Anne Landman's Daily Documents


Ann Landman's Daily Documents


  • 01/03/12 'Sue the bastards!' (EPA) PM, 1993
      This memo from Thomas Humber of the giant PR firm Burson-Marstellar (B-M) to Ellen Merlo of Philip Morris (PM) Corporate Affairs signals the start of PM's war against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) after EPA pronounced secondhand smoke a group A carcinogen. Humber emphasizes how PM needs to discredit the EPA, portray the agency as corrupt, encourage other businesses to oppose EPA, and cast EPA as an agency under siege. Humber tells Merlo PM needs to sue EPA ("Sue the bastards!") as a way to help the industry regain credibility, encourage other companies to fight EPA, and "delay or cloud" other legal actions against the company . . . The memo reveals the awesome power that major public relations firms wield in defining issues and shaping the American political landscape. Humber boasts how, using front groups "Citizens for a Sound Economy" and the "Institute for Regulatory Policy," B-M arranged a symposium where the keynote speaker was the vice-president of the U.S., then assured that the media coverage generated by the event was dominated by the corporate message of "overregulation." Humber also points out that PM could find allies in ventilation businesses, since they stand to profit from PM's stance that ventilation is the solution to problems caused by secondhand smoke (not smoking bans).
        HVAC/IAQ Business and Groups: We have also previously outlined a potential approach to those businesses and groups whose economic interests would be furthered by the adoption of policies and regulations centered on total IAQ solutions rather than source control
  • 01/02/28 BAT: 'We really need something for people to die of.' BAT, Nov 20, 1978
      This document, from British American Tobacco [Campbell Johnson LTD], discusses how the industry should handle the increasing onslaught of anti-smoking sentiment worldwide, and suggests that the tobacco industry should band together to respond to these threats uniformly:
        The industry's response needs, in consequence, to have many facets, but to be balanced and co-ordinated, and, above all, to be unanimous....
      One chilling passage mentions the "social cost" issue, and offers an argument in favor of smoking that the industry acknowledges it could never use publicly :
        ...with a general lengthening of the expectation of life we really need something for people to die of. In substitution for the effects of war, poverty and starvation, cancer, as the disease of the rich, developed countries, may have some predestined part to play. The argument is obviously not one that the tobacco industry could use publicly. But its weight, as a psychological factor in perpetuating people's taste for smoking as an enjoyable if risky habit, should not be under-estimated...
      The document also discusses threats that other drugs, like marijuana, pose to the industry.

  • 01/02/26 Smoking Deaths Save Money BAT, Sep 1, 1994
      The following article saying that smoking deaths save governments money was published in the Canadian Newspaper, the Ottowa Citizen, in September 1994. A copy of the report on which this article is based (by economist Jean Pierre Vidal) can be found at: http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/batco/html/2200/2269/otherpages/allpages.html A report commissioned by Imperial Tobacco says tobacco-related deaths are an economic advantage to Canadians because cigarettes kill people off before they become a burden to the health-Care system. Previously, the tobacco giant always denied any link between cigarettes and death.

  • 01/02/22BAT: 'Competition from Cannabis, Glue Sniffing, Heroin'
      This document, written by D.E. Creighton of the British American Tobacco Co, states that tobacco products could expect "competition from Cannabis, glue-sniffing and possibly hard drugs--heroin and cocaine," and immediately after that, "We must find a way to appeal to the young."
        9. Additional contraints on delivery to include Cyanide, Acreolin, Acetaldehyde, Heavy Metals, Nitrosamies, Nitric Oxide and benzopyrene.10. Nicotine classified as a scheduled poison and sold "on prescription only" to registered users. . . High on the list of consumer needs is nicotine, which I believe to be the main motivator and sustainer of smoking behavior. . . high on the list of product requirements is an adequate level of nicotine to sustain the smoking habit. We have tried the low delivery product route with limited success. This might be because the nicotine in such products is below the pharmacological threshold of effectiveness. Smokers have dissappointed us in that they have chosen not to smoke twice as many 10mg cigarettes if they changed frm 20 mg products. Thus in order to reinforce the primary pleasures of smoking, I have proposed to make it easier for smokers to take what they want from a cigarette which might well have a low delivery when smoked by machine which overcomes current legal constraints to enhance the sensations from the first few puffs.

  • 01/02/18 RJR: Seeking 'Replacement Smokers' RJR, Jan 1, 1989
      This R.J. Reynolds document from 1989 refers to young people as "the only source of replacement smokers." It acknowledges the importance of young people to the future of tobacco industry profits. . . It also reveals that younger smokers are important to the industry's future growth because they both exhibit strong brand loyalty (as many smokers do) and because young people increase their smoking rates as they age:
        The value of FUBYAS [first usual brand younger adult smokers] compounds over time due to extreme brand loyalty and rate per day increases. . . Rate per day increases 30% between ages 18 and 35.
      This statement is particularly interesting in light of tobacco industry's long-time argument that cigarettes aren't addictive because smokers don't show tolerance for nicotine. Tolerance, or increasing the amount of a drug required for to achieve a "high," is a hallmark criteria defining substance addiction. The document also reveals RJR's admiration for the Jack Daniels Whiskey and Budweiser Beer ad campaigns, and considered them models for going after young people. They admired how Budweiser beer "went to work on younger adults," and noted that "the payoff was big." Clearly young people are corporate America's battleground, and especially so for the alcohol and nicotine industries. How many parents know that these corporations are drooling over young people this way? How can a line truly be drawn in an ad campaign between appealing to a sixteen year old and an 18 year old?

  • 01/02/16 PM on the Narcotic Effect of Nicotine PM, May 24, 1972
      People use cigarettes for the narcotic effect derived from the nicotine, according to this internal memo from the director of Philip Morris' consumer research department. It says:
        A widely held theory holds that most people smoke for the narcotic effect (relaxing, sedative) that comes from the nicotine. The "taste" comes from the "tar" (particulate matter) delivery. Although more people talk about "taste," it is likely that greater numbers smoke for the narcotic value that comes from the nicotine.
      Philip Morris' was also aware (long ago) of the link between nicotine use and marijuana use:
        ...This ties in with the information we have from focus group sessions and other sources that suggest that Kool is considered to be good for 'after marijuana' to maintain the 'high' or for mixing with marijuana, or 'instead.'

  • 01/02/15 Potential Threats to Cigarettes BAT, Mar 19, 1976
      In a fascinating discussion, this British-American Tobacco (BAT) document considers future product developments that may threaten sales of cigarettes.
        Nearly ten years ago, a French paper ... discussed numerous plants which might replace tobacco. The only material which has received a lot of attention is marijuana... In the illicit use of marijuana, relatively large doses of the active principal are involved. If the use of such drugs was legalised, one avenue for exploitation would be the augmentation of cigarettes with near sub-liminal levels of the drug.
      BAT also noted that the link between smoking and disease has not deterred most people from smoking. More of a threat to sales than the spectre of disease, they say, is the "increasing tendency to portray smoking as socially undesirable." To combat this threat, they speculate that public relations will be more effective than science:
        ... Taking a long-term view, there is a danger in the current trend of lower and lower cigarette deliveries - i.e. the smoker will be weaned away from the habit....if the nicotine delivery is reduced below a threshold 'satisfaction' level, then surely smokers will question more readily why they are indulging in an expensive habit.
      But most chilling is the notion that they would be threatened if people could find an effective way to control their own brain activity without benefit of drugs:
        ...smoking (largely via nicotine) may assist people to control the level of activity in the brain to a desired level. Other means of such control represent, therefore, a rival to the cigarette. There is an increasing amount of evidence ... that subjects can control their levels of brain activity, without recourse to drugs, if they are given information on the level of brain activity (biofeedback)....such techniques might be used by anti-smoking clinics.
      And last but not least is a statement both acknowledging smoke toxicity and speculating that the company could benefit because it presents them with opportunities for "cigarette designs which offer the image of 'health reassurance.' " :
        ...Looking further down the road, the possibility exists that, as inhalation tests are developed and accepted, then filters might offer a selective means of controlling smoke toxicity...Well before that date, however, opportunities exist for filter and cigarette designs which offer the image of "health re-assurance."...

  • 01/02/14 Targeting Cigarettes at African Americans RJR, Dec 2, 1977
      This R.J. Reynolds document shows that RJR had an interest in targeting African Americans for their products. Here a marketing specialist recommends that RJR consider designing a cigarette just for this ethnic group:
        RJR's business among Blacks is underdeveloped.... Further, given their strong preference for menthol flavor, we probably need to devote more attention to Blacks than before in the development of our marketing plans...In fact, I even feel that a project designed to develop a cigarette for Blacks may be a viable business proposition.
      The marketing company also noted that the incidence of smoking was dropping among caucasians but not among African-Americans, their interpretation of this being that it was a good thing, since it assured the industry of a solid cigarette market among African Americans.

  • 01/02/13 Philip Morris ETS Strategy, 1990 PM, May 7, 1990
      This environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) strategy document by Philip Morris' public relations firm Burson Marsteller reveals how Philip Morris and its PR flack perceived the ETS issue and how they developed "accommodation" as a strategy to deflect it in the 1990s. There are many pivotal lessons for advocates in this document, specifically that 1) the "...social acceptability [of smoking] is ultimately the bedrock upon which the industry's survival depends," thus accellerating the increase in the social unacceptability of smoking will help diminish the industry's future, 2) As long as we fight the tobacco industry on the issue of health--and not allow the industry to co-opt it into an argument of "free choice" or "rights of smokers" we will win, as per the following quote:
        Equally, [these figures] reveal the source of the power of the anti-smokers as long as they can fight the cigarette wars on a battlefield of health....The industry stands somewhat flat-footed in response since it questions the fundamental promise (ie the existence of the health problem) -- a stance which puts it in conflict with the weight of public opinion.
        ...the annoyance issue is more than a health concern...The annoyance issue is as dangerous and perhaps even more dangerous than misperceptions of the health impacts of ETS. If government officials, business managers or restaurant owners feel that they want to ban smoking for health reasons, the scientific data can be mustered to show that such a ban serves no health purpose. But, as has been discovered in the battle for airline smoking, as long as the decision-maker can fall back on a "comfort" or "customer preference" argument, it doesn't matter what the science says. It becomes a question of social harmony and good customer relations...
      5) We should expose Philip Morris' "accommodation" program as a strategy the tobacco industry designed purely to benefit itself, not smokers, as per the following quote:
        Accommodation must be perceived to be for smokers, not for the tobacco industry. If smokers are not visible carriers of the accommodation message, it will lack credibility...
      There are many more lessons to be learned from this document.

  • 01/02/12 Marlboro Man: Losing his Cool? PM, Mar 2, 1992
      Joe Camel had the Marlboro Man worried. After all, the Camel was young, hip, urban, cool,phallic-looking and had no work ethic. The Marlboro Man on the other hand, was tough, severe, serious, rural, older, and delayed his gratification. Joe was selling lots of cigarettes to young people. In the tobacco industry's war to win the hearts of impressionable, rebellious young people (who, according to this document, themselves had no work ethic) the Camel was winning. Thus, industry advertising experts recommended that Philip Morris re-make the Marlboro man into a looser, cooler guy. Have him smile and wave, they recommended, have him show his backside, appear in "Cosmo" magazine -- in short, make him less "Clint Eastwood" and more "Bruce Willis. . . Oh, and by the way, this document confirms that the Camel's nose was a phallic symbol.
      • WHY [THE CAMEL IS] EFFECTIVE WITH 18-24 SEGMENT:
      • Blatant sexuality without responsibility
      • Nose - phallic symbol
      • cigarette instrument of pleasure
      • women as sex objects
      • Identify with the rebelliousness of the Camel
      • Between child and fully responsible adult...
      • The Marlboro Man can have whomever he wants because he is at the top of the dominance hierarchy... ...Target those magazines (e.g., Playboy, Cosmopolitan) where he could be pictured with a woman... ...Show his backside and/or tipping his hat to a lady

  • 01/02/10 Tax Increases, Teen Smoking and Beetles PM, Sep 3, 1987
      This insightful Philip Morris (PM) memo discusses how the company should handle a significant excise tax increase on cigarettes. Of course the answer was to pass it on to customers, but the astonishing revelation is that PM executives knew fully well--in 1987 (and no doubt to this day)--that raising taxes on cigarettes (or a price increase in general) is a proven means of keeping teens from starting to smoke. This was something Philip Morris clearly considered a detriment (despite current PM rhetoric of not wanting kids to smoke):
        Last time, of course, we increased prices five times between February of 1982 and January of 1983.....and this fact was not lost on consumers....the 1982-83 round of price increases caused two million adults to quit smoking and prevented 600,000 teenagers from starting to smoke. Those teenagers are now 18-21 years old, and since about 70 percent of 18-21 year olds and 35 percent of older smokers smoke a PM brand, this means that 700,000 of those adult quitters had been PM smokers and 420,000 of the non-starters would have been PM smokers. Thus, if Harris is right, we were hit disproportionately hard. We don't need to have that happen again.
      This document also reveals that people are regularly smoking worm/beetle larvae in their cigarettes. The writer suggests that the company urge their smokers to stock up on cigarettes before the tax increase, but also that the company urge smokers to refrigerate their cigarette supply under the guise of "preserving their freshness." In reality, it's to keep beetles from emerging from the tobacco

  • 01/02/9 Free-basing Nicotine: State of the Art RJR, Oct 2, 1973
      Determined to find out why their brands were doing so poorly compared to the others, RJR chemically "deconstructed" Marlboro cigarettes with the aim of finding out just how they were different. RJR soon discovered that Philip Morris (PM) had made a "deliberate and controlled" chemical change in thesmoke of their cigarettes. PM was altering the smoke pH by adding ammonia to the tobacco, which made the smoke more alkaline.Why? Because in a more alkaline atmosphere, more of the nicotine "...occurs in 'free' form, which is volatile, rapidly absorbed by the smoker, and believed to be instantly perceived as nicotine 'kick'." Putting more of the drug into a vapor form that is rapidly taken up by thebody is known as "free-basing" a drug. This paper, marked "SECRET," discusses RJR's discovery of this sales-enhancing chemical change, and how they could mimic the freebasing technique that Philip Morris was using. Now, as the industry calls it, employing "ammonia technology" is state of the art in cigarette manufacturing. In essence, all cigarette companies now freebase nicotine, to give the user a faster, harder "kick" after lighting up. The industry calls it "increasing customer satisfaction." Others view it as markedly increasing the addictiveness of cigarettes.

  • 01/02/08 RJR's Target: Less Educated People RJR, Apr 22, 1985
      As the executive vice president of a marketing company writes to RJR:
        I would like to extend our thanks to you and Jeff for your presentation on 'The Less Educated Smoker'....Clearly those people who attended college but have not graduated are the more meaningful target for us<
      Also notice that the marketing executive plans to use information obtained from a "youth study" to help RJR market Camel cigarettes:
        ...we are currently using the learning from the Youth Study and shall be applying it to upcoming projects on Camel..

  • 01/02/06 'Independent Scientists' Tout Substance Enjoyment Burson Marsteller, Sep 28 , 1993
      In 1993 the joint global tobacco industry (through PR company Burson Marsteller) invented an "independent" group of "eminent" scientists, putting them forth as "apolitical" experts on the topic of how substance use enhances quality of life. Incredibly, they named the group "Associates for Research in Substance Enjoyment," or ARISE. ARISE held press conferences around the world at which they expressed their expert scientific opinion that substance use gives humans pleasure, thus enhances people's quality of life and health. Among the activities they listed as being beneficial were "eating food, chocolate, smoking, drinking tea, coffee and alcohol." The group did not mention that drinking tea and eating chocolate never killed anyone, but smoking has taken the lives of millions. . . ARISE held conferences around the world, released polls and sent video news releases to the media assuring the masses that substance use (including smoking) is pleasurable and harmless. . . Journalists ate the hook. In this January, 1997 Philip Morris memo, the writer bragged that,
        Yolande de la Bigne, a well-known [French] journalist, covered the [ARISE Paris] conference...concluding that 'a piece of chocolate, a glass of wine, a good cigarette, you can go for it. Instead of being obsessed by health, everybody should be obsessed by pleasure which induces good health. Le Parisien also covered the conference in a lengthy feature entitled 'Pleasure is good medicine.'

  • 01/02/05 'Youth Programs Could Reduce Sales...' TI, May 9, 1989
      Here is yet another document describing the real reasons the industry has "youth programs."
        This document is the result of a working session on advertising restrictions held on May 3, 1989. The recommendations were produced to address Strategy III of the Institute's public affairs plan on ad ban issues: . . .Concern: There is some risk that efforts to discourage youth smoking could decrease tobacco sales, both immediately and over the long term. This is true. However, the group agreed that, in the absence of credible industry efforts to address the youth smoking issue, various types of potential legislative and regulatory action would have a much more serious impact upon tobacco sales.
      Thus the tobacco industry opted for the lesser of two evils, adopting "youth programs" being the lesser. Here industry representatives describe being forced into having "youth programs":
        The youth smoking issue puts the industry in a 'damned if you do and damned if you don't' situation. Even the most sincere industry efforts cannot be expected to sway anti-smoking hard-liners, who will merely suspect that the campaign has ulterior motives. However, the potential 'damned if you don't' ramifications are serious enough to warrant actions.
      According to the industry, the goals for their "youth programs" are not to reduce the number of children who become addicted to a deadly product, but rather to:
        Provide ammunition to tobacco allies (legislators and others) to oppose unfair restrictions, Enhance the industry's overall ability to gain and maintain allies, Weaken a key argument of tobacco foes.

  • 01/02/04 Job Openings at PM? PM, Jul 1, 1990
      Philip Morris admires the ingenuity ofpeople in the anti-tobacco movement and would like to hire them when they get bored with the movement, according to this speech...
        This may surprise you, but I would like to conclude these remarks by expressing my respect and admiration for the leaders of the anti-tobacco movement, or at least for those in the background who plot their aggressive strategy. In our business we look for people who succeed in developing new products which capture the imagination of the public. We never cease to be amazed with the ability of the anti-tobacco activists to come up with something new. No sooner does common sense destroy one of their assertions, than they are into another line of argument...

        We could certainly use such ingenuity at Philip Morris and let me say here and now, we would be glad to receive the resumés of members of the anto-tobacco movement after they become bored with the cigarette and health controversy. Who knows? If they still have a problem with Merit or Parliament, perhaps we could give them a go with Crystal Light or Miracle Whip.

  • 01/01/30 Lorillard, Jan, 1975: Smoking: Self-treatment for Aggression?
      The tobacco industry took note of a number of studies that showed that nicotine reduces aggressive behavior in humans and animals. Hardly daring to consider the notion that their industry could be contributing to society by reducing crime and aggression in the general population, the writer speculates about this "benefit" of cigarettes:
        No one would be so imprudent as to confer some beneficent role upon the cigarette industry in reducing crime or in quieting the raging beast in man, but the persistence with which the suggestion on an inverse relationship between smoking and aggression has laced the literature is such as to call for a concerted examination of the facts.
      The paper calls for a conference to discuss nicotine's role in the reduction of aggression.

  • 01/02/02 PM, Feb 23, 1982: Admissions of a PM Scientist
      Jim Charles, Ph.D., a veteran scientist with PM's Research and Development department, frets about the landlside of public and private experts who are starting to link cigarettes with multiple organ cancers and other diseases. . .
        This company is in trouble. The cigarette industry is in trouble....The anti-smoking forces are out to bury us... Their goal is to destroy the industry and any means to that end is justified (in their opinion)....

        The Surgeon General's press conference was disturbing. For the first time associations between cancers other than the lung and cigarette smoking are being made in an emphatic manner. Associating cigarette smoking with 30% of all cancer deaths should make someone sit up and take notice...

        Let's face the facts:

        1. Cigarette smoke is biologically active.

        A. Nicotine is a potent pharmacological agent. Every toxicologist, physiologist, medical doctor and most chemists know that. It is not a secret.

        B. Cigarette smoke condensate applied to the backs of mice causes tumors.

        C. Hydrogen cyanide is a potent inhibitor of cytochrome oxidase - a crucial enzyme in the energy metabolism of all cells.

        D. Oxides of nitrogen are important in nitrosamine formation. Nitrosamines as a class are potent carcinogens.

        E. Tobacco-specific nonvolatile nitrosamines are present in significant amounts in cigarette smoke.

        F. Acreolin is a potent eye irritant and is very toxic to cells. Acreolin is in cigarette smoke.

        G. Polonium-210 is present in cigarette smoke.

        H. We know very little about the biological activity of sidestream smoke.

        I. We do not know enough about the biological activity of additives which have been in use for a number of years.
      Notice that while Charles at first says that the "scientific basis for the statements" about the effects of secondhand smoke on nonsmokers "is not sound," he admits at the same time that PM "knows very little about the biological activity of sidestream smoke." These confessions were written in 1982 by a top Philip Morris scientist, and were sent to the head of PM's Science and Technology Department. Yet despite this important admission from one of its most dedicated and stalwart scientists, PM continued to advertise and market cigarettes as though they were safe...

  • 01/01/28 'Excellent Study, could be Very Damaging to Business.' PM, Mar 30, 1980: PM
      [A]n important find. It demonstrates how the goal of Philip Morris' scientific affairs department was to find any means possible to dispute the findings of scientific papers that they determined "could be very damaging to our business," even if it was (as in this case) a paper that the department head himself admitted was "an excellent piece of work." The paper being reviewed here by Jim Charles of Philip Morris was by James R. White, Ph.D. and Herman Froeb, M.D. and shows that nonsmokers exposed to secondhand smoke suffer significant damage to the function of their small airways. The finding that bystanders were harmed by their products was of no concern to Charles, though. Rather, it is clear that his sole focus was on finding some way, no matter how small, to criticize and ultimately discredit the paper, and thus minimize the damage such an "excellent report" could cause the tobacco industry.
        I have reviewed the above paper and find it to be an excellent piece of work which could be very damaging to our business. There are several things that can be done to minimize its impactNo matter who we find to rebut the paper, the ultimate response must be in the form of a legitimate criticism of the significance of the data to appear in the New England Journal of Medicine under the name of a recognized medical authority....Other than the above points I can find little to criticize. The authors have put together an excellent paper in my opinion"

  • 01/01/26 Avoiding the Health Issue by Focusing on 'Corporate Responsbility' PM, Nov 23, 1988
      In this 1988 Philip Morris (PM) document, Philip Morris Counsel Gary Long is instructing Charles Wall of PM on how to frame a speech to improve the company's public image while avoiding "the primary issue" . . Notice the out-and-out recommendation to dodge the smoking and health issue and focus instead solely on "corporate responsibility" and the "recognition of the continued necessity of research in the smoking and health area," even though PM already knows what smoking does to health:
        Industry foes are concerned that Philip Morris may use this increasing economic power to attempt to downplay the public debate concerning smoking and health, by lobbying activity, by controlling internal smoking policies of its non-cigarette divisions, by its advertising decisions and by pressure on its suppliers. Perhaps the focus of the speech could be Philip Morris' recognition of the continued necessity for research in the smoking and health area as well as a statement that discussion on the issue is encouraged by the Company.
       Today, PM's "foes" are still concerned with the same issues, particularly that PM is using its economic power to control the debate and pressure media not to carry anti-tobacco ads, and PM is still using the same dodging tactic of focusing on "corporate responsbility."

  • 01/01/25 PM: Lung Disease Causes Smoking PM, May 29, 1974
      In casting about for something else they could point to as the culprit that was causing lung disease in smokers, the tobacco industry came up with some interesting hypotheses. Their "carotene hypothesis" attempted to blame lung cancer on a high intake of dietary carotene. Another view, promoted for some time, was the "Constitutional Hypothesis" which claimed that a genetic defect caused some human beings to "have difficulty adapting to the problems of existence." Thus they claimed that smoking was a substitute for people's normal coping mechanisms (that is, in some lesser strain of people who suffered from being particularly inadaptable):
        Smoking, then, would result not directly from a genetic predisposition, but as a response to the frustrations (flunking tests in school, etc.) which these relatively unadaptable people experience."
      But one of the most bizarre was the "Reverse Hypothesis," in which Philip Morris scientists tried to substantiate the claim that lung disease was a cause of smoking.

  • 01/01/24 RJR on 'Pre-smokers' and 'Learners' RJR, Feb 2, 1973
      Here is one of the absolute worst documents revealing the tobacco industry's marketing to youngsters . . . Claude Teague of RJR's research department muses about how to attract "pre-smokers" or "learners" to smoking in a marketplace where the cannot do so overtly:
        It should be said that we are presently, and I believe unfairly, constrained from directly promoting cigarettes to the youth market... Realistically, if our Company is to survive and prosper, over the long term, we must get our share of the youth market. In my opinion, this will require new brands tailored to the youth market...

        Pre-smokers learn to smoke to identify with and participate in shared experiences of a group of associates. If the majority of one's closest associates smoke cigarettes, then there is strong psychological pressure, particularly on the young person, to identify with the group, follow the crowd...This provides a large incentive to begin smoking...Thus a new brand aimed at the young smoker must somehow become the 'in' brand and its promotion should emphasize togetherness, belonging and group acceptance, while at the same time emphasizing individuality and 'doing one's own thing.'

        C. Self-Image Enhancement - The fragile, developing self-image of the young person needs all of the support and enhancement it can get. Smoking may appear to enhance that self-image in a variety of ways. If one values, for example, an adventurous, sophisticated, adult image, smoking may enhance one's self-image....
      And finally, RJR gives us a dismal reminder at how health education, and even warning labels, can serve to actually drive youngsters TOWARDS smoking:
        The smoking-health controversy does not appear important to the group because, psychologically, at eighteen, one is immortal. Further, if the desire to be daring is part of the motivation to start smoking, the alleged risk of smoking may actually make smoking attractive. Finally, if the 'older' establishment is preaching against smoking, the anti-establishment sentiment discussed above would cause the young to be defiant and smoke. Thus, a new brand aimed at the young group should not in any way be promoted as a "health" brand, and perhaps should carry some implied risk. In this sense, the warning label on the package may be a plus.
      While this may be an older document, the basic premises survive. We can be certain that the industry still remembers such advice from their experts, for they know (as we do) that if young people aren't attracted to smoking, there won't be any smokers!

  • 01/01/23 M: 'Up from the Bombshelter'
      These are the astounding musings of an "industry friendly" attorney who is is trying to convince members of the industry that they need to take decisive action to combat the ever-growing anti-smoking forces. To do this, he proposes that the industry take up arguments common to property rights and expression rights, and says that these concepts can be "succesfully engrafted" onto current law.
        Beyond tobacco farmers, industry workers, and those in allied wholesale, retail, and related groups, tobacco lacks a highly motivated constituency. Many former smokers (and those who want to quit) look forward to prohibition. They bolster their resolve by Alcoholics-Anonymous-like "altruistic" anti-smoking involvement....

  • 01/01/19 PM, Jun 15, 1988: A Voice of Honesty within the Industry
      This document reveals a pivotal moment in 1988 when members of the global tobacco industry came together to talk about the difficulties they faced regarding the issue of envirnmental tobacco smoke (ETS). . . These are privileged and confidential minutes of a joint industry meeting held in London in 1988. Representatives of the European, Japanese, Canadian, the American and United Kingdom tobacco companies were present. . .Of particular interest are the statements of German cigarette industry scientist, Dr Adlkofer, who questioned the industry's creation of it's own "marketable science." In a stunning departure from typical industry plotting, Dr. Adlkofer stated his view that what the industry was really seeking was "good public relations material, not good science." Dr. Adlkofer further said that "real science" would be "essential if the industry was to prevail on the ETS issue." . . Dr. Adlkofer "refused to endorse a situation in which scientific research is guided by public relations needs." . . He urged the industry instead to concentrate on identifying a threshold level for risk of ETS exposure. . . Dr. Boyce of British American Tobacco (BAT) said that the "no threshold" argument would "automatically indict active smoking." Thomas Osdene of Philip Morris suggested that "a threshold level could be set, but that the threshold not be quantified." Another attendee, Mr. Westcott, said that setting such a limit would be "dangerous" because it would provide "a priori proof of causation for anti-smoking advocates,and would "indict active smoking." John Rupp, of the U.S. tobacco industry's law firm Covington and Burling, further went on to say that "the industry should continue to emphasize the lack of substantive proof of causation." To this Adlkofer responded,
        Science cannot propel the industry any further on the ETS issue unless it is able to say that not one person has died from exposure to ETS.
      There was nothing further added in discussion of this landmark statement. . . The rest of the document is full of descriptions of the industry's existing path of global deceit on the ETS issue. . . This entire document is worth a read.

  • 01/01/18 Fire Safe Cigarette Would Cut into Profits PM, 1992
      For many years, advocates have been lobbying for laws that would require the tobacco industry to make cigarettes that go out when left unattended. It has taken decades for the industry to come up with such a product. Why did it take the industry so long? Because such a product would cost the industry money, according to this Philip Morris document.Tactics taken by the industry to avoid producing a fire-safe cigarette included a massive plan to befriend the fire-service community across the United States by giving grants to hundreds of local fire departments across the nation. This was known as "inoculating hostiles" (the Fire Service was deemed a huge potential enemy to the industry on this issue). Another tactic taken was the production "fire safety" programs and materials aimed at convincing the public at large that is was their responsibility, not the smoker's, to be vigilant and protect people against the fire dangers that smokers caused.
        Efforts by anti-smoking groups to mandate a "fire safe" cigarette could destroy the competitiveness of leading brands and increase the cost of manufacturing cigarettes. . . During the plan period, PM-USA will expand coalitions among the fire prevention community and public policy makers to diffuse support of "fire safe" cigarette legislation at the state and federal level as well as build public awareness of fire safety and prevention.

  • 01/01/16 More on Cigarette Contaminants PM, Jul 20, 1994
      Following are some ofthecontaminants in cigarettes that were listed as the sources of customer complaints in just two Philip Morris company documents: Insects ("insect infestation"), The tear tape found at a murder scene, Varnish, "Adhesive-like materials", Ink solvents, "Insect damage", Machine lubricating oils (lubricants that are used in cigarette manufacturing facilities--apparently up to 100 types of lubricants are used) , Pieces of rubber from assembly belts, Blood, Metal powder, Rubber bands, Matchheads, Pieces of wire (consistent with paper clip components), Explosive loads, Glass fibers, Mold

  • 01/01/12 Washington Legal Foundation & Tommy Thompson WLF, May, 1998
      In 1994, Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson (incoming president Bush's nominee to head the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which oversees the tobacco control functions of federal government) joined the policy advisory board of an organization called the Washington Legal Foundation, or WLF. WLF receives funding from the Philip Morris tobacco company (PM) and in turn WLF defends PM on its issues. In 1998, the WLF ran this extremely inflammatory, pro-tobacco advertisement in several large papers including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the National Journal, the CongressDaily AM, and others. Easily recongizeable in the article are many of the tobacco industry's arguments (freedom of speech, the Bill of Rights, "slippery slope" arguments about enacting "prohibition" as well as emotion-laden phrases like "anti-tobacco zealots"). . . the WLF has also repeatedly sued government agencies that oversee public health functions, like the Food and Drug Administration and the Enivronmental Protection Agency, who they sued over workplace smoking policies. Thompson's close linkage with WLF, an organization which has long proven itself powerfully hostile to tobacco control and which clearly opposes public health measures, should be strongly questioned by senators scrutinizing Thompson as a possible head of agencies overseeing tobacco control efforts in the U.S.. . .
        Let me see if I've got the most recent version of this game straight. Anti-smoking zealots in government seek to simultaneously single out and punish the demonized tobacco industry while continuing to collect billions of dollars in tax revenues from tobacco sales, as they have for decades. . . --The Washington Legal Foundation --'effective advocate of free enterprise'

  • 01/01/10 There's 40% Less Tobacco in a Modern Cigarette Lorillard, May 4, 1983
      ln 1940, a commercial cigarette contained 1300 milligrams (mg) of tobacco by weight, and by the 1980s it contained only 750 mg of tobacco. The author states,
        Thus, a cigarette of the 1980's would contain about 40% less tobacco... than its counterpart of 40 years ago.
      Apparently, early in the 1900s, cigarette makers used just the upper one-fourth of the tobacco leaf. Over the years, though, mechanical threshing created increased waste, and labor costs kept increasing. Eventually, the industry found ways to make use of parts of the tobacco plant that were never initially intended for use, like stems. They developed ways to incorporate stems by making fillers like reconstituted and "puffed" tobacco (puffed tobacco is treated with a gas to expand it). In the long run, these cost-saving measures, combined with the use of additives, have decreased the amount of actual tobacco in a cigarette by fully 40%.

  • 01/01/08 Tobacco Industry Zealotry TI, Dec 11, 1979
      When tobacco industry representatives use their time-worn strategy of portraying members of the anti-tobacco movement as nothing more than a bunch of shrill, over-emotional zealots, pull out this wild speech by Horace Kornegay of the Tobacco Institute. Kornegay gave this speech to theTobacco and Allied Industries Division of the American Jewish Community on December 11, 1979. In the speech, Kornegay ingratiatingly likens attacks on the tobacco industry to the repression experienced by Jews, and likens the tobacco industry's struggle for survival to Jewish historical efforts to
        combat] bigotry and [protect] civil rights...
      He repeatedly invokes passages from "the Jewish Bible." Kornegay refers to federal health advocate Joseph Califano "Ayatollah Califano" and compares anti-tobacco supporters to axe-murderers . . . Kornegay goes on to make "dire" predictions that smoking will eventually be banned on airlines, in Federal buildings, and that the industry would (*gasp!*) have to place tar and nicotine numbers on the packages, and strengthen the health warnings, predicting that these measures will cause the industry great harm. Then, ironically, he goes on to make what we now consider to be a very strong case in favor of policies to eliminate public smoking:
        Consider this: If the pressure of anti-smoking laws and regulation succeeds in stopping each American smoker from lighting up just one cigarette each day, the annual consequences are devastating: Cigarette consumption would drop by more than 18 billion units. Personal spending for cigarettes would decline by more than half a billion dollars.

  • 01/01/05 Philip Morris Around the Globe PM, Dec 17, 1986
      Written by Philip Morris' Andrew Whist, (who, incidentally, according to telephone records, maintains contact with Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson . . ) this document reads like a brag sheet:
        The government in Hong Kong responded to Philip Morris pressure by narrowing the differential between duties on imported leaf and finished cigarettes...significantly benefiting Philip Morris... In South Australia, Philip Morris significantly watered down an anti-smoking tobacco products control bill... In Venezuela, we were successful in stopping a detrimental, self-regulating advertising code... Our work in Senegal resulted in a new advertising decree which reversed a total advertising ban.
       This report reveals the sheer scope of global activity by Philip Morris (PM), but perhaps more importantly it also reveals the powerless state of governments before this corporate behemoth, as PM goes about restructuring countries' tax systems, repealing laws it doesn't like and blocking legislation pushed by citizenry. We can only ask ourselves how much progress would have been made around the world in reducing the spread of tobacco-related disease had Philip Morris put humanity above its own profits, and refrained from pouring so much of its resources into stopping, delaying and watering down health measures in every corner of the globe.

  • 01/01/04 RJR's Project YAX: Well-being in a Cigarette RJR, 1983
      This R.J. Reynolds document shows the psychological scrutiny that tobacco marketing departments give the psychological needs of young adults . . .
        A brand that stands for serenity via tranquil/majestic settings will be perceived by younger adult smokers as contributing to their sense of well-being....A brand that stands for the joy, closeness, and sense of belonging of male/female relationships via intimate and/or romantic situations will be perceived by younger adult smokers as contributing to their sense of well-being....A brand that stands for the openness and sense of belonging of friendships via close, interpersonal situations will be perceived by younger adult smokers as contributing to their sense of well-being...A brand that stands for financial security via achievable wealth-oriented imagery will be perceived by younger adults as contributing to their sense of well-being...
      So we see that RJR strove to encourage young adults to derive a sense of well-being, joy, closeness and serenity...from cigarettes -- a product which would ultimately addict and kill them.

  • 01/01/03 Tommy Thompson & Philip Morris PM, Sep 28, 1993
      The incoming president of the United States, George W. Bush, has nominated Wisconsin governor Tommy Thompson to head the federal Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the agency which oversees many governmental health agencies that are responsible for tobacco control activities. Governor Tommy Thompson has close ties to thePhilip Morris Tobacco Company (PM). So close, in fact, that PM has actually been directly involved in raising funds for Mr. Thompson, as reflected in the following passage from a 1994 internal Philip Morris strategy document:
        In 1993, raised money for: . . Governor Tommy Thompson of WI
      The document also identifies that detriment to PM profits is the major justification for PM's continuing to fight measures to restrict public smoking,
        Smoking restrictions have been estimated this year alone to have decreased PM profits by $40 million...
      Furthermore, a quote shows us that PM curries favor with legislators by targeting its corporate grants to areas of "special interest to key elected officials." It also shows us how PMopportunistically creates public relations value for itself from natural disasters by ceremoniously presenting state governors with checks for disaster relief:
        Expand involvement of Corporate in making grants to public policy organizations and continue identifying grants that are special interest to key elected officials. Also take advantage of Disaster Relief Budget to involve governors in check presentations.
      A separate item (a letter) shows that Governor Thompson attended a PM Board of Directors dinner in 1992, and while there assured PM CEO (Michael Miles) that he would have direct access to the Governor for "items of mutual interest"

  • 00/12/30 Obituary Cig Ad Placement a Bad Idea
      Giant cigarette manufacturers who insist on running newspaper ads to promote deadly products have to be extra picky about where ads get placed. It's a real bummer, for example, if your ads get placed next to the obituaries in the newspaper, as happened here to Philip Morris (ironically, over and over).
        We have numerous complaints regarding Marlboro insertions that ran in your newspapers. The following details those problems:
        Paper Date Brand Problems
        Harrisonburg New-Record, VA 10/16/84 Marlboro Lights Ad ran opposite obituaries
        San Angelo Standard, TX 10/23/84 Marlboro Red Ad ran opposite obituaries
        Norwich Sun NY 10/23/84 Marlboro Red Ad ran opposite obituaries
        Stuttgart Daily Leader, AK 10/30/84 Marlboro Lights Ad ran backed by anti-smoking editorial...
        Athens Daily Post, TN 10/23/84 Marlboro Red Ad backed by American Cancer Society ad...

  • 00/12/28 Industry's "Youth Programs" Help Avoid Regulation TI?, Jun 10, 1985
      As we have already seen, the tobacco industry's "youth programs" help the industry deflect effective tobacco control legislation, regulation and increases in tobacco taxes. Such "kids don't smoke" programs also give the industry an aura of "self-regulation" which helps curry favor with, and give political cover to legislators who serve and protect the industry from regulation. This document is essentially the transcript of a talk given by a member of the Tobacco Institute. In the talk, he is bragging about how about how the Tobacco Institute's "Helping Youth Decide" was used to help the industry avoid just such regulation:
        Our representatives in New Hampshire and Maryland...used program to help head off sampling and transportation ad bans in those states respectively ... In Wisconsin, TI's Responsible Living Program was used a couple of weeks ago ... to avoid attachment of a sampling ban to a measure establishing an 18-year minimum cigarette sales age. In California ... In California, TI's Anne Browder testified, 'Helping Youth Decide' [helped] our people defeat half-cent cigarette tax increase earmarked for anti-smoking 'education' in the schools...

  • 00/12/26 Raising Taxes Promotes Quitting, Reduces Consumption PM, Jan 12, 1990
      According to Philip Morris' surveillance in California after the 1989 cigarette tax increase, raising cigarette taxes is an extremely effective way to reduce overall cigarette consumption and promote quitting. Here's what PM found:
        Effective January 1, 1989, the California cigarette tax rate was increased from 10 cents per pack to 35 cents...Relative to smokers in other states, Californians reduced their cigarette consumption [and] increased their quit rates... Californians smoked fewer cigarettes per day in 1988 than others in the rest of the country and even fewer in 1989 than 1988. The difference in their consumption rates between the years is almost three times as large as the difference for the rest of the sample...Californians also quit smoking more frequently than those in the rest of the country.
      So, both pro-smoking and anti-smoking forces agree that raising taxes on cigarettes is a highly effective way to promote public health--and it produces revenue for the government (or for more anti-smoking programs) to boot. This data should go a long ways towards encouraging more states to raise cigarette taxes.

  • 00/12/25 Spinning the Info on Secondhand Smoke PM, May 26, 1987
      By the 1980s, there was no longer any serious scientific doubt that exposure to secondhand smoke was detrimental to human beings. . . PM's "strictly confidential" words, previously unseen by the public, provide a stark outline of the company's frightening underlying global agenda against public health. . .
        End Goals:
      • Resist smoking restrictions
      • Restore smoker confidence
        • Prerequisites:
      • Reverse scientific and popular opinion
      • Restore social acceptability of smoking
      • Preserve product liability defences.
      Part of PM's routine strategy to fool the public about the dangers of secondhand smoke was to create its own independent "third party" allies who would act as "independent experts," and "spin" the issue its way in public testimony and the media. PM's intent to deceive the public is clearly revealed in this document, which says (of ACVA Atlantic, PM's "third party ventilation expert"):
        ACVA must be perceived to be at arm's length from the industry, including media briefings. Its role at most should seem as yet another third party expert amongst others.
       PM has never come clean about techniques like this that they have used to fool the public, nor have they publicly apologized for the damage they have done to public health by using such deceit. And yet in innumerable television and magazine ads today PM is casting itself as a socially responsible company. It was recently suggested that if PM truly wanted to be a socially responsible company, their ads would show PM employees hauling free oxygen concentrators, portable oxygen tanks, free nasal cannulas and tracheostomy supplies to the millions of sickened and homebound victims of their products.

  • 00/12/24 Tobacco Industry says Bans are Most Effective TI
      According to the Tobacco Institute itself, by far the most effective means of reducing cigarette consumption is to enact public and workplace smoking restrictions. In addition, the industry reports that in the absence of its own invasive social and cultural interference, overwhelming popular support exists for smoking restrictions in both eating and workplaces. . .
        Our 1984 Roper survey found increasing support for separate sections for smokers in public places, especially in eating and work places. A decade ago, about half the public favored separate smoking and nonsmoking sections in restaurants. Today, 90 percent do.
      Furthermore, the industry describes with hard numbers the extreme effectiveness of workplace smoking bans, saying that even the mildest smoking restrictions have a profound effect on the country's overall cigarette consumption rate:
        Those who say they work under restrictions smoked about one-and-one-quarter fewer cigarettes each day than those who don't. That may sound light but remember we're talking about light restrictions, too. Those 220 people in our survey who work under smoking restrictions represent some 15 million Americans. That one-and-one-quarter per day cigarette reduction then, means nearly 7 billion fewer cigarettes smoked each year because of workplace smoking restrictions... That's 350 million packs of cigarettes. At a dollar a pack, even the lightest of workplace smoking restrictions is costing this industry 233 million dollars a year in revenue.
      Thus there should no longer be disagreement in any sector about which measures are most effective in decreasing tobacco consumption across the board: public and workplace smoking bans.

  • 00/12/13 Philip Morris: Discreetly Threatening, and Worse PM, Feb, 1992
      This document summarizes the goals and activities of Philip Morris' European Science and Technology Unit in 1992.
        Demonstrate to lawmakers that, under the changed economic climate, the pursuit of outdated socioeconomic policies could easily become politically suicidal...Discreetly assist Third World countries in denouncing WHO's misleading anti-tobacco campaigns and in demanding discontinuation of these campaigns, in view of the potential damage they may otherwise cause to Third World economies and welfare.
      And even as recently as 1992, Philip Morris is shown here as bucking the common knowledge that tobacco use is bad for you, saying that one of their goals was to:
        Remove the 'moral' base of anti-tobacco legislative efforts by exposing the fallacious nature of most anti-tobacco allegations.
      For any who may be left who believe Philip Morris' current, far-reaching platitudes that "we've changed," the following passages reveals with crystal clarity the real reason WHY Philip Morris is trying so desperately to appear socially conscious: to taint juries who may serve in future trials against them:
        The Creation and Cultivation of Goodwill for Philip Morris - (This is not a "motherhood" objective). Goodwill is essential for succeeding in crucial situations, such as litigations (need for friendly witnesses and a good image of the Company), submissions to legislators (development of mutual trust with the bosses and sympathy of the staff), public debate (again trust and mutual respect). . .
        The creation of IAI, an independent international association on indoor air quality was discreetly solicited by S&T and put into effect by key ARIA members (ARIA is an association of our consultants. The name stands for Associates for Research on Indoor Air).

  • 00/12/11 Beneficial Additives: Medicating the Masses? PM, Mar 19, 1981
      In this Philip Morris document, Beneficial Additive Cigarette, scientists glibly and easily kick around the idea of medicating the general public for dental caries, reducing anxiety, cold symptoms, improving moods, etc. through cigarettes. Their frequent references to how careful they must be not to trigger FDA regulation makes one realize how important the FDA's "interference" is in protecting people from physical and chemical tinkering at the hands of the tobacco industry's "shade-tree pharmacists." . .
        Cigarettes delivering therapeutic agents, physiological effects, mood changes, or reducing dental caries, anxiety, colds, etc. received much discussion. Although cigarette filler is a relatively poor delivery device, tipping paper can be coated and the agents may be delivered orally. The questions of potential FDA jurisdiction and PM's inability to advertise these benefits was raised.
      Notice how ideas like introducing compounds into cigarettes that reduce oral plaque, freshen breath and reduce odors are considered good, while Idea #20, brushes off the obvious:
        Additives to reduce biological acitvity are not considered worth pursing at this time....The idea might be worth pursuing when we have identified specific compounds responsible for activity.

  • 00/12/07 Menthol and Nicotine 'Impact' PM, Mar 29, 1995
      A number of documents (including this one, which relates results of a study done at Philip Morris' overseas lab for biological studies, INBIFO ) reveal that menthol enhances the sensory, or drug effect, of nicotine.
        It was found that menthol increased 'impact' for the low nicotine delivery cigarette...as a function of the menthol content. . . It was concluded that menthol has a pronounced effect on nicotine-derived 'impact.'
      The term "impact" when used in industry documents is frequently offset in quotes. In position papers, Philip Morris' official definition of the term "impact" is a "feeling sensation rather than odor or taste." They further compare it to the carbonation in soda pop or the spicy heat in chili peppers. People who have worked inside the industry, though, tell us that "impact" refers to the drug effect of a substance, particularly nicotine. In reading large numbers of documents, it is interesting to see that Philip Morris performed many (and what appears to be the majority) of its human biological studies internally on their own R&D (Research and Development Department) employees. What could have been the reason that PM avoided using outside subjects? What could have been the effect on the employees?

  • 00/12/05 Control of 'Grasstops' Government PM, Mar 30, 1993
      This 1993 document, Grasstops Government Relations, is a basic but very thorough description of the strategies Philip Morris (PM) uses to achieve such powerful influence over legislation in the U.S. PM has analyzed virtually every part of a legislator's world, and misses no opportunity to exert influence, even to the point of currying favor with a legislators' spouses:
        We also make sure that we know the legislator's -- and his or her spouses -- favorite philanthropies and try to support them. . . We make sure legislators are aware of, and invited to, promotional and cultural events funded by Philip Morris. . . [W]e try to keep Philip Morris out of the media on issues like taxation, smoking bans and marketing restrictions. Instead, we try to provide the media with statements in support of our positions from third party sources, which carry more credibility than our company and have no apparent vested interest...we create coalitions of third party sources to help carry our baggage on issues. For example, on excise taxes, we work with state and local CARTS, the acronym for Committee Against Regressive Taxation...restaurant owners on smoking bans...retailers on the minimum age issue...and influential groups like the Association of National Advertisers on marketing restrictions. ..Finally, we try to change the focus on the issues. Cigarette tax become[s] an issue of fairness and effective tax policy. Cigarette marketing is an issue of freedom of commercial speech. Environmental tobacco smoke becomes an issue of accommodation. Cigarette-related fires become an issue of prudent fire safety programs. And so on.
      [T]he long-term failure of American legislatures to enact meaningful tobacco control in the face of recognition of the current epidemic of tobacco-induced disease is testimony to the astonishing effectiveness of this one company in controlling the machinations of governments.

  • 00/12/01 Total Ban on Advertising? No Big Deal PM, Apr, 1986
      As this document demonstrates, whatever laws they may choose to enact, governments are powerless to reign in the disease-spreading activities of Philip Morris, which laughs at advertising bans, viewing them as opportunities that lead them to new and more pervasive marketing ideas, like creating Marlboro fashion wear and Marlboro travel vacations (which of course constitute not cigarette ads, but clothing and travel ads, respectively). . . Note how Philip Morris violates not only the spirit of the law, but when it deems that the risk of being caught is sufficiently low, also the letter of the law:
        Finally, we even advertised in some periods when the risk of being fined was perceived to be lower.
      Note the use of terms in this document like "para-advertising," "diversification" and "co-advertising" that denote ways they get around the Italian ad ban. . . Also, note the introduction of promotional techniques that are particularly damaging, like Philip Morris' new "World Tennis Championship of Doctors" featuring tennis-playing professors. . . This document is a primer on how cigarette corporations get around government regulations and in the doing, work their way even deeper into the cultures of different countries.

  • 00/11/28 The PR War & Discontent with the Industry PM? 1990
      It isn't often you get to read something that shows that fear inside the tobacco industry, but here is one such document. Ten years ago the industry noted that a former staunch ally, the Economist magazine, did a 180-degree turn, printing an article that stated that tobacco "...kills about 3M people a year around the world, and the number is rising fast" The article went on to cite the "...obvious self-interest and fraudulent arguments of the tobacco and alcohol lobbies..."and actually called these entities "lying killers." . . The paper explores the reasons for the public's "discontent" with the tobacco industry.
        The pressure against us is growing at a frightening speed...Defeat, like fear, is contagious. Once people sense surrender is in the air, the collapse of the whole operation can come with enormous rapidity....The collapse of South Vietnam is a graphic case in point.
      The writer then lays out a strategic plan of action to deal with the dire situation. Once again however, opposite to the industry's 1954 pledge in the "Frank Statement" that it intended to work with public health entities, their strategy consists of fanning the flames of doubt about its products, utilizing third parties to do the industry's bidding, and carrying on "offensive" media campaigns. But perhaps the most important strategic point made by this paper, is the reason why preserving advertising and sponsorship is so important to this industry. These activities buy them a host of extremely powerful supporters. Losing these supporters would devastate the industry's power base because it would drastically cut the industry's political and media clout.
        If one takes the pessimistic view of present trends, the tobacco industry could lose almost all its political clout within two years. Overstated? Not really. If you take away advertising and sponsorship, you lost most, if not all, of your media and political allies.

  • 00/11/27 Application of Pesticides in Turkey PM, Dec 4, 1989
      This document gives us an idea of the laxity of procedures in application of pesticides to tobacco in developing countries. This (Philip Morris) document reveals that not only was very little if any attention paid to the safety of the workers applying the chemicals, but also little if any monitoring of the application of the pesticides to the tobacco itself. With an unregulated, monitored and uninspired product that people regularly take into their bodies, a situation such as this could be a problem.
        Treatments are conducted under tarpaulin (tent) of selected tobacco stacks within dealer storage areas...No monitoring is PH5 gas concentrations during application, gassing, or degassing periods are performed...Neither monitoring pumps or gas concentration tubes were available for use by State license fumigators. . . Two phosphine accidents occurred in 1988 from lack of pesticide safety knowledge: (1) at one location four employees were informed they could enter a phosphine tarpaulin treatment area because an expert assured them "there was no problem, the gas will not hurt you." All four had to be taken to a local hospital for phosphine gas exposure.

  • 00/11/21 Smoking and Attention Deficit Disorder PM, Jun 13, 1977
      Philip Morris scientists hypothesize that adult smokers are hykerkinetic children who have grown up, and who are now self-medicating with cigarettes. The writer draws a parallel between Ritalin and nicotine, saying,
        ...the stimulant characteristics of nicotine enabled [smokers] to control some of their behavior problems just as Ritalin does for today's children.
      It is also interesting that the report says that smokers are more impulsive and have more accidents than nonsmokers. To test the hypothesis about whether adult smokers are hyperactives who are self-medicating with nicotine, the PM scientists sought ways to monitor children for a number of years to see if there was a preponderance of smokers among adults who, as children, were diagnosed as being hyperactive. It appears that having to gain parental consent for such a study might have been a roadblock...
        Although school system records would seem best suited for such research...restrictions on access to records,...[and] on the use of children in research without the informed consent of their parents will keep us out of the school systems until the rules are rewritten...

  • 00/11/20 PM: Create a Public Backlash, Motivate People to Fight Gov't PM, Dec, 1990
      This is an outline of the Philip Morris Tobacco Company's (PM) strategic plans to fight workplace smoking bans in Europe. . . It is interesting that the very governments that permit this company to operate within their borders are unaware of this company's workings to incite the people against the government. . . Also, note PM's intent to concoct surveys which reflect its own ideas, and to hide behind "respected polling firms": . . Also,notice how vastly expensive and grandiose plans roll so easily off PM's planning docket--strategies that public health entities could never afford to employ, like publishing books, commissioning videos and training and touring around speakers to speak on their behalf:
        --Identify speakers such as sociologists, psychologists, freedom advocates, etc. and place them in appropriate speaking forums....
        -- Publish a book or series of articles on past and present paradoxes of free and democratic societies.
        --Commission a video of the future when drinking milk is only by prescription.
        --Mail articles and books to liberal journalists and freedom issues likely to generate support on the principles involved.<        /ul>

    • 00/11/14 The Marboro Man Eats Veggie Fajitas PM, Jul 15, 1992
        In the early 1990's, . . Philip Morris sought to re-make the image of the Marlboro Man into a new-age, sensitive pop icon that would appeal to these new-age sensitive guys of the 90's. They sought to alter the cowboy-icon's image from "Cowboys are outlaws. Cowboys are brutal. Cowboys eat pork and beans. to "Cowboys are kind. Cowboys eat grilled vegetable fajitas...Cowboys dance with wolves." . .

          New Myth:

          Cowboys are sensitive.
          Cowboys are advocates of the land.
          Cowboys are Indians.
          Women are cowboys.
          Cowboys ride the range with their wives.
          Cowboys have principles.
          Cowboys are kind.
          Cowboys eat grilled vegetable fajitas.

        In short, they sought to change the cowboy from a "John Wayne" image to a kinder-gentler "Kevin Costner" image. Of course, the marketing and promotional potential of this re-make was unlimited: promotional tie-ins could include piggybacking on the causes of land preservation and the environment, adding expensive silver and turquoise Indian jewelry to the Marlboro Gear catalog, offering "soft adventure" vacations where smokers could go rafting and hiking at the Marlboro Ranch... And oh, the appeal to women!

    • 00/11/13 PM, May 27, 1987: The Industry on Taxes, Liability, ETS and More
        This document, "Social-Political Context of Cigarette Sales and Use in the U.S. - 1987", is full of revelations. It analyzes the myriad problems facing the tobacco industry, including the decrease in the social acceptability of smoking, the proliferation of attempts to enact local public-smoking restrictions, product liability suits, the possibility of advertising restrictions, federal excise taxes, and legislation to require that cigarettes be fire-safe. The document is extraordinarily prescient, and shows us the industry is able to predict the future with great accuracy. It also tells us what it fears most andwhat really works to decrease smoking rates. . .
        • It is apparent that the effects of ETS on others is now the most powerful anti-smoking weapon being employed against the industry . . .
        • The problem with tax increases is that it does decrease consumption, just as desired by the social engineers posing these increases want to see. . .
        • If legislation is passed [mandating fire-safe cigarettes] it would probably be necessary to modify several aspects of current cigarette construction. This could have a negative impact on per unit costs. . .
        • This gloomy picture of 1987 and beyond must be interpreted in terms of opportunity as well as challenge....A threat to the industry can be an opportunity for the company which can find consumer acceptable answers to the types of challenges discussed in this memo. . .
        Let us also not forget that one of the keys to this industry's miraculous survival has been its tendency to view threats as opportunities (one example is the introduction of filter cigarettes in response to the "health scares" of the 1950's and 60's--a move which made the industry more profitable than ever)

    • 00/11/11 PM: Cigarettes Saved the Earth! PM, Apr 17, 1975
        My instinctive reaction to the movie of the cat whose appetite for mice is blocked by nicotine is that we should arrange as promptly as possible a showing on national television.... .The film could be tested "as is" and also with an accompanying narrative which spells out its implications for the world of people. There might be several versions of such an accompanying script. Perhaps the most hard-hitting claim would be to come right out and say that the Indians kew what they were talking about when they spoke of the "peace pipe" and that we believed Leonid Brezhnev, cigarette smoker, was somewhat less likely to push his side's atomic war button than a Leonid Breshnev whose cigarettes had been taken away from him.

    • 00/11/9 Creating the Appearance of Controversy B&W? Sep, 1979
        By the mid-1970s, public health agencies had done a good job of getting word out to the public that tobacco caused deadly diseases. Science had proven the case and all that remained to be done was to keep spreading the word to the public. But rather than cooperating with public health agencies, as the industry promised in its widely-published "Frank Statement" of 1954, ("We always have and always will cooperate with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health.") the tobacco industry took it upon itself to whip up the appearance of a "controversy" about smoking and health where there really was none at all. The goal was stated succinctly by William Kloepfer, public relations manager of the Tobacco Institute, in this 1979 internal document:
          Our objective is to bring a seemingly closed subject back to the level of controversy in the public's mind.
        How how many people might never have started smoking, and how many lives would have been saved worldwide had the tobacco industry not worked so hard, and invested so much money and years of effort, into the fight against public health?

    • 00/11/8 The Odor Of Free Nicotine 'Will Almost Bowl One Over' B&W? 1971
        "Project Mad Hatter" was designed to
          maximize the desirable constituents of smoke and minimize the undesirable ones. . . we are in a nicotine rather than a tobacco industry . . . Another easy test of free nicotine odor and irritation involves smelling some as it is eluted from a gas chromatograph. -- a small amount will almost knock one over and the aroma is apparent.
        If the aroma and irritation from a small amount of free nicotine is so powerful that it can "almost knock one over," and since the industry has greatly increased the amount of free nicotine in cigarettes since the 1960's, how can this industry justify opposing laws banning indoor smoking? This is an admission that this substance is physically irritating. (Unless, of course, they hide such internal insights about free nicotine from the public, legislators and boards of health.)

    • 00/11/3 SAWP's "Countermeasures" against Health RJR, May 20, 1979
        In the late 1970's eleven major tobacco companies around the world joined together to form the International Committee on Smoking Issues, or ICOSI. The purpose of ICOSI was to determine how the companies would deal with the global proliferation of smoking restrictions and the unilateral decline in social acceptability of smoking around the world. A subcommittee of ICOSI was formed called the Social Acceptability Working Party or SAWP. This document is an update on SAWP's progress in coming up with a plan to reverse the decline in the social acceptability of smoking. We can see clearly from this document that the anti-tobacco arguments that were most most damaging to the industry and most effective at reducing the worldwide smoking rate and were 1) secondhand smoke and passive smoking, 2) the social costs of smoking on society and 3) the discourtesy of smoking in front of others. SAWP concluded that the negative attitudes about smoking, if left unchecked
          ... will eventually solidify into strong beliefs -- creating even further pressures for the suppression or banning of smoking in public places.
        The conclusion of the working party is expressed boldly, in caps, and underlined:
          WE MUST START TRYING TO MOLD PUBLIC OPINION FAVORABLY ON THE SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF SMOKING.
         If it were not for the tobacco industry's actions, the global smoking rate would have continued to decline, and the death rate from tobacco use would have declined along with it. The tobacco industry's actions set world health back many decades. For this they offer no apology and no acknowledgement, but instead are asking us to simply forget their actions.

    • 00/11/1 Hill and Knowlton: an Expose PM, 1992
        This document, Health and Morality -- Tobacco's Counter Campaign, should be mandatory reading. It is a historical account describing the key part that the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton played on behalf of the tobacco industry in obfuscating the link between tobacco use and disease. . . The document is authored by John W. Hill II, and was sent to Murray Bring . . .
          The stakes in this ongoing public relations battle are enormous. On one side of the ledger is the health of more than 200 million teen-agers and adults. One (sic) the other side are [the] profits, even survival, of the tobacco industry in dependence on the 55.8 million addicted smokers as of 1988.
        Furthermore, to his credit, Hill later broke completely with the industry's tactic of forming front groups to protect profits:
          Over time John Hill had stoutly asserted that paper groups established by a client to promote a cause under the guise of being independent should be eliminated from the public relations profession. 'The right of free speech also carries the obligation that the source of it will be open for all to see,' he wrote. 'It is not the work of public relations--let it always be emphasized--to outsmart the American public by helping management build profits.' But in fact the TIRC was essentially a front for the public relations work of the industry, created to blunt the growing threat to the cigarette makers' enormous profits.

    • 00/10/29 TI: Bad Kid Ads Show Smoking As Unhealthy, Repugnant TI, May, 1982
        Tobacco industry-created "kids-shouldn't smoke" programs are designed to assure children in a subtle way that smoking is a really positive choice that one can look forward to making in the future. This industry puts forth its own "youth programs" because campaigns designed by anti-smoking groups "present[ed] smoking as repugnant and unhealthy." According to this Tobacco Institute document, the goals for the tobacco industry's "kids don't smoke" campaigns include
          offset further erosion of the industry's image in this area, reverse political trends and gain recognition of our efforts from public service organizations and public officials.
        But the goal of reducing or eliminating the problem of nicotine addiction among youth remains conspicuously absent. . .
          Federal and local legislation has been proposed to deal with the [youth smoking] issue. And, naturally, anti-smoking groups have spent a good deal of time and money discouraging youngsters from smoking. Unlike our proposed project, they present smoking as repugnant and unhealthy.

    • 00/10/23 CTR & "Public Relations" Pseudo-science PM, Jun 24, 1974
        This confidential Lorillard memorandum was faxed to Philip Morris by the law firm Shook, Hardy and Bacon. It was found in a file called "Cipollone Problem Documents," referring to an early liability lawsuit against the industry. It reveals that the "smoking and health research" programs that were carried on for so many years by the tobacco industry's jointly-funded Council on Tobacco Research (CTR)
          have not been selected against specific scientific goals, but rather for various purposes such as public relations, political relations, position for litigation, etc.
        Carrying on "smoking and health" research projects that secretly were designed to benefit the industry's public and political relations gave the industry cover to claim to the unwitting public for many years that they were spending millions on research into smoking and health and "haven't discovered anything conclusive." It gave the appearnce that they were "doing something" about the smoking and health problem, and had the added bonus of creating "studies" that benefited political perceptions of their product.

    • 00/10/22 Philip Morris Battles Health Efforts In Asia PM, Jun 15, 1989
        PM feared a ramping up of health efforts in Asia, and also feared the efforts of American health groups to draw world attention to the cigarette industry's Asian export practices. There was (and probably still is) very good reason for this: Asian cigarette exports account for a huge portion of the tobacco industry's profits. Note the astounding statistic that PM itself reveals on the vast importance of Asian cigarette exports to their bottom line:
          We should remember that U.S. cigarette exports to Asia account for close to 70% of our volume and 97% of our profits
        PM further responded to increased tobacco control efforts in Asia by expanding their "Whitecoat Project" into Asia. They successfully pulled in additional funding from the R.J. Reynolds and Brown and Williamson tobacco companies to help expand the project into Asia:
          PM, RJR and B&W agreed to fund a network of ETS scientists in Asia. Candidates have been identified in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Philippines and Thailand.... At the end of a training session in late June we will have a core of 10 scientists who are fully trained on the issues, ready and prepared to make a contribution by way of writing articles, briefing government officials and so forth
        This document reveals the deep, pervasive, damaging (and very effective) interference that these powerful American tobacco companies exert on the government, culture and health affairs of foreign countries in which they are permitted to do business.

    • 00/10/20 The Marboro Man is Gay PM, Feb, 1994
        This document is the result of a a focus group session done by a market research company to try and find out which types of imagery (in this case, which poses of the Marlboro Man) would sell cigarettes to gay men.
          Maintaining the highest share of the gay market, Marlboro imagery is fairly instant and clearly dominated by the Marlboro Man. Among gay consumers, this image has particular importance as an overt cue to masculinity/sexuality. Marlboro's success in this context depends wholly on the relevance of this cowboy image to the world (fantasy and real) of these gay consumers. . . NEGATIVES: . . Common . . . Has a regular job; nothing out of the ordinary. Drives something American, a few years old. Blends in with the world. . . He could be a good friend but probably not much past that. Maybe a great one-nighter, but no one you'd want to spend everyday with. What would you talk about? Drag racing? False masculinity... Tries real hard to let you know how butch he is. No real confidence. Macho. / Only dances if he's drunk. Redneck.. Likes to square dance . . . All the worst qualities of straight men rolled into an attractive gay man.

    • 00/10/17 Countermeasures Development Program PM, May 20, 1979
        This is a speech made in confidence by a Philip Morris representative to the members of the global tobacco industry at a meeting of the International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI). . . Note the warlike tone . . .
          We must also have countermeasures going directly to the antis. We can no longer ignore them....Between government and the antis, there is now mutual support. In many countries, it is hard to tell the antis from certain branches of government. That's the reason why the industry has to start attacking the antis directly with countermeasures. . . But in developing countermeasures, I believe we mustn't forget that a state of war does exist... Countermeasures are weapons, or combinations of weapons....We must produce a continual supply of the AMMUNITION.
        This clandestine speech before members of the global tobacco industry is in stark contrast to the public rhetoric the industry published in the "Frank Statement" of 1954, wherein they said:
          We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business. . . We always have and always will cooperate with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health.
        Should an industry that publicly promises to protect public health while secretly declaring war on public health be trusted? How about five years later? Ten, or twenty years later?

    • 00/10/16 TI Issue Strategy: Deflect, Redefine, Broaden TI, Apr 10, 1985
        This is a confidential speech . . . about the the difficulties the industry faces from the environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) issue. . . it says clearly that the most effective way to reduce smoking overall is to enact smoking bans:
          The logical appeal of smoke-free air is irresistible to politicians, commentators, even some smokers. It is the most effective way to reduce smoking.
        If WE say smoke-free laws are effective at reducing the overall smoking rate, and the INDUSTRY confirms this same thing (as the Tobacco Institute does in this document) then there is no longer any disagreement that smoke-free laws are entirely beneficial to public health. Legislators should take note that both anti-tobacco advocates and the industry are in complete agreement on this point. . . Also, in this document the president of the Tobacco Institute admits that few people (or entities) other than the tobacco industry itself are motivated to oppose smoking restrictions:
          We seem to be trying to protect a population without a popular will to join the resistance.
        Thirdly, the document reveals the industry's acknowledgment that secondhand smoke exposure will never be proven safe:
          We need to be candid with ourselves in recognizing that it will never be established that there are no effects [from ETS exposure].
        And lastly, Mr. Kloepfer's speech lays out the tobacco industry's game-plan for dealing not only with the ETS issue, but with most of the other damaging issues they have faced:
          To summarize, the direction we are headed will be to deflect this [ETS] issue, to redefine it, to broaden it, to demonstrate as we have in the case of accidental fires and youth behavior that we are contributing to the solution rather than to the problem.
         The triple-strategy of 1) deflecting the issue, 2) broadening the issue and 3) appearing to contribute to a solution is seen repeatedly in the documents and it is how the tobacco industry deals with issues that are damaging. This document will definitely be important to quote from at public hearings for smoke-free laws.

    • 00/10/15 Marketing Strategies For Camel RJR, Mar 10, 1988
        This marketing proposal for RJR's "Camel" brand reveals the goals of cigarette marketing: to appeal to basic human needs and emotions. I was particularly struck by the controlling language used in this piece, e.g., "Force a one-on-one relationship between the brand and the smoker," and "Forces the smoker to study the pack...". I was also unsettled by the exploitation of basic human emotions, particularly those of younger people, as marketing tools: greed, avarice, mating rituals, humor, the need to be admired, vanity, etc. This piece may be helpful for media literacy instruction, as it reveals that the "science" of advertising can be quite offensive to us "targets."
          Purpose: Create a 1989 theme or "big idea" for Camel that accommodates the following... 1) Merges the brand's 75-years of authenticity...and masculine independence into the mind-set of an 18-24 year old target smoker. 2) Uses the Camel brand as a psychological bridge between the target and their fantasies. 3) Integrates as many of the target's basic emotional drives as possible....Force a one-on-one relationship between the Brand and the smoker...Welcome the target smoker into the concept and allow he/she to personalize it to their own interpretation and fantasies.... Concept: Focus attention on Pack history, authenticity and intrigue... Execution: Use a series of mysteries, missing items, changed visuals and folklore, with direct incentives for "studying" the Pack. Forces the target smoker to physically pick up the pack, scrutinize it and show it to his/her friends.

    • 00/10/13 History Of Tobacco Industry Advertising PM, Aug, 1987
        This document, while marked "confidential," was produced outside the industry. It is a fascinating chronology of the history of cigarette advertising by Dr. Richard Pollay, a professor of marketing. It gives an insight into the industry's invasive advertising tactics that can only be had by taking a historical look at the industry's advertising behavior.
          1917 -- Rivalry between CAMELS and LUCKY STRIKE involves scandalous rumors. American Tobacco suspected by R.J. Reynolds of disseminating rumors of salt petre in tobacco, and factor workers with leprosy and syphilis. Claims that agents would enter streetcars, one from the front and one from the rear, and hold a loud conversation about these...and then exit to repeat again and again. R.J. Reynolds posts $500 reward notices. . . 1925 -- Women consuming 5% of total cigarettes... 1935 -- 20% adult women smoking.

    • 00/10/12 TI 'Fire Safety Program' And Increased Fire Deaths TI, Sep 18, 1986
        Four years after the Tobacco Institute started its "Fire Safety Program," the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reported that the rate of fire deaths in the United States had jumped by an astounding 20% in residences and 18% overall ("the largest one-year jump in decades") showing that the Institute's vastly expensive "Fire Safety program" had been a dismal failure at reducing fires. . . Today's document is a letter from the president of Tri Data Corp. to the Tobacco Institue and Covington and Burling that reflects the Institute's primary area of concern about these statistics. Note that concern was not the increase in
          NFPA has just released the latest (1985) fire statistics. The news is very bad. Fire deaths jumped up in 1985, by 20% in residences and 18% overall. This is the largest one-year jump in decades... We can assume...that deaths from careless smoking will be sharply higher, too. Since smoke detectors are perceived by the fire service as close to saturating the market, there may well be pressure to turn to new approaches -- like fire safe cigarettes.

    • 00/10/11 TI on Fire Service: 'Support for Hostiles = Innoculation' TI, May 9, 1989
        Todays document is a report on the Institute's activities dealing with the "Accidental Fire Issue." It contains some telling information and telltale handwritten notations by Martin J. Gleason of the Tobacco Institute. For example, the document mentions Andrew McGuire, who was the director of the nonprofit Burn Council, which was a counseling and education organization based at San Francisco General Hospital. Mcguire was an outspoken advocate of the need for a self-extinguishing cigarette. . . . McGuire's strong public health/consumer advocacy made him an enemy of the tobacco industry. Fittingly, Gleason's handwritten comment by McGuire's name says simply, "Discredit" -- underlined twice. . . But perhaps Gleason's most telling handwritten comment on this document about TI fire service programs says, "Cont[inue] support for hostiles -- innoculation" indicating that the tremendous financial support the tobacco industry gave to the the fire service carried with it the expectation that it would neutralize their opposition."

    • 00/10/03 Osdene (of PM): "I will act on them and destroy" PM, Undated
        Philip Morris conducted biological research on the health effects of tobacco and cigarettes at INBIFO, research that was performed offshore to keep the information it revealed out of PM's files in the U.S, since if it were in files in this country it would then be subject to discovery in a lawsuit. If these documents were subject to discovery, then people could find out what the company knew, when they knew it, and what they were doing in Cologne, Germany. . .
          OK to phone and telex (these will be destroyed).... ... If important letters or documents have to be sent please send to home -- I will act on them and destroy.

    • 00/10/01 Fighting Free Choice: Battling Voluntary Restrictions TI, Undated
        In complete contrast to its public statements about freedom of choice, the industry aggressively opposes people's free choice to enact smoking restrictions. Today's document is a speech by Peter Sparber of the Tobacco Institute. Sparber, speaking to the executive board of the Institute, reveals the industry's aggressive plans to beat back a flood of voluntary actions on the part of business owners to make their workplaces smoke-free.
          The voluntary restriction of smoking by businesses, associations, public agencies and even labor unions is one of the most damaging and most insidious challenges we face.... We have opposed public smoking laws by arguing that such matters should be voluntary. Now that they are increasingly voluntary, what do we think? ..This morning we are prepared to outline a program to deal aggressively and efficiently with the voluntary restriction of smoking by businesses, labor unions, public agencies and other private organizations.
        The speech also reveals the industry's intent to gain support of labor unions through a system of grants and legislative favors. . .
          Overall we will create the sense that organized labor will not tolerate smoking restrictions ..We also propose a financial relationship with organized labor.
        But the real reason the industry wanted the support of labor unions . . . was to influence the smoking policies being made by corporations and agencies:
          Organized labor is of vital importance, but ultimately, it is not labor that we want to influence. Corporations and public agencies are our first targets.

    • 00/09/30 The 'Frank Statement' of 1954 TI, Jan 4, 1954
        The publication of the Frank Statement marked the beginning of the industry's long-term plan to disseminate misinformation about the health effects of tobacco to the American public. . . Their statement contradicted what medical consensus had shown by that time, namely that tobacco use caused cancer and other respiratory diseases. Furthermore, the industry had not produced any evidence showing that their product was not injurious to health. Rather than cooperating as they promised with "those whose task it is to safeguard the public health," history reveals that the industry's actions instead have been 1) to criticize studies by independent scientists that reveal the hazards of their products, 2) generate a sense of controversy about the health effects of their products . . . 3) misrepresent the safety of its products by continuing to advertise their products as though they were safe . . . 4) marketing to children by using cartoon characters and exploiting the adolescent phenomenon of peer pressure, 6) chemically adjusting their products to enhance addiction . . . and mask the warning properties of smoke (adding "smootheners").
          We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business. We believe the products we make are not injurious to health . . . We always have and always will cooperate with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health.

    • 00/09/29 "The base of our business is the high school student" Lorillard, Aug 30, 1978
        This is the famous Lorillard memo which states flatly,
          "the base of our business is the high school student.
        It was written by a member of Lorillard's sales force refers to the "in status" of the Newport brand among young people. The recipient of the memo was Curtis Judge, the President of Lorillard. Despite this acknowledgment from his own field sales force that children formed the basis of their company's cigarette business, just a few months later, in May of 1979, Mr. Judge wrote a letter to Joseph Califano (Secretary of Health Education and Welfare) in response to accusations that the industry's advertising appealed to children. In the letter, Mr. Judge denies any attempts by his company to appeal to children. Judge said,
          For many years Lorillard has avoided directing the appeal of its advertising to young persons....Everyone, including Lorillard, agrees that children should not smoke...We neither direct the appeal of our advertising to children, nor do we encourage them to start to smoke. In sum, Mr. Secretary, we do not advertise to children and do not intent to do so in the future. [Letter from Curtis Judge to Joseph A. Califano Jr. 19790517]

    • 00/09/28 TI, 1981: The problem of fire-scarred victims
        The industry fought fire-safe cigarette proposals, stating that such changes would "unduly [affect] the nature of the product." They proposed instead that all furniture manufacturers make fire-resistant furniture. . .
          Neither industry response has been particularly effective in offsetting fire scarred victims interviewed by the news media and paraded before legislative committees.
        If the industry appeared to lack somewhat in empathy for the victims of cigarette fires, though, they nevertheless realized they had a formidable legislative problem on their hands . . . the tobacco industry embarked on a vast public relations campaign to create the appearance of concern about fire safety, particularly to legislators. The campaign propsed PR activities like putting out "fire safety calendar" in conjunction with local fire service agencies urging people, for example, to take care around their Christmas trees. Less known to the public, however, was that the campaign included giving extraordinary levels of financial support to firefighting agencies nationwide. The campaign was highly successful, ultimately buying the silence of the fire service industry on the subject of self-extinguishing cigarettes, and turning fire service agencies nationwide into allies for the tobacco industry when it came to heading off fire-safe cigarette legislation.

    • 00/09/22 Monumental industry addiction blooper PM, Dec 4, 1982
        In 1981 George Mackin, Director of Sales for Philip Morris, United Kingdom gave a presentation to the Retail Confectioners' and Tobacconists Association in Majorca. An article based on his speech was subesquently published in the trade journal Confectioners, Tobacconist Newsagent on December 4, 1981. In describing to retailers the value of selling cigarettes, George wrote:
          Cigarettes are not just habit forming -- the body builds up a requirement for them. Twenty million smokers cannot do without their weed. Take the example of a man going to work in the morning. It is pouring with rain. . . Would he stop for a newspaper? Would he get wet for a kit kat? . . The answer is probably No, but he would stop for his fags, because he is addicted to cigarettes. And while buying a pack he takes a morning paper and a Kit Kat. With 20 million regular smokers in this country, there is an enormous traffic opportunity built up exclusively on tobacco -- and a lot of it could come your way.
        Frank Colby, Associate Director of Scientific Issues in the Research Department at R.J. Reynolds (RJR) was NOT amused, and on January 26,1982, fired off a note to Samuel B Witt III, Esquire at RJR which he entitled
          With Friends Like This, We NEED Enemies

    • 00/09/21 Philip Morris' 'Merit Awards' program (death)PM, 1994
        This document is a promotional mailing from the Philip Morris tobacco company (PM) which contains coupons for discounts on Merit cigarettes. PM sent this particular mailing to a deceased customer, dead at age 51-- from smoking Merit cigarettes. The caregiver of the deceased's 94 year-old father returned the promotion to PM with the following note:
          Dear Ms. Suter, Mrs. Williams died 21 months ago from smoking your product. Do not send any more of your stuff to this address again. I am her father's (94 yrs) non-smoking caregiver. The 94 year old is a nonsmoker. Mrs. Williams was a beautiful 51 year old. I feel sorry for you people.

    • 00/09/18 TI removing the rights of Americans TI, Dec 10, 1992
        Andrew Tisch brags about the Tobacco Institute's pervasive interference in the democratic process:
          In state and local affairs, we have, with a few significant exceptions, enjoyed a remarkably successful 1992. Of more than 1,000 anti-tobacco pieces of legislation, regulation or voter initiatives, just 65 were approved....Smoking bans and restrictions were proposed in 32 states and passed in just 9....Bans on sampling and promotional distribution of tobacco products were proposed in 23 states and were defeated in 22. Retail or vending sales restrictions were proposed in 31 states and defeated in 26....Legislation mandating "fire-safe" cigarettes was introduced in five states and defeated in all....Campaigns were mounted to qualify...tax proposals for ballots in Colorado, Oregon, Nebraska and Arkansas. Thanks in large measure to Institute efforts, none made it.
        But obviously, the tobacco industry noted the relative success rate of tobacco control efforts at the local level, so their next step was to remove Americans' rights to pass local laws, as evidenced by this chilling passage:
          We know that the most effective way to address these local issues is to urge adoption of statewide laws that prohibit local action. To date, we have succeeded in doing just that in 8 states. We have targeted another 17 in 1993.

    • 00/09/17 PM: Dealing with employee demoralization at PM
        This document makes it clear that Philip Morris management realizes it isn't easy to be an employee of the world's biggest manufacturer of a deadly product. Here, they outline the need for a program that will "reassure and comfort" PM employees and help them deal with the demoralizing aspects of their employment. In this document, it becomes clear that PM is (or was) in complete denial about the devastating effects of their products. . . After reading this, one could easily believe that such "feel good" ad campaigns as PM is currently putting on (PM feeds the hungry, gives to domestic violence shelters, etc.) are as much for the benefit of their own employees as to try boost their public image. . .
          Public awareness of the health and social issues surrounding smoking is very high. This is mainly due to what they see and hear in the media. . . As a result of these popular beliefs, public tolerance of smoking and tobacco companies' commercial activities have declined to a point where both smokers and companies are in danger of becoming social pariahs. . . Instead of knowing nothing the reaction we should aim to engender in our employees may be something like this: "These are complex issues but since joining PM I've learnt that there is another side to the story." A full briefing on the social and health issues surrounding smoking would be beneficial for both the sales force confidence and for helping them to handle objections in a more professional, informed manner.

    • 00/09/16 TI: Smokers don't rebel TI
        The Tobacco Institute (TI) did its best to fight the initial airline smoking ban, saying it would cause a smoker rebellion and carrying on "non-public" actions like prompting tobacco company employees and employees to write letters to the Department of Transportation and Congress opposing the ban. This letter-writing network, which encompassed not only tobacco industry employees but employees of their subsidiaries, like Kraft and Nabisco, was often used by the Tobacco Institute to skew the appearance of public opinion to agencies and legislators on tobacco issues. The network was called the Tobacco Action Network, or TAN. The Tobacco Institute never denied that secondhand smoke exposure in aircraft cabins was dangerous. Rather, they deflected attention from the problem of ETS exposure by broadening the issue into one of overall air quality, taking the discussion into addressing problems on aircraft with "ozone, cosmic radiation, microbes, viruses." Perhaps of more interest, though, is the admission in this document that, much to the Institute's frustration, a rebellion by real smokers failed to materialize. Instead they noted that smokers went along with the ban easily, with no hint of "rebellion." This typical real-life reaction of smokers to smoking bans is completely counter to the industry's repeated predications (even now) that mayhem and economic devastation will occur from such bans.
          [B]y all accounts, implementation of the ban went very smoothly. This really isn't surprising...smokers are law-abiding and reasonable people. At same time, we were somewhat surprised that there weren't at least a few random incidents since there was little public discussion of the ban until the day it went into effect....

    • 00/09/16 PM doesn't want you to quit PM, Apr, 1992
        By 1992 it was solidly established that cigarettes kill consumers. Yet even in face of conclusive evidence that its consumers were likely to suffer cruel and suffocating deaths, the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM) didn't want smokers to quit. By 1992 a number of nicotine replacement therapies had entered the market. PM was clearly threatened by these "competitor" products which, as they coldly put it, would "accelerate decline of the cigarette industry" by "enhanc[ing] the success rate of quitters who permanently leave smoking." Moreover, PM kept track of what they termed the "Gross Industry Smoker Loss" they incurred due to the nicotine replacement patch products storming onto the market. Hmmm....according to recent commercials, PM feeds the hungry, brings water to flood victims and supports domestic violence shelters. Pretty socially conscious company, right? But wouldn't you think that a truly socially conscious company would be just a little bit kinder to their own consumers, the millions of addicted smokers out there who are desperately seeking ways to avert an early death?
          Approximately 23% or 11.7 million smokers try to quit every year. 3.5 million claim to quit in the past year. 2.4 million stay quit for the year. Nicotine patch could potentially accelerate decline of cigarette industry in several ways
          Encourage more smokers to try to quit
          Enable more triers to actually quit
          Enhance success rate of quitters who permanently leave smoking

    • 00/09/13 Ode to PM (a.k.a. 'Crackpot letter')PM, Feb 11, 1986
        Philip Morris's legal department keeps an entertaining file entitled "Crack Pot Letters." It contains some amazing stuff. Following is a unique and powerful ode penned by a gentleman from Michigan who seems to have a good grip on tobacco issues. . .

          The soothing taste of your despicable ware
          Rolled and sold by those who don't care
          Centuries ago a ritual of peace
          You've turned into a murdering thief . . .

          Your advertisers prey on dreams they invent
          To ride the wide range is the road to content
          Millions of dollars and millions of lives
          Pave the road you've built over those who have died

    • 00/09/11 Less Educated: Today's Trend, Tomorrow's Market RJR, 1985
        Less educated people are more likely to smoke, and the tobacco industry preys upon the less educated as target markets for their products. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the R.J. Reynolds document, " Less Educated: Today's Trend, Tomorrow's Market," which gives us insight into the sociological observation and the depth of scrutiny that cigarette companies give their most productive markets. The document portrays "acceptance of purposelessness" as a "trend" for the less educated. One charts shows that Marlboro, Winston and KOOL are the cigarettes of the younger and less educated population sectors. . . Furthermore, the writer discusses the need to target the wants of the less educated for "style, prestige and status," outlining how RJR should "leverage" the psychological needs of this group:
          Need for self-esteem, Need to feel in control, Need for security, Need for structure.
        People are likely to say there is nothing new or unique about the fact that companies evaluate their markets, but how many members of the consuming public have actually been privy to these evaluations? How many have actually gotten to see how major corporations analyze, study, classify and ultimately regard their consumers? Thanks to the release of the tobacco industry's documents, we now have access to a large cache of such information.

    • 00/09/09 PM on Nicotine and heart disease PM, Mar 26, 1980
        In this Philip Morris (PM) internal memo, PM scientist Ray Fagan indicates that nicotine may lower the heart's threshold to ventricular fibrillation, an inefficient pumping mode wherein the heart "flutters" and fails to pump blood efficiently. Fagan further observes that this condition can result in sudden death:
          This type of arrythmia is frequently the cause of sudden death in cardiovascular disease.

    • 00/09/04 PM, Nov 1, 1972: 'Sounds like cigarettes are addicting...'
        This 1972 Philip Morris (PM) internal memo, Electromyographic Studies of Muscle Relaxation in Smokers, establishes the fact that PM knew that cigarettes were addicting way back in 1972, fully 22 years before the '94 congressional hearings wherein the tobacco CEOs testified that they didn't believe nicotine was addicting. This PM employee states quite frankly that:
          What it sounds like at the moment is that cigarets are addicting and the reaction of the inveterate cigaret smoker is like that of any drug addict.
        Also note the PM employee's understanding that his company lacked a reputation for "'intellectual honesty and integrity" when it came to scientific research, as he intimates that tobacco industry-financing for the study would have to be hidden from the public view if they intended to "market" the results of this proposed study:
          The market promotion value of this work, assuming it is valid, may be negated by the fact that it was done in an independent institute financed by a cigaret manufacturer or by the tobacco industry. Only if the work were done under the auspices of an institution with a well-established reputation for intellectual honesty and integrity would this be worthwhile.

    • 00/08/30 RJR's crack-puffing baboons RJR, Feb 9, 1989
        RJR hired a research lab to do an experiment. In the experiment, they made baboons smoke Premier cigarettes laced with crack cocaine, and then they analyzed the animals' blood for cocaine content. The reason for this bizarre experiment became clear after reading the conclusions of the scientist who conducted the test: it was to find out whether the Premier cigarette functioned adequately a drug delivery device. . .. From the phrasing of the conclusion, it was apparent that RJR hoped that a substantial amount of cocaine would be found in the baboons' blood after smoking the crack-laden Premier cigarettes. Note this apology by the scientist conducting the experiment:
          I am sorry to hear that the samples from the animals who smoke Premier cigarettes loaded with crack were relatively low in cocaine content...I listed several possible interpretations [of why this might be the case], including: ... 4) The Premier really does not serve as a drug delivery device.
        Since the tobacco companies insist that cigarettes aren't drug delivery devices (and indeed they fought this charge very strongly at the FDA), you would think the RJR Tobacco Company would have been happy about these findings-- wouldn't you?

    • 00/08/27 Roper to the rescue TI
        It appears that beyond the functions of just taking polls and doing surveys, however, the Roper organization actually took it upon itself to design studies that would return beneficial results for the tobacco industry. . . This is a proposal from the Roper Organization to do a study that would help diffuse the charge that smoking leads to death by returning results supportive of the Tobacco Institute's "Constitutional theory"--that is, the theory that it is the fault of the smoker that he gets sick and dies, and not the fault of the cigarette or manufacturer. The "Constitutional Theory" asserted that smokers had some sort of biological defect that predisposed them to excess, e.g., caused them to live hard, drive fast, eat too many achovies, get divorced, and generally feel more stress than nonsmokers, etc.
          However, as a result of many years of work in the tobacco field, some of it for the Tobacco Institute, we have developed a different thesis that we think merits testing. . . It is our thesis that if a proper study were done, a type of person who is inclined towards excesses could be identified and described and that cigarette smoking would merely be one of many "symptoms" that would identify such a person. If true, such a study would: a) help to establish the smoking and health data as associative, not necessarily causative; and b) suggest the desirability of future research, medical and otherwise, on the constitutional theory--the kinds of people that are inclined towards excesses, and ultimately whether the excesses are merely descriptive or may be contributory, if not directly causative. . . We propose a large sample for the conduct of this study.... It will have to be large...in order to be psychologically impressive.

    • 00/08/23 PM's Global ETS Conspiracy PM, Feb 17, 1988
        This amazing document reveals Philip Morris (PM) as the ringleader in a global conspiracy to create and maintain a controversy about the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). The project, (conceived by Philip Morris and later named "The Whitecoat Project" after the white coats that scientists wear) proved to be a tremendously expensive undertaking, even for PM. To this end, PM arranged this 1988 meeting to describe their plan to their British counterparts and then to solicit financial support for their activities:
          Philip Morris presented to the UK industry their global strategy on environmental tobacco smoke. In every major international area (USA, Europe, Australia, Far East, South America, Central American and Spain) they are proposing, in key countries, to set up a team of scientists organized by one national coordinating scientist and American lawyers, to review scientific literature or carry out work on ETS to keep the controversy alive...
        This document, and others discovered by ASH UK that prove that PM actually carried out these plans, vindicate public health workers who have so long been working to warn the world's populace about the dangers of secondhand tobacco smoke. When up against the clandestine global effort of the Philip Morris Tobacco to obscure the truth, however, it has been nothing short of an epic battle. The efforts of Philip Morris have left the world's people decades behind where they should be in eliminating people's exposure to ETS

    • 00/08/22 Image of Feminine Cigarettes? Trailer Trash, chemicalsT PM, Dec, 1991
        This is a report of a 1994 focus group session done for Philip Morris to investigate what sort of images women have of "feminine" cigarette brands, like Misty and Virginia Slims. On page 6 is a section entitled, The Image of Specific Brands. In this exercise, women were asked to report the key types of images they had for each given brand of cigarette (a kind of "free association" exercise). I was taken by the strongly negative images that these women associate with almost all brands of cigarettes! A few images these women associated with "feminine" cigarette brands included: "grandma," "tacky," "cheap," "chemical," "asbestos," "Jesse Helms," and "trailer trash."

    • 00/08/19 PM, 1994: PM: Smoking bans lead to 20% quit rate
        States and countries that want to reduce smoking among their citizens need look no further than this conclusive acknowledgment by the Philip Morris Tobacco Company (PM) that workplace smoking bans lead to a 20% Quit Rate among cigarette consumers. What better way than to use PM's own data to show legislators that workplace smoking bans definitely do achieve a higher quit rate among citizens. (Thanks, PM!) Plus, since about 80% of smokers want to quit, a statewide workplace smoking restriction law would be invaluable in helping these citizens exercise their freedom of choice.
          Fact: Bans/Restrictions Affect Consumption: 20% Quit Rate w/ U.S. Workplace Bans Increasing Restrictions will have negative impact on P/L [profit/loss] . . Conclusion: . . --[smoking bans have] a Big and Direct Impact on bottom line and is Potentially Irreversible.

    • 00/08/18 'Medical Experts' say ditch stronger health warnings TI, Apr 30, 1969
        Given the conclusive evidence we now have that smoking is the leading cause of preventable death worldwide, and given the growing epidemic of tobacco-induced illness worldwide, the testimony of these distinguished "medical experts" for the Tobacco Institute is amazing and utterly shameful. How many lives could have been saved if "distinguished medical experts" like these had not given such grossly misleading testimony to the government and the public? Doris L. Herman, M.D., a Los Angeles pathologist, A former president of the American Medical Women's Association, Dr. Bernice C. Sachs of Seattle, dean of Perugia University Medical School, Dr. Lucio Soveri, a pathologist, Travis W. Winsor, M.D., a University of Southern California heart specialist
          Joshua Harold Burn, M.D., former head of the pharmacology department at Oxford and a visiting professor at Washington University in St. Louis, told the committee that "there is a growing body of evidence that nicotine is stimulating and useful to man" in the amounts found in cigarettes. . . A Chicago physician said the same thing about atherosclerosis, another illness which has been statistically associated with smoking. Dr. Walter S. Priest, a professer-emeritus of medicine, warned of "psychic trauma" if smokers are continually confronted with unreasonably frightening warnings.

    • 00/08/15 PM's battle plan against health PM, 1994
        Here is Philip Morris' (PM) definitive battle plan outline for use against governments and health advocates worldwide. . . It is interesting that in this document PM refers to tobacco control advocates as "competitors" rather than adversaries. In their view, health advocates threaten to take away their market share, just as another cigarette company would. It is also interesting to see how PM considers itself virtually alone in this epic battle. Taking note of the dismal lack of support and coordination it has achieved with the other cigarette makers in its quest to obfucate truth, the writer comments that "PM Appears to be Driving the Industry both issue-wise, Dollar-wise, and political-wise.