotine which might be acceptable in the smoke, an assumed pH target, and a known relationship between ammonia content and smoke pH. From Table 1, it can be seen for a number of competitive cigarette brands that the smoke pH ranges from 6.35 to 8.00 while the free nicotine is between 0.01 and 0.16 mg/cigarette."
April 18th, 1977 Lorillard memo, "Gas Phase Ammoniation of Tobacco," by Paul D. Schickendantz, with a carbon copy to Dr. Minnemeyer Trial Exhibit #TE 10101

"The promising report from the group flavor panel with the highly ammoniated (1.3%) Burley tobacco gives credence to the argument that the undesirable taste previously associated with ammoniated tobacco are a result of the ammonia-sugar reaction with surgar containing tobaccos. In view of this, more studies are needed to determine the relationship between the ammonia level, smoke pH and smoke nicotine for various types of tobacco. Such information would be useful inpreparing cigarettes which have a high enough but not too high level of free nictoine in the smoke. The same arguments that were given for using ammonia to increase the smoke pH and nicotine effectiveness hold just as well for strongly basic alkylamines. Some alkylamines, which are even stronger bases than ammonia ahnd should have even less of the free base in the smoke to give an unpleasant taste, include: methylamine, di-methylamine, dipropylamine and diisopropylamine."
April 18th, 1977 Lorillard memo, "Gas Phase Ammoniation of Tobacco," by Paul D. Schickendantz, with a carbon copy to Dr. Minnemeyer Trial Exhibit #TE 10101

"In addition to these effects noted in the animal studies, it is considered that the respiratory and cardiovascular evidence from humans gives rise for considerable concern"
1984 memorandum from BAT Co. Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 04/02/98

"It is recommended that the use of Freon 11 in tobacco products should be phased out as quickly as practicable"
March 1984 B.A.T Co. Ltd document

"'A few whiffs of the vapor could cause death. . . Also vapor or liquid could be fatal on penetrating clothing. . . The material should be stored in a cool, well-ventilated place, out of direct sun rays, away from areas of high fire hazard, and should be periodically inspected and monitored."
Feb. 21, 1986, report by a Philip Morris USA safety official

"L-phellandrene Reported skin tumor promoter in rodents, reported to produce allergic reactions and reported mutagen."
April 8, 1987 RJR document, "Priority Ingredients" from Dr. Scott Appleton to Ms. Suzanne Jowdy. "The document appears to be the first to surface in which a cigarette maker has linked specific additives to potential health problems." The Wall Street Journal 06/09/98

"An excessive quantity of tomato juice would have done that, as I recall . . . "
August 19, 1997. American Tobacco Co. CEO Donald Johnston on Wynder's 1953 study in which tobacco tars, painted on the backs of mice, produced tumors in 44% of the animals.

YOUTH

"We have never raised any objection to the use of our labels feeling, for your more or less private information, that it is not too bad an advertisement"
1946 letter from then-B&W lawyer Addison Yeaman to a candy-cigarette manufacturer. The document surfaced in the Iowa suit. The Wall Street Journal 07/17/98

"[T]he base of our business are high school students."
Lorillard Tobacco memo

"Given their age and environmental/economic conditions, target young adult smokers have limited disposable incomes"
Camel Brand Promotional Opportunities

"The studies reported on youngsters' motivation for starting, their brand preferences, etc., as well as the starting behavior of children as young as 5 years old. . . The studies examined examination [sic] of young smokers' attitudes towards 'addiction,' and contain multiple references to how very young smokers at first believe they cannot become addicted, only to later discover, to their regret, that they are."
"Apparently Problematic Research," a B&W document which Judge FitzPatrick said was placed in an advertising category, instead of one relating to minors Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 03/08/98

"[Jack Daniels' merchandizing campaign is] an example of a viable positioning executed in a 'nonstandard' but authentic and unpretentious way, which not only reached [younger adult] consumers, but converted [younger adults] into walking billboards."
RJR report on how to increase Camel's market share Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 03/25/98

"starting [smoking] behavior of children as young as 5 years old"
Undated company document describing such research LA Times 04/07/98

"The industry does not . . . concede that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous to anyone, young or old. The position in effect merely says that, out of a decent respect for the opinions of persons concerned about children taking up controversial habits, the industry does not direct cigarette promotions at people under 21"
BAT memo from senior vice president and general counsel Ernest Pepples

"Unlike the anti-smoking zealots, I am unwilling to assume that a significant correlation necessarily implies causality, but given that there is such a thing as a `sensation-seeking personality,' and that cigarette smoking has been a characteristic of that personality type, it seems not unreasonable that impressionable high school students could consider drugs to be a viable alternative to cigarettes. If this is the case, the major beneficiaries of the anti-smoking campaigns would appear to be the drug pushers."
"Trends in Smoking Among High School Seniors," a 27-page Philip Morris memo by Myron Johnston St. Paul Pioneer Press 04/25/98

"We are not suggesting that the effect of nicotine is repsonsible for the initiation of the habit. To the contrary. The first cigarette is a a noxious experience to the noviate (sic) . To account for the fact that the beginning smoker will tolerate the unpleasantness we must invoke a psychosocial motive. Smoking a cigarette for the beginner is a symbolic act. The smoker is telling his world, "This is the kind of person I am." Surely that there are many variations of the them, 'I am no longer my mother's child, I'm tough, I am an adventuress[? Nearest guess to corrected draft], I'm not square.' Whatever the individual intent, the act of smoking remains a symbolic declaration of personal identity. . . As the force from the psychological symbolism subsides, the pharmacological effect takes over to sustain the habit, augmented by the secondary gratifications."
Fall, 1969 Philip Morris draft report by Thomas Osdene, then VP of Research and Development, to the board of directors, "Why One Smokes." Minnesota Trial Exhibit 3681 Bates # 1003287036-48

"It's a well-known fact that teen-agers like sweet products. Honey might be considered"
1972 Brown & Williamson memo, among documents released by U.S. Rep. John Conyers in Feb., 1998

"[C]omic strip type copy might get a much higher readership among younger people than any other type of copy."
April, 1973 RJR marketing memo. Trial Exhibit 24144

"KOOL has shown little or no growth in share of users in the 26+ age group. Growth is from 16-25 year olds . . at the present rate, a smoker in the 16-25 year age group will soon be three times as important to KOOL as a prospect in any other broad age category."
1973 Brown & Williamson memo Washington Post 02/05/98

"Because brands of the new type continue to show vigorous growth in sales; because a high proportion of beginning smokers are learning to like Marlboro, the leading brand of the new type; and because we have no current brand in this newly identified, major segment of the market; it has become appropriate for us to consider moving our present brands in the direction of the new type of cigarette"
1973 memo from Claude E. Teague, RJR assistant director of research and development The New York Times 02/23/98

"KOOL'S stake in the 16- to 25-year-old population segment is such that the value of this audience should be accurately weighted and reflected in current media programs. As a result, all magazines will be reviewed to see how efficiently they reach this group and other groups as well"
1973 B&W memo, by R. L. Johnson, brand manager, to executive VP Pittman Trial Exhibit #TE 13820

"Pre-smokers"
Interesting term in 1973 draft paper, written by R. J. Reynolds' research planning department Scripps Howard 03/30/98

"They represent tomorrow's cigarette business. . . As this 14-24 age group matures, they will account for a key share of the total cigarette volume -- for at least the next 25 years."
1974 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. marketing plan presented to the company's board of directors

"We are not sure that anything can be done to halt a major exodus if one gets going among the young. This group follows the crowd, and we don't pretend to know what gets them going for one thing or another . . . Certainly Philip Morris should continue efforts for Marlboro in the youth market, but perhaps as strongly as possible aimed at the white market rather than attempting to encompass blacks as well."
1974 Philip Morris document

"Marlboro's phenomenal growth rate in the past has been attributable in large part to our high market penetration among young smokers ... 15 to 19 years old . . . my own data, which includes younger teenagers, shows even higher Marlboro market penetration among 15-17-year-olds."

"The teen-age years are also important because those are the years during which most smokers begin to smoke, the years in which initial brand selections are made, and the period in the life-cycle in which conformity to peer-group norms is greatest"
1975 report from PM researcher Myron E. Johnston to Robert B. Seligman Richmond Times-Dispatch 05/09/98

"Our attached recommendation to expand nationally the successfully tested 'Meet the Turk' ad campaign and new Marlboro-type blend is another step to meet our marketing objective: To increase our young adult franchise. To ensure increased and longer-term growth for CAMEL FILTER, the brand must increase its share penetration among the 14-24 age group which have a new set of more liberal values and which represent tomorrow's cigarette business."
January 23, 1975 RJR memo from Mr. C.A. Tucker St. Paul Pioneer Press 03/12/98

"Evidence is now available to indicate that the 14-to-18- year-old group is an increasing segment of the smoking population. RJR-T must soon establish a successful new brand in this market if our position in the industry is to be maintained over the long term."
1976 Claude Teague draft report, "Planning Assumptions and Forecast for the Period 1977-1986 for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company."

"Our people have been asked a couple of times why, if the cigarette companies do not want to promote smoking among young people, they allow candy cigarette manufacturers to use their brand names"
November 1976 memo from William Kloepfer Jr., a senior vice president with the Tobacco Institute, to Arthur Stevens, Lorillard's vice president and general counsel The Wall Street Journal 04/23/98

"However intriguing smoking was at 11, 12, or 13, by the age of 16 or 17 many regretted their use of cigarettes for health reasons and because they feel unable to stop smoking when they want to . . . Over half claim they want to quit. However, they cannot quit any easier than adults can"
"Project 16". By Kwechansky Marketing Research Inc. Report for Imperial Tobacco Limited. Montreal: 1977.

"The adolescent seeks to display his new urge for independence with a symbol, and cigarettes are such a symbol since they are associated with adulthood and at the same time adults seek to deny them to the young."

"Since how the beginning smoker feels today has implications for the future of the industry, it follows that a study of this area would be of much interest. Project 16 was designed to do exactly that --learn everything there was to learn about how smoking begins, how high school students feel about being smokers, and how they foresee their use of tobacco in the future."

"Serious efforts to learn to smoke occur between ages 12 and 13 in most cases."

"Ads for teenagers must be denoted by lack of artificiality, and a sense of honesty"
"Project 16," Oct. 18, 1977 Kwechansky Marketing Research Inc. Report for Imperial Tobacco Limited

"Smoking during pregnancy interferes with fetal development, and even if the mother is only exposed to smoke-filled rooms she will produce smaller babies and will have a one-third greater chance than a non-smoking mother of giving birth to a stillborn. The reason is nicotine constricts fetal blood vessels."
Feb. 9, 1977 B&W file note, "Book Summary: The Greatest Battle by Ronald J. Glasser, M.D. (Random House, 1976)" Bates Nos: 690009054-9065

"Our profile taken locally shows this brand being purchased by black people (all ages), young adults (usually college age), but the base of our business is the high school student"
1978 Lorillard memo from T.L. Achey to Curtis Judge, CEO of Lorillard about the "fantastic success" of Newport Trial Exhibit #TE 10195 Bates Numbers: 03537131/7132.

"the base of our business is the high school student ... It is the `in' brand to smoke if you want to be one of the group"
Aug. 30, 1978 Lorillard memo from executive T.L. Achey wrote to former Lorillard President Curtis Judge Greensboro News & Record 06/28/98

"They [Philip Morris] believe the industry should not show `gratification' at news that smoking among children is trending down or express the view that children should not smoke"
May 1979 BAT memo from senior vice president and general counsel Ernest Pepples to the industry's ``committee of counsel'' St. Paul Pioneer Press 04/24/98

"Marlboro dominates in the 17 and younger category, capturing over 50 percent of this market"
1979 Philip Morris memo Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 04/25/98

"Consider also that in 1967, for one dollar, a teen-ager could buy two gallons of gasoline and a pack of cigarettes . . . this was no longer possible for the 1979 teen-ager, and the 1980 teen-ager could not even afford the two gallons of gasoline. I think it is more than coincidental that the sharpest declines in smoking prevalence among teen-age males occurred in 1979 and 1980, the years in which the price of gasoline rose most sharply. When it comes to a choice between smoking cigarettes or cruising around in his car, the average teen-age male would probably choose the latter"

"Today's teen-ager is tomorrow's potential regular customer. . . The smoking patterns of teen-agers are particularly important to Philip Morris. . . the share index is highest in the youngest group for all Marlboro and Virginia Slims packings"
1981 report sent from researcher Myron E. Johnston to Robert B. Seligman, then vice president of research and development at Philip Morris in Richmond. Richmond Times-Dispatch 05/09/98

"We will no longer be able to rely on a rapidly increasing pool of teenagers from which to replace smokers through lost normal attrition. . . Because of our high share of the market among the youngest smokers Philip Morris will suffer more than the other companies from the decline in the number of teenage smokers."
1981 report sent from researcher Myron E. Johnston to Robert B. Seligman, then vice president of research and development at Philip Morris in Richmond.

"It is hypothesized that very young starter smokers choose Export ‘A' because it provides them with an instant badge of masculinity, appeals to their rebellious nature and establishes their position amongst their peers"
March 22, 1982 RJR-Macdonald Inc Export Family Strategy Document

"It is the case that most of those who become smokers do so in their teens, but this is by no means to say that the teen years are when young people first try cigarettes. In fact, many, the males in particular, dabble at smoking well before adolescence. That very first smoke, in a number of cases, took place between the ages of 9 and 12 or 13."
1982, "Project Plus/Minus". By Kwechansky Marketing Research Inc. Report for Imperial Tobacco Limited. Montreal: 1982. Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 05/06/98 Here's the full report: Project Plus/Minus Report for ITL by Kwechansky Marketing [952 Kb]

"Believe it or not, I had my first cigarette when I was in kindergarten"
1982, "Project Plus/Minus". By Kwechansky Marketing Research Inc. Report for Imperial Tobacco Limited. Montreal: 1982. Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 05/06/98 Here's the full report: Project Plus/Minus Report for ITL by Kwechansky Marketing [952 Kb]

"[T]he desire to quit seems to come earlier now than ever before, even prior to the end of high school. In fact, it often seems to take hold as soon as the recent starter admits to himself that he is hooked on smoking. However the desire to quit and actually carrying it out, are two quite different things, as the would-be quitter soon learns."
Project Plus/Minus Report for ITL by Kwechansky Marketing [952 Kb] Report for Imperial Tobacco Limited. Montreal: 1982.

"[Brown & Williamson] will not support a youth smoking program which discourages young people from smoking."
1983 Tobacco Institute memo US News 05/04/98

"I have just received data on the graduating class of 1982 and the results are much more encouraging and corroborate the Roper data [a survey that tracked track smoking trends] . . . These data show that smoking prevalence among these 18-year-old high school seniors has increased from 1981 to 1982."
Philip Morris interoffice memo, Feb. 18, 1983. Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 03/14/98

"I wish I had never began smoking"
1984 Philip Morris document that said more than 85 percent of smokers agree strongly or very strongly with the statement. CNN 03/16/98

"Kool is successfully attracting new smokers." [Defined by B&W as a group between 16- and 25-years-old]
1984 Brown & Williamson advertising agency report

"Younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50 years. They will continue to be just as important to brands/companies in the future for two simple reasons: The renewal of the market stems almost entirely from 18-year-old smokers. No more than 5 percent of smokers start after age 24. [And] the brand loyalty of 18-year-old smokers far outweighs any tendency to switch with age... Brands/companies which fail to attract their fair share of younger adult smokers face an uphill battle. They must achieve net switching gains every year to merely hold share... Younger adult smokers are the only source of replacement smokers... If younger adults turn away from smoking, the industry must decline, just as a population which does not give birth will eventually dwindle."
February 29, 1984 RJR document, "Young Adult Smokers: Strategies and Opportunites"

"Overall, Camel advertising will be directed toward using peer acceptance/influence to provide the motivation for target smokers to select Camel"
1986 RJR Nabisco document Dow Jones 03/10/98

"[Advertising should] create the perception that Camel smokers are non-conformist, self-confident and project a cool attitude which is admired by their peers. . . This approach will capitalize on the ubiquitous nature of Marlboro by repositioning it as the epitome of conformity, versus Camel the smoke of the cool/in-group"
1986 memo by Rick Caufield, an employee of Reynolds' Brand Group Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 04/05/98

"real laid back. . . . He's kind of a `90s role model for young guys. . . . What guy wouldn't want to live like him -- be like him? . . . Joe's so cool `cause he's real weird looking, but he does so many neat things . . . Joe's so totally something else that I just like him. . . . It sounds weird, but even though he's not real -- he's a good role model."
1991 RJR focus group comments St. Paul Pioneer Press

"To ignore the impudence of the Camel could also be gambling with the entry level smoker and the future of the Marlboro franchise "
1992 New York advertising agency report done for Philip Morris Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 04/05/98

Public Suasion

"

"

"

[The below documents are discussed in

Wanted: Stars for tobacco PR campaign St. Paul (MN) Pioneer Press]

"Further to our meeting on 9 June 1993, I contacted John Luik to invite his comments on the two options for publication that are now open to us . . . I reiterated our reservation that the full paper may be too long, either to attract committment to publication from an appropriate publisher or for optimum impact upon publication. In his reply, Luik expresses a strong preference nevertheless for attempting to have the full paper published as one piece in a respected journal. He says that despite the careful surgery performed by John Rupp and himself, the "Tokyo" paper is too sketchy"
June 22, 1993 memo, J. C. Luik's "Pandora's Box" paper, from John Lepere, Chairman of the Confederation Of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers, to members. Bates #s 2501139681/9682 Any relation to the "R. Luik" cc'd in this letter of March 7, 1968? Bates # 2049422341

"There are many research projects that the industry could spend money on--cancer, heart, respiratory diseases--but our money should be spent to produce results. Not necessarily confined to smoking and health per se, but on some of the new promising developments which are beginning to point up other factors relating to disease. These would take away the burden now laid on smoking. Look for areas where the results will relieve the pressures on the industry. For example, study the kind of people who smoke to identify differences from non-smokers which would explain the statistical association. Research in this area looks promising"
Bill Shinn, in March 13, 1972 Tobacco Institute meeting (Bates #s 50004925-28). The text is here.

"We expect plaintiffs to argue that CTR was a fraud, created not to conduct relevant research, but to further political, legal and public relations aims. In addition, plaintiffs may assert that Brown & Williamson and the industry conspired with CTR to mislead the public concerning smoking and health.

"Specifically, plaintiffs may claim that through CTR the industry conspired to refute, undermine, and neutralize all information coming from the scientific and medical community about the health hazards of smoking while at the same time over-promoting those few studies which suggested that smoking was not harmful. The end result of this conspiracy, according to plaintiffs, was to reassure smokers that 'nothing had been proven' and thereby encourage them to continue smoking and to encourage new smokers to begin smoking."
October, 1991 Shook, Hardy document, " BROWN & WILLIAMSON -- COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH CTR NOTEBOOK" (Bates #s 682631909-2261 (353 pp)) Text of the first 36 pp is here

"Let's go to Washington and hear from the Chairman of the Tobacco Institute, the organization which represents tobacco companies: Horace Kornegay.
CAMERA MOVES TO MONITOR WITH KORNEGAY.
KORNEGAY (SYNC): We don't know [if cigarette smoking causes lung cancer], nobody does. But, as an industry, we've spent more than any non-governmental agency trying to find out, more than the American Cancer Society and Lung Association combined. We have one position and that's all: there is a clear need for answers and carefully conducted research is the only way we're going to get answers. . . We do know that a lot of folks feel that all of the answers are known, that cigarette smoking does cause cancer. We know that a lot of people consider it a closed subject. But that's all the more reason for us to fund serious research. It's the right thing, the constructive thing to do. . .
DICK (SYNC): Cigarette smoking and lung cancer? Is it a closed book? No. It is one of many scientific mysteries yet to be solved. . .
CLOSING CREDITS SUPERED OVER LS SET IN DIM LIGHT.
CREDITS MUST INCLUDE FIRST AMENDMENT STATEMENT."
May 24, 1982 RJR DRAFT, "UNTITLED" (Film on Smoking and Lung Cancer) Bates #s 500888775 - 8792 The text is here

"The industry also funded a project at UCLA Medical School, but only after the Medical School reassured the industry that nothing damaging to the industry would be discovered. . . The least damaging response to the Huber and UCLA issues is a matter-of-fact attitude. The substance of the studies conducted by these researchers is favorable to the tobacco companies' position. Thus, unless the defendants give plaintiffs credibility issues by denying what they know about the outside studies, the issue marginally helps defendant."
Undated RJR report, Corporate Activity Project, prepared by outside law firm Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. The document was released in the Washington Medicaid suit June, 1998. Here's the June 11, 1998 PR from the Washington AG Office You can download the 23 Mg TIFF file (Bates # 681879254) here

"[I]t is impossible to overlook the fact that some of the industry's advertising has come in for serious public criticism because of emphasis on health aspects of smoking. . . it must be recognized that some of the advertising may have created a degree of skepticism in the public mind which at the start at least could affect the believability of any public relations effort"

"10. Radio and Television. Millions of people are informed and their attitudes influenced by radio and television. It will be important to keep commentators and other key people in broadcasting aware of the Committee's existence and of any facts it may assemble. . . Moreover, the Committee should be on the alert for public discussion programs where spokesmen for the facts as the Committee sees them might be welcome. . . Plans should be explored for giving attention to the positive aspects of smoking through motion pictures suitable for television use as well as group showings."
December 24, 1953 Hill and Knowlton memo, PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS
A blueprint for waging the tobacco war, in text format
This 9 page document may be viewed at Frontline: The Cigarette Papers

"Because of the grave nature of a number of recently highly publicized research reports on the effects of cigarette smoking, widespread public interest has developed, causing great concern within and without the industry. These developments have confronted the industry with a serious problem of public relations. Obviously, that problem would be quickly solved if the adverse publicity would cease and people would stop talking about the whole matter."

"[T]here is no evidence that the publicity has abated, or is about to abate, or that the research workers who are critical of cigarettes are going to cease these criticisms. . . There is nothing the manufacturers can say or refrain from saying that can stop people from being interested in their health. . . The situation is one of extreme delicacy There is much at stake and the industry group, in moving into the field of public relations, needs to exercise great care not to add fuel to the flames"
December 24, 1953 Hill and Knowlton memo, PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS
A blueprint for waging the tobacco war, in text format
This 9 page document may be viewed at Frontline: The Cigarette Papers

"As regards the media, we plan to build similar relationships to those we now have with Murdoch's News Limited with other newspaper proprietors. Murdoch's papers rarely publish anti-smoking articles these days"
March 29, 1985 appendix by a PM exec to The Perspective of PM International on Smoking and Health Issues: Text of the discussion document used at the meeting of top management (Bates #2023268329) Mother Jones 08/25/98

"The two most valuable lessons from this experience, which should be applicable to almost any type of marketing response project, concern the use of phone calls in conjunction with direct mail. The first is that phone calls have a termendous impact on mail recall. . . The other lesson from this project is that telephone calls dramatically increase the average resonse time in terms of receiving mail back."
December 9, 1994 report, Lessons from Proposition 188, from Mike Meyers, Michael D. Meyers Company, Inc., to David Laufer and Sid Stitzenberger, The Dolphin Group

""

"[T]here are two complicating factors that make it difficult to explain the discrepancy between the number of voters who promised to sign a petition and the number who actually returned a signed petition. The first was the barrage of negative publicity in the middle of the signature gathering process. The empirical evidence regarding the impact of this adverse coverage is that more than 30% of the voters contacted by the follow-up phone program reported that they had changed their mind about signing."
December 9, 1994 report, Lessons from Proposition 188, from Mike Meyers, Michael D. Meyers Company, Inc., to David Laufer and Sid Stitzenberger, The Dolphin Group

"What We Did Right

• Utilized the proper criteria of previous turnout history, household composition, etc. to identify likely voters. Our principal target universe of non-smokers was comprised of the top 62% of likely voters. . .
• Pretested most of the mail. Focus group reaction to conceptuals was extremely helpful in terms of fine tuning creative approach for pieces that worked and, perhaps more importantly, indentifying conceptuals that were clearly off the mark."

"Dear Dr. Colby, I have much pleasure in enclosing a preprint of the talk I gave in Lexington last November. I apologise for the delay in sending it to you. I was interested to hear about your collection of tobacco literature* and I am grateful to you for your offer of assistance should this be required."
February 16, 1976 letter from Alan K. Armitage, Scientific Director, Hazelton Laboratories Europe (now Covance Laboratories), to Dr. F. G. Colby, Manager, Science Information R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
The graphic image of the original document may be viewed on the RJ Reynolds Site as a TIFF file, or here as a smaller gif file. The full text is here

"Confirming our telephone conversation earlier today, Hazleton will amend the smoking policy at its Madison facility to be consistent with the practices in effect at other Hazleton locations. Namely, those of our Hazleton Wisconsin employees who wish to smoke will be able to do so, both in specified locations within the building and outside the building but on the site. . . We have approached these changes in the context of the broad business relationship which exists between RJR/Nabisco and Hazleton . . . We hope this is seen as constructive and as a commitment on our part to see all aspects of the relationship flourish"
March 11, 1991 letter from William C. Neely, VP of Hazelton Corporation (now Covance Laboratories), to Dr. A. Wallace Hayes, Vice President, Biochemical/Biobehavioral Research & Development, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Covance performed the "personal air monitors" European ETS study reported by the 08/18/98 Electronic Telegraph) This document (#508038472,73) may be viewed on the RJ Reynolds Site but the text is here

"Approximately 50 documents prepared by or for Imperial Tobacco Limited were produced as exhibits in the course of the Canadian tobacco advertising ban trial pleaded in Montreal during 1989-1990. A small number of these documents have been, or could be, used out of context to suggest that ITL has engaged in inappropriate marketing activities, particularly in respect to youth. The present document is prepared on the assumption that the best defence to such suggestions is the presentation of all the facts, as they appear in the documents themselves or from testimony and evidence filed in Court."
December 18, 1991 Brown & Williamson document on Imperial Tobacco's "Project Viking" Bates # 689466035 [to be continued . . . ]

"ITL's Chairman issued a directive to the effect that the study could be continued, but that there was to be nothing done with the results of the study without further approval from him. No use of the results has ever been proposed, no approval has been either sought or granted for their use, and no action has ever been taken based on Project Viking. (Transcripts p. 1314, testimony of Don Brown)
December 18, 1991 Brown & Williamson document on Imperial Tobacco's "Project Viking" Bates # 689466042

"Looking toward the future, the report suggests that there would seem to be targetable groups for advocacy communications. The most susceptible groups are those which were characterized as "pressured" and "disease-concerned". It also suggests that "disease- and socially-concerned non-smokers should be considered as a target for a campaign of amelioration of anti-smoking positions". It concludes that if a decision is made to enter the public debate, the issue of passive smoking should be used as the focal point."
December 18, 1991 Brown & Williamson document on Imperial Tobacco's "Project Viking" (Bates # 689466039): ITL Documents: Apparent Difficulties And Relevant Facts

" In effect, as extensive as Project Viking's research was, it only reaffirmed to ITL the correctness of its position that advertising could not, and therefore should not be directed at non-smokers."
December 18, 1991 Brown & Williamson document on Imperial Tobacco's "Project Viking" (Bates # 689466044): ITL Documents: Apparent Difficulties And Relevant Facts
ITL never set as its objective to increase the size of the overall tobacco market, nor has it ever set as an objective to limit the decline of the market. (Transcripts p. 597, testimony of Don Brown)
ITL has never considered targetting non-smokers for the purpose of making them consider smoking, and no advocacy campaign of any sort has ever been designed with non-smokers as the target. Project Viking simply tells ITL what it could or could not do in this regard, that is, whether it has the necessary credibility to undertake advocacy advertising. The results of the study show that it does not. (Transcripts pp. 902, 909, testimony of Don Brown; Project Viking, Volume II, pp. 14, 17, 61)
The study found no possible means to forestall people from actually quitting, except perhaps by means of a medical endorsement, but even this was not viewed as an effective or feasible measure. (Transcripts pp. 2707, 2730, testimony of Ian Brown; Project Viking, Volume II, pp. 14, 17, 59-60-61)
The findings regarding would-be quitters "in urgent need of reassurance and stroking" (Project Viking, Volume II, p. 33) were the opinion of the researchers, and not of ITL. (Transcripts pp. 2707, 2730, testimony of Ian Brown) ITL never sought the assistance of a doctor for advocacy purposes. (Transcripts p. 914915, testimony of Don Brown)"
December 18, 1991 Brown & Williamson document on Imperial Tobacco's "Project Viking" Bates # 689466042-43

"While there was a high incidence of starting smoking among their peers when they decided to reject smoking, there was also a high level of pressure from within the home not to start. Peer pressure was not sufficient to encourage serious smoking. A major part of the reason for this was the physical reaction to the cigarette. Lack of physical tolerance is the major reason given for rejection of cigarettes. The products tried were just too harsh and irritating and caused symptoms Experimenter/Rejectors were not prepared to endure."
PROJECT VIKING Volume 1: A Behavioural Model of Smoking B&W Bates # 689466047-63

"product was supplied"
Philip Morris supplied tobacco for 190 films from 1978-1988, according to Document # 2025863645
Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune 08/05/98

"We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business. We believe the products we make are not injurious to health. We always have and always will cooperate closely with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health."

"A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers," January 4, 1954 Trial Exhibit #14145 The text is provided at the St. Paul Pioneer Press 05/07/98

"Counsel at Shook, Hardy, & Bacon and Covington & Burling are seeking scientists and physicians able and willing to refute claims of nonsmoker harm"
RJR memo on secondhand smoke Knight Ridder 04/23/98

"After leaving a long research career funded by the tobacco industry at Harvard where Huber managed to keep the millions rolling in from the offices of lawyer Dave Hardy who was the middlemean for the tobacco companies (Harvard was funded as a Special Acct Project) . . . . he managed to annoy his medical students at Harvard for taking the cig. company money, an apparent conflict for a medical researcher . . . . annoyed them more by pasting up a giant tobacco leaf in his office (causing students to boycott and protest his actions . . . said cigs were not harmful, and grabbed money. When John Wyatt, head of the Un. of Ky. Research on Tob. and Health Institute, died in 1980(?), he was hired at the urging of B&W and CTR."
Unexplained, unattributed, undated note found in the Brown & Williamson Collection, UCSF

"There is only one problem -- confidence, and how to establish it; public assurance, and how to create it . . . And, most important, how to free millions of Americans from the guilty fear that is going to arise deep in their biological depths -- regardless of any pooh-poohing logic -- every time they light a cigarette"
December 1953 Hill and Knowlton memo

"We have one essential job -- which can be simply said: Stop public panic"
December 1953 Hill and Knowlton memo

"Statistical association does not prove cause and effect"
1958 comment by Clarence Little, in response to the Dorn study on the mortality rates of smokers who as veterans had bought life insurance from the U.S. government

"The continued failure of evidence which is qualitatively different or of increased significance to appear leaves the causation theory of smoking in lung cancer, heart disease and other ailments without clinical and experimental proof.... The result is that the tobacco theory is rapidly losing much of the unique importance claimed by its adherents at its original announcement. . . The one hard fact that we must face up to is that there is so much more to find out.... It is [as] important to know ... why the overwhelming majority of heavy cigarette smokers do not develop lung cancer as it is to know why the comparatively small percentage of smokers do"
1960 TIRC Scientific Advisory Board report, "Causation Theory of Smoking Unproved"

"I just don't believe it. People are hearing the same old story, and the record is getting scratched."
April 21, 1960. RJR chairman Bowman Gray, Jr. on cancer and smoking.Time Magazine Cover Story

"Mr. W.W. Reid suggested that no industry was going to accept that its product was toxic or even believe it to be so. And naturally, when the health question was first raised, we had to start denying it at the PR level. But by continuing that policy, we had got ourselves into a corner and left no room to maneuver. In other words, if we did get a breakthrough and were able to improve our product, we should have to about-face, and this was practically impossible at the PR level. If we could ease the approach a bit, then when we did make a positive contribution, we could at least say so without having to crawl behind the door."
1962 Discussion, Smoking and Health--Policy on Research

"Mr. McCormick. It was very difficult when you were asked as chairman of a tobacco company to discuss the health question on television. You had not only your own business to consider but the employees throughout the industry, retailers, consumers, farmers growing the leaf, and so on. And you were in much too responsible a position to get up and say, `I accept that the product which we and all our competitors are putting on the market gives you cancer,' whatever you might think privately."
1962 Discussion, Smoking and Health--Policy on Research

"The raising of so many bogey-man issues over the centuries concerning the allegedly unhealthful effects of tobacco has no doubt jaded the user's appetite for such rations. Consequently, the tobacco interests have successfully put their accusers in the position of proving their point, and as the latter failed, so the issue died."
Feb. 18, 1964, SMOKING AND HEALTH Significance Of The Report Of The Surgeon General's Committee To Philip Morris Incorporated Trial Exhibit #TE10322

"The informal agreement between TRC members not to make health claims was explained to Philip Morris. Mr. Weissman said that he was not prepared to bind himself and had to reserve freedom of action as